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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I study coordination or collaboration settings that are either
within company or at inter-organizational levels in the form of three essays. In the
first essay, I study the relationship between a client and a vendor in value co-creation
environments such as knowledge intensive services. I consider that the client gets
utility from the project throughout the development period. The output is contingent
on the effort levels of each party and I allow these effort levels to be dynamic. Hence,
the client needs to optimally decide the terms of the payment so as to maximize the
project output and minimize its cost. In my second essay, I study another value
co-creation environment. In this case, unlike the first essay, I assume that the effort
levels are not observable but might be monitored. In both essays, I analyze the
performance of different contracts and find the best one for the client in diverse
settings. Among several other results, I derive the conditions under which the client
chooses not to observe vendor’s effort level and operates in a double moral hazard
environment. In addition, I show that the remaining time of the project and the
client’s valuation of the project regulate the behavior of the effort levels and some
other characteristics in the collaboration.
In the third essay, I consider a subscription based rental organization, such as
Netflix and Blockbuster. In these environments, the satisfaction of customers de-
pends on the availability of requested products. Hence, it is important for these
firms to satisfy as much demand as possible. Recommender systems, in a DVD-
rental context, are typically used to help customers in finding the right movies for
them. However, recommendations can be utilized to shift demand among movies
considering the inventory level and future demand to increase the number of satis-
ii
fied customers or profitability. I address this issue by considering inventory in the
optimization of recommender systems. I present several results that could be uti-
lized by managers in order to make important tactical and operational decisions.
Results suggest that the proposed approach may improve profitability of the firms
substantially.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Value Co-Creation
Management of services has increasingly become more sophisticated and chal-
lenging. Attaining high productivity and efficiency levels in service supply chains
has been argued to be difficult because of many factors such as higher customer ex-
pectations for better service with higher quality and lower prices, loosely structured
delivery processes, shorter product life cycles, tailoring of products or services to
meet customer needs, and in particular, significant customer involvement through-
out the process (Bettencourt et al. 2002). In the first two essays in my dissertation
that are presented in Sections 2 and 3, I contribute to the literature by studying the
involvement of customer firms in generating a service in a dynamic environment in
different settings.
1.1.1 Traditional versus Collaborative Environments
I begin with illustrating the traditional vendor-client relationship in Figure 1.1(a)
where the efforts of two parties are substitutes. In such settings, the client (referred
to as she) offers a payment to the vendor (referred to as he) based on her business
requirements and the vendor assumes the whole responsibility in the generation of
the service if he accepts the offer. Then, based on the vendor’s performance in
the creation of the service, the client receives value and makes a payment to the
vendor. In the operations management literature, the relationship between a client
and a vendor so far has been mostly studied in such traditional settings (Cachon and
Netessine 2004). However, the specifics of the client-vendor relationship is changing
towards creating value through value co-creation in service environments (Toppin
and Czerniawska 2005, Roels et al. 2010) that is illustrated in Figure 1.1(b).
1
Vendor 
Rejects
Business 
Requirements
Payment
Contract 
Design 
Service 
Generation
No Collaboration
Output
Client
Vendor 
Accepts
Vendor
(a) Traditional Vendor-Client Environment
Vendor 
Rejects
Business 
Requirements
Payment
Contract 
Design 
Value-Cocreation
No Collaboration
Output
Client
Vendor 
Accepts
Vendor
(b) Collaborative Vendor-Client Environment
Figure 1.1: Traditional versus Collaborative Vendor-Client Relationship
As shown in Figure 1.1(b), value co-creation implies that joint efforts are required
from both the client and the vendor in order to create and deliver the service. Ser-
vices are becoming more complex, unstructured, and tailored to fit unique needs of
particular clients (Bettencourt et al. 2002). Therefore, in order to attain successful
outcomes, clients must participate in the creation of the services. In effect, clients
get involved in the service projects in (i) the problem definition stage, (ii) the se-
lection of the solution, and (iii) the implementation of the solution. For example,
in engineering and R&D projects, the client may provide critical input in the form
of know-how or specialized equipment, and assist the vendor in all stages of the
project (Plambeck and Taylor 2006). On the other hand, the clients often rely on
the expertise of their vendors that may bring in knowledge or components that are
required for the success of the research. The value co-creation environment presented
in Figure 1.1(b) can be called a general collaborative service or knowledge intensive
service. Some examples of such services are information technology (IT) outsourc-
ing, software projects, auditing, consulting, financial planning, engineering projects,
and R&D projects (Cohen et al. 1996, Cachon and Netessine 2004, Løwendahl 2005,
Roels et al. 2010).
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1.1.2 Contributions
Collaborative business environments have been studied with the application of
contract theory, e.g., cross-functional coordination (Kouvelis and Lariviere 2000)
and supply chain coordination (Cachon and Netessine 2004). The contracts which
are related to my work are in the domains of general collaborative services (Roels
et al. 2010), construction (Bajari and Tadelis 2001), legal services (Rubinfield and
Scotchmer 1993), and call centers (Hasija et al. 2008). However, none of these studies
focuses on the dynamics of collaboration between the parties. Most of the supply
chain collaboration literature has focused on static settings where the effort levels
are stationary (Cachon and Netessine 2004). However, it is not always necessary for
the parties to keep their effort levels constant throughout the collaboration.
Further, the literature generally focuses only on the final outcome and disregard
any on-going value that is useful from the moment it is generated until the end
of the collaboration. However, the relationship between a vendor and a client in
a collaborative environment is usually an on-going process and dynamic in nature.
Hence, any manager working with projects that are developed in useful increments
should consider on-going value (Pigoski 1996). These increments might be different
modules of a project or software that are useful to the client by themselves, or
valuable knowledge co-created through the collaboration. Accordingly, other than
some extension sections, I consider that the project’s terminal value is less important
compared to the on-going utility received from the collaboration, and can be ignored.
This applies to cases where the parties work together until the end of the useful life
of the service (Currie and Galliers 1999). For example, a system or application being
developed in a collaborative project may become an essential part of the client’s
business during its development. One specific example is IT environments, where
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the systems are usually built and enhanced using the incremental development until
the end of their useful lifetime, and the client can use the intermediate versions
of the system (Pigoski 1996, Currie and Galliers 1999). Other examples include
financial services, marketing, and continuous service improvement programs where
the ongoing utility is essential and there is collaboration until the useful life of the
service (Bhuiyan and Baghel 2005). Further, in some of the extension sections in the
following sections, I consider scenarios where the client receives value both during
and at the end of the collaboration. Note that a special case of such setting includes
environments where the value is received only at the end of the collaboration.
In addition, collaboration, with a focus on dynamic environments, has not re-
ceived considerable attention in the literature (Erhun and Keskinocak 2011). Kar-
markar and Pitbladdo (1995) point out the importance of the involvement of cus-
tomers in the service delivery process, and call for explicit modeling of service co-
creation. According to Hopp et al. (2009) and Roels et al. (2010), there are many
promising research opportunities pertaining to the management of service opera-
tions. With the first two essays in this dissertation, I respond to these calls by
analyzing a dynamic setting that requires joint efforts from a client and a vendor for
the generation of the output.
In the first essay that is presented in Section 2, I examine pure revenue sharing
settings and the settings where the payment between the client firm and vendor firm
depends on the effort spent by the vendor firm. In particular, I focus on the following
contracts: (a) the effort dependent contract, (b) output dependent contract, and (c)
the hybrid contract. In the second essay of my dissertation that is presented in
Section 3, I further consider that the effort levels of both parties are not observable
or verifiable. However, they can be monitored (with some cost) if the client chooses to
do so. Based on whether the effort levels are observed or not, I study two contracts
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in Section 3. In the first case, effort levels are not monitored. Hence, a double
moral hazard problem arises and the contract can be written only in terms of what
is observable or verifiable. Therefore, in this case, an output dependent contract
is utilized which might also be thought of as a revenue-sharing agreement. In the
second scenario, the effort level of the vendor is monitored, and subsequently, an
effort dependent contract is administered.
In Sections 2 and 3, I utilize a differential game approach in a single client and a
single vendor setting. Differential games can be considered as a fusion of game theory
and optimal control theory. Hence, they incorporate strategic decision making and
continuous change simultaneously. Dockner et al. (2000) provides a general discussion
of differential games. However, as Cachon and Netessine (2004) state, because of the
inherent difficulty in solving differential games, there are a few studies that utilize
differential games in operations and supply chain management literature. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first study that considers differential games in a
value co-creation environment.
Based on the solutions of the models, I derive several useful managerial insights
pertaining to many aspects of the value co-creation environments. Most importantly,
I answer the questions regarding how the client should manage the collaborative
relationship. Specifically, I identify which type of contract is better for the client
under various scenarios. I find in Section 2 that, as long as the sensitivity of output
to vendor’s effort is not very high, the effort dependent contract is better than the
output dependent contract for the client. On the other hand, if the output is very
sensitive to the effort of the vendor, then the client should offer payments based on
output in order to give enough incentive to the vendor to spend more effort and
generate more value together. If the client’s contract selection also includes the
hybrid contract and if the output is moderately or highly sensitive to vendor’s effort,
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it is better for the client to utilize a hybrid contract. This implies that the vendor
should be offered a share of the output, as well as payments related to the effort
he spends in the generation of the output. If the output is not much sensitive to
vendor’s effort, the client should prefer an effort dependent contract.
In addition, my analysis in Section 3 reveals whether the client should monitor
vendor’s effort or not, and how the severity of the double moral hazard problem
changes across scenarios. I find that the vendor’s effort should not be monitored
when the participation cost of the vendor is very low. Further, my results show
that the client should not monitor vendor’s effort if the sensitivity of output to
vendor’s effort is relatively higher than the sensitivity to client’s effort. I also derive
the optimal payment terms for these contracts and the evolution of the equilibrium
effort levels. Furthermore, I explore some extensions of the models.
1.2 Recommender Systems in DVD Rental Firms
The explosive growth of Internet has enabled easy access to a vast amount of
information and led to the e-everything phenomena. E-commerce businesses grew
into multi-billion firms like e-marketplace Amazon.com, or e-entertainment firms
Netflix and Blockbuster. Amazon.com offers many different items, including millions
of e-books for its kindle customers (Amazon.com 2011). Likewise, Netflix carries
more than 140,000 different movie titles (Liedtke 2012). This is an overabundance
of information for both firms and their customers (or users). Hence, finalizing a
decision to buy or rent from the huge collection of these firms is a rather challenging
task for the customers.
These firms can increase customer satisfaction by providing proper information to
abridge the decision processes of their customers (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003, Murthi and
Sarkar 2003). To this end, recommender systems are increasingly being used by elec-
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tronic retailers to help customers find the products they are looking for (Senecal and
Nantel 2004). Recommender systems can reduce the information overload and search
complexity of the customers, and improve their decision quality (Xiao and Benbasat
2007). The tailored recommendations are also shown to increase both sales and
customers’ shopping experiences (De et al. 2010, Pathak et al. 2010). Hence, recom-
mender systems are regarded as vital tools in sustaining Internet economy (Shapiro
and Varian 1999).
E-entertainment firms, such as Netflix and Blockbuster, offer subscription based
plans to their customers through DVD by mail or online streaming and use recom-
mendations in both services. As I discuss later, DVD by mail business is vital to
these firms because of the operating losses in online streaming, especially in inter-
national markets (Netflix 2012). Accordingly, the CEO of Netflix points out that
they want to keep their DVD businesses as healthy as possible for many years ahead
(Grover and Edwards 2011). Therefore, in this paper, I mainly focus on the DVD
by mail businesses of these firms.
Rating 
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Ratings Selection of
Recommendations
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Recommendations
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Utility
Probability of 
Asking for Movies 
by Customers
Demand
(a) Conceptual Working of Recommender Sys-
tem without Consideration of Inventory
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Demand
(b) Conceptual Working of Recommender Sys-
tem with Consideration of Inventory
Figure 1.2: Significance of Considering Inventory in Recommender Systems
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1.2.1 Significance of Considering Inventory in Recommender Systems
In Figure 1.2, I illustrate the conceptual working of recommender systems with
and without the consideration of inventory. In this study, inventory accounts for
not only the current status but also the expected future rentals and returns. When
the inventory is not considered in the recommendation decision, then, as shown in
Figure 1.2(a), first the recommender estimates customers’ ratings for each movie.
Next, the movies with high estimated ratings are recommended to the customers.
This conceptual recommendation environment is user centric, i.e., it is designed to
find out the movies that each customer will value the most (Schafer et al. 2001).
Past studies have suggested that recommendations help the firm in shifting demand
among movies − as if they were advertisements (Fleder and Hosanagar 2009). Hence,
the recommender systems that are solely based on estimated ratings (without explicit
consideration of inventory and its future pattern) do not fully utilize the effectiveness
of recommendations.
Therefore, the conceptual model presented in Figure 1.2(a) does not result in
higher customer satisfaction if the DVD-rental firm is not able to ship the requested
movies to its customers. On the other hand, if the firm considers the expected request
and return patterns and better utilizes its inventory information in the generation of
the recommendations, it can shift the current demand among movies such that fu-
ture shortages (and, therefore customer dissatisfaction) are reduced more effectively.
To this end, Figure 1.2(b) presents the second conceptual framework that incorpo-
rates a feedback loop between the recommender system and the inventory. In this
framework, inventory is affected by the recommendations. In turn, this inventory in-
formation is utilized, along with expected request and return patterns and estimated
ratings, in the selection of recommendations that are shown to users.
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1.2.2 Prevalent Industry Practice
The prevalent industry practice is to offer movies that (i) are estimated to be
liked by customers (Hastings et al. 2008), and (ii) have immediate availability in
the inventories without consideration of expected rentals and returns (Shih et al.
2009). Because all available movies with estimated ratings above a threshold level
are recommended in the prevalent industry practice, I also refer to it as the all-
inclusive policy. The rationale for using such a threshold is to maintain the trust of
users on the recommender system (Tintarev and Masthoff 2007). In the long-run,
users would request the recommended movies less frequently if they perceive that the
recommender system offers movies that they do not like (Chen and Pu 2005, Kim et
al. 2009). The recommendation threshold is a good practice per se, however, it does
not necessarily maximize the satisfaction of customers because of the primitive use
of inventory information.
The DVD-rental firms should utilize the operational link presented in Figure 1.2(b)
and shift demand among movies effectively such that user dissatisfaction is reduced.
However, the focus of the industry is not on better utilizing the recommendations.
Rather, the focus of recommender systems has been on making better predictions,
running fast and efficient, being able to function with sparse datasets, or sometimes
offering a wider variety of products (Herlocker et al. 2004, Adomavicius and Tuzhilin
2005). Similarly, in DVD-rental firms the focus is on better prediction accuracy, e.g.,
see Netlix Prize discussed in Bennett and Lanning (2007). Academicians are also in-
creasingly recognizing the fact that the recommender systems are not utilized in the
most effective manner (Schafer et al. 2001, Bodapati 2008). I provide more details
in Section 4.1 regarding how DVD-rental firms can better utilize recommendations.
However, before that, I briefly outline my contributions in the following subsection.
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1.2.3 Contributions
My analysis is based on the policies observed from DVD-rental firms and the
discussions with managers of one such firm. In this paper, I answer several questions
that are of managerial interest in this industry. I first ask and answer the following
question: Does the usage of inventory information in recommender systems have a
significant impact on customer satisfaction? The answer is yes. The major drawback
of all-inclusive policy is that it is unable to shift demand from high-demand movies
(that have current or expected future shortages) to low-demand movies (that have
current or expected future excess supplies). In effect, I address the problem of finding
the best set of recommendations while explicitly considering inventory and derive the
conditions where the prevalent industry practice is not optimal. Besides, seemingly
reasonable or greedy heuristics are shown to be non-optimal. For some special cases
of the problem, I derive the optimal recommendation decisions that help managers
in understanding the structure of the optimal solution.
The second issue is about the quality of the inventory information. Here, I ask
the following question: Does the performance of my proposed method deteriorate
when the inventory information is inaccurate? The answer is not necessarily yes. I
find that the quality of the solution, i.e., expected number of unsatisfied customers,
is not very sensitive to underestimation errors. However, when the inventory is
overestimated, the quality of the solution is sensitive to the error. Interestingly, in a
critically balanced system, where demand and inventory for most movies are close,
my proposed solution approach may perform even worse than the prevalent industry
practice when the inventory is overestimated. Hence, if there is uncertainty about
the inventory levels, the firm should be conservative in the estimation, i.e., it should
underestimate its inventory rather than overestimate.
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The third issue I study is the trade-off between user trust in the recommender
system and the short-term profitability of the firm. In this context, I answer the
following question: How should the firms set the threshold in order to balance short-
term profitability and long-term trust if they utilize my proposed approach? The
recommendation threshold affects both short-term profitability (lower threshold is
better) and long-term customer trust (higher threshold is better). My analysis re-
veals that the answer to this question depends on other characteristics of the firms.
Therefore, the managers should be careful in setting the threshold level.
The fourth issue deals with the solution approach DVD-rental firms should em-
ploy. The problem I study is a stochastic problem. However, I carefully justify the
validity of a deterministic approximation in the form of an integer program and use
it for further analyses. The deterministic problem can be solved with two different
approaches. The first approach uses estimated values for rentals and returns, and
solves the optimization problem based on that. Secondly, I propose a practicable
dynamic solution approach where the future decisions are based on the observation
of actual rentals and returns in current and past periods. The question I ask is: Does
the firm have to solve the problem dynamically? The answer is “not always.” My
analysis reveals that it is beneficial for the firm to adopt dynamically in a critically
balanced system. However, if this is not the case, the firm may consider the solution
of the static approach. This might help them in saving the costs related to updating
parameter values and solving the problem in each period.
As discussed earlier, the focus of the recommendation literature and business
practice is mostly on achieving better prediction accuracy. Hence, Schafer et al.
(2001, p. 145) argue that the recommender systems should be made useful for the
firms in other ways and calls for research that better integrates recommendations
with other forms of techniques. In this direction, Bodapati (2008), Hosanagar et al.
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(2008), and Garfinkel et al. (2008) state that the recommendations may not be the
products that have the highest utility expectations. However, none of these studies
consider the impact of recommendations on demand, which is the focus of my paper.
In summary, my research is motivated from both industry and academic per-
spectives. My study brings a fresh perspective to the recommender system research
because I argue and show that recommendations should be tailored according to both
the tastes of the users and the inventory status, along with expected future demand
and returns.
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2. PURE REVENUE SHARING AND PAYMENT PER HOUR MODELS IN
VALUE CO-CREATION
2.1 Problem Definition
I study in this section a collaborative setting where a client and a vendor partici-
pate. In this section, I limit the discussion to pure revenue sharing contracts and the
contracts that solely depend on the effort level of the vendor as these contracts are
observed in business settings (Gil and Lafontaine 2012). In this setting, the client
tries to find the contract that will maximize the value she receives from the collabo-
ration, i.e., the difference between the value of the output and all costs related to the
collaboration. On the other hand, the vendor tries to receive the maximum value he
can receive from the collaboration. His value is the difference between the transfer
payment he receives from the client and the costs related to the collaboration. As
explained in the introduction section, the client or the vendor can receive on-going
value from the project. Therefore, I model the problem in the forms of differen-
tial games that differ in payment terms. In the next section, I introduce different
components of the models.
2.1.1 Input Parameters
The client’s and vendor’s effort levels are denoted by u(t) and v(t), respectively.
These can be regarded as resources, such as labor-hours, exerted by each party. The
effort levels are continuous variables, hence they are defined as functions of time.
In this paper, t denotes the time instance, and T represents the total time horizon.
The cost for client spending the effort level is modeled with a general power term
structure, i.e., ccu(t)
γ. The commonly used quadratic cost structure is a special case
of this modeling approach. In this formulation, cc is the cost multiplier for the effort
13
the client spends. I assume that γ is more than 1 in order to reflect the fact that the
marginal cost of effort increases with the level of effort. This means that the client
chooses her least costly options first. In a similar way, the cost for the vendor is
cvv(t)
δ with cost multiplier term cv and the cost elasticity term δ > 1. In addition,
γ and δ could be referred to as the costliness of client and vendor, respectively.
In this section, I assume that the effort levels are verifiable or observable. IT
enabled services and cross-located personnel mainly help in monitoring these ef-
forts. More specifically, Internet has facilitated real-time access to information
across supply chains that enables decision models and software to take actions for
streamlining supply chain operations (Swaminathan and Tayur 2003). RosettaNet
(www.rosettanet.org) and the GS1 (www.gs1.org) are global standards organizations
that enable collaboration and automation of transactions across industries and in
global supply chains (Erhun and Keskinocak 2011). These standards and other IT
enabled services have benefits such as real-time data transfer and automated com-
munication that enable firms to reduce contract costs, planning times, number of
manual transactions, and administrative costs (Erhun and Keskinocak 2011). Hence,
IT creates an environment that fosters timely reporting, interaction, and visibility
that are required in a co-value creation environment (Mentzer et al. 2000, Erhun and
Keskinocak 2011).
The settings that I focus in this section, i.e., collaborative or knowledge intensive
services, require even more than just IT enablers. The integrated parties in the
collaboration probably even have personnel located in the other party’s sites, they
may hold regular meetings, might have presentations, etc. Because of this high level
of integration between the client and the vendor, it is reasonable to consider that
the effort level of each party is observable. I assume in this section that the variable
portion of the monitoring costs are negligible. In addition, the fixed part of this cost
14
is sunk, hence I do not consider monitoring costs explicitly in this section. However,
in Section 3, I explicitly consider monitoring costs in modeling the problem. Clearly,
the cost parameters cc and cv can be easily estimated using the cost structures
of the firms. The cost elasticities of client’s and vendor’s effort level (i.e., γ and δ,
respectively) can also be estimated based on firms’ overtime policies, hire-fire policies,
etc. In the next section, I discuss the output parameters of the model.
2.1.2 Output Parameters
As discussed earlier, the client firms in many business settings get utility from the
output during the collaboration, not just at the end. However, I do not rule out the
possibility that the parties receive value also at the end of the collaboration as this
case is analyzed in Section 2.4. Therefore, I model the output that is denoted by q(t)
as continuous, doubly differentiable, strictly concave for positive effort levels, and
nondecreasing in effort levels. In addition, the instantaneous increase in output is
because of the collaborative work between the client and the vendor. Hence, both the
client and the vendor need to exert effort in order to increase the output. I consider
the output as a Cobb-Douglas function similar to other studies (Cohen et al. 1996,
Roels et al. 2010, Kim and Nettessine 2012). The Cobb-Douglas functional form
ensures that if one party exerts higher levels of effort, then the other party will have
incentive to do so as well. In effect, I model the instantaneous increase in the output
as q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β with α, β ≥ 0,1 and α + β < 1. Here, α + β < 1 is actually
related to the concavity of the output function. In effect, I do not need to assume
α + β < 1 if a set of more relaxed conditions, i.e., α < γ and β < δ holds. If these
relaxed conditions are also not satisfied, then it would mean that there is increasing
1Please note that the Cobb-Douglas functional form is flexible in the sense that it can represent
a setting in which the vendor assumes the whole responsibility in the creation of the output. This
is possible by setting α to 0.
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return to scale with respect to the effort levels. Clearly, it does not make practical
sense, and therefore this constraint is imposed.
Cobb-Douglass functional form can represent the speed of improvement in output
in different settings, e.g., in food and automotive industries (Cohen et al. 1996). The
parameters α and β represent the output elasticity or sensitivity to client’s and
vendor’s effort levels respectively. These parameters can be estimated using the data
from the past projects. It should be expected that the relative weight of the output
elasticity parameters will be different across different business settings. In a setting
where the vendor assumes almost all responsibility in the generation of the output,
it should be expected that α is close to 0. On the other hand, if it is a value co-
creation setting, then both of these parameters should be expected to be greater
than 0. Based on these conditions on the parameters, now I present the following
remark. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1 The following condition satisfies: (γ − α)δ − βγ > 0.
Since the client gets value from the project while it is being developed, the value
can be defined as ∫ T
0
kq(t)dt. (2.1)
In the above equation, k is used to convert the output to a utility measure. One
possible interpretation of k is dollar value per unit output. Hence, I also refer to k as
the valuation of the project. I would like to note that I do not discount the net values
of the parties. This is because, I consider the planning horizon as a short or medium
term. However, it is easy to modify the model for long term planning horizons by
including the discount factor. I find that the consideration of the discount factor
does not affect the key insights of this section. From the discussion above, q(t) can
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be written as:
q(t) =
∫ t
0
u(s)αv(s)βds; q(0) = 0. (2.2)
2.1.3 Payment Structures
As discussed earlier, the payment between the client and the vendor can be based
on the effort level of the vendor. In this section, I also examine the business settings
where the client firm offers a share of the output to the vendor firm. Specifically, in
this case, a pure-revenue sharing contract is used that is based on the output (Gil
and Lafontaine 2012). In addition, I also study a contract that is a combination of
both the effort level of the vendor and the output. I analyze these cases in three
different models. Since the planning horizon is usually short to medium term, I do
not discount the net values of the parties in the analyses. However, it is easy to
modify the model for long term planning horizon by including the discount factor. I
find that the inclusion of discount factor does not affect the key insights of the paper.
In the first model, the payment is based on the effort level of the vendor. In
this case, the payment between the parties is
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt where p ≥ 0. Here, the
parameter p denotes the payment per unit effort of the vendor. As will be explained
later, I optimize the parameter p in order to maximize the value for the client since
we are taking it as the dominant party in the collaboration. In the second model,
the client transfers a portion of the revenues or savings to the vendor. Hence, the
transfer between the parties is modeled to be
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt with l ≥ 0. I also optimize
the payment parameter l. Finally, in the third scenario, I consider that the payment
is due to both the effort level and the output, and define it as
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt+
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt
with p, l ≥ 0. I limit the discussion to these prominent payment structures or con-
tracts. I focus on analyzing their sensitivity with respect to different characteristics
of the parties, and compare and contrast these contracts. Table 2.1 summarizes the
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Symbol Definition
Parameters
cc Cost multiplier for client’s effort
cv Cost multiplier for vendor’s effort
k Valuation of the project (i.e., client’s value per unit output)
α Output elasticity (or sensitivity) to the client’s effort, α ≥ 0
β Output elasticity (or sensitivity) to the vendor’s effort, β > 0
γ Cost elasticity (costliness) of the client’s effort, γ > 1
δ Cost elasticity (costliness) of the vendor’s effort, δ > 1
T Length of planning horizon
Variables
q(t) Output at time t (state variable)
u(t) Level of client’s effort at time t (control variable)
v(t) Level of vendor’s effort at time t (control variable)
p Transfer payment per unit vendor’s effort (decision variable)
l Transfer payment per unit output (decision variable)
Table 2.1: List of Parameters and Variables in Section 2
variables and the parameters used in the model. Next, I focus on the details of the
model and the solution.
2.2 Model and the Solution
In the settings I analyze, the client is the principal and the vendor is the agent.
Building the discussion in the reverse setting is also possible without any further
complication. The client offers a business relationship to the vendor and the vendor
accepts it if the gain is more than his reservation utility. For simplicity, I consider
the reservation utility to be zero. However, with slight modifications, the results
apply to the cases where the reservation utility is positive. If the offer is accepted
by the vendor, both parties start working together and select and adjust their effort
levels dynamically. Now, I analyze each of the three models discussed earlier.
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2.2.1 Effort Dependent Contract
The client maximizes her value by optimizing the effort trajectory u(t) throughout
the planning horizon. Similarly, the vendor optimizes his effort trajectory v(t) for
all t. Hence, based on the earlier discussion, the objective functions of the client and
the vendor, and the constraints can be written as:
max
u(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt
}
,
max
v(t)
{∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt
}
,
subject to q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt ≥ 0;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
The Hamiltonians for the client and the vendor (i.e., Hc(t) and Hv(t), respec-
tively) can be written as below (Arrow and Kurz 1970):
Hc(t) = kq(t)− ccu(t)γ − pv(t) + λ1(t)u(t)αv(t)β,
Hv(t) = pv(t)− cvv(t)δ + λ2(t)u(t)αv(t)β.
Here, λ1(t) and λ2(t) are the adjoint variables for the client and the vendor re-
spectively. These variables can be interpreted as the change in the corresponding
objective functions of the client and the vendor for a small change in the state vari-
able q(t), i.e., the output (Sethi and Thompson 2000). In effect, the adjoint variables
are the marginal value of changes in the output for the client and the vendor.
The Hamiltonian for the client (i.e., Hc(t)) consists of two parts. The first part
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is the integrand of the objective function for the client, and the second part is the
adjoint variable λ1(t) times the right hand side of the state equation for the output.
For a given instance of time t, the first part represents the direct contribution to the
objective function of the client. The second part, however, characterizes the value of
the changes in the rate of increase in output due to the decisions made at that specific
time. Therefore, the second term represents an indirect contribution to the objective
function. Consequently, the Hamiltonian needs to be maximized in each instance of
time. In a given time instance, maximizing only the integrand would have been a
myopic solution because of ignoring the indirect contribution of the increases in the
output to the overall value. The maximum principle in dynamic optimization is a
way to decouple the continuous problem into a set of static maximization problems
in which the Hamiltonian acts as a surrogate objective to be maximized at each
instance of time t (Sethi and Thompson 2000). The Hamiltonian for the vendor (i.e.,
Hv(t)) can be interpreted in a similar manner. Now, I present the equilibrium level
of efforts for the client and vendor below in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium effort levels for the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
(
k(T−t)α
γcc
(
p
δcv
) β
δ−1
) 1
γ−α
; v(t) =
(
p
δcv
) 1
δ−1
.
The equilibrium level of client’s effort (i.e., u(t)) presented in Lemma 1 is strictly
concave and decreasing with time. Furthermore, the client exerts no effort at the
end of the planning horizon, because she does not have any utility from the collab-
oration after the project ends. Lemma 1 also implies that the equilibrium level of
client’s effort strictly increases as the payment per unit effort to the vendor (i.e.,
p) is increased. This result might seem counterintuitive, but can be explained as
follows. If the client increases the payment per unit effort to the vendor, the vendor
increases his effort level because he has a direct incentive to do so. In turn, the fact
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that the vendor is putting more effort into the project is an incentive for the client to
increase her own effort level. Hence, if the client pays more per unit vendor’s effort,
it essentially creates an incentive to increase her own effort level. This is in line with
the complementary nature of the business environment studied in this paper.
In contrast to the client’s case, the equilibrium effort level of the vendor (i.e., v(t))
is constant throughout the planning horizon. This equilibrium level is essentially
derived by equating the marginal gain of the vendor to the marginal cost of vendor’s
effort. This implies that vendor’s equilibrium effort strictly increases in the per unit
payment he receives from the client. Because neither of the marginal terms have time
components, the vendor’s effort stays constant throughout the planning horizon.
From a practical perspective, any increase in the transfer payment does not nec-
essarily result in an increase in the value the client gets from the collaboration.
Likewise, in the model I study in this section, the total net value the client gets from
the project is concave in the payment parameter p. More specifically, it increases up
to a specific level, and then starts to decrease. Hence, after substituting the equi-
librium effort levels presented in Lemma 1 into the client’s objective function, one
can obtain the optimum level of payment using the first and second order conditions
with respect to p. This optimal payment level is presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The optimal payment level per unit vendor’s effort is given by:
p∗ =
(
β(γ − α)γcc
α(2γ − α)δ
(
kTα
γcc
) γ
γ−α
) (γ−α)(δ−1)
(γ−α)δ−βγ
(δcv)
γ(1−β)−α
γ(1−β)−αδ .
By substituting this payment term in Lemma 1, one can derive the equilibrium effort
levels that maximize client’s value.
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2.2.2 Output Dependent Contract
In this setting, the client does not transfer payments based on the effort level of
the vendor. Rather, the client offers a portion of the output, i.e.,
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt, to the
vendor. More specifically, I analyze a pure revenue sharing contract here and there
is no notion of fixed payment between the parties in this setting (Gil and Lafontaine
2012). The costs for both the client and the vendor stay unchanged compared to the
first model. Hence, the objective functions of client and vendor, and the constraints
can be written as:
max
u(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt
}
,
max
v(t)
{∫ T
0
lq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt
}
,
subject to q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
lq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt ≥ 0;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
The equilibrium effort levels for the parties are now presented below.
Lemma 3 The equilibrium effort levels for the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
(
(T − t)δ
(
lβ
δcv
)β (
(k−l)α
γcc
)δ−β) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
;
v(t) =
(
(T − t)γ
(
lβ
δcv
)γ−α (
(k−l)α
γcc
)α) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
.
Here the equilibrium effort level of the vendor (i.e., v(t)) changes with time, in
contrast to that in the effort dependent structure. The reason is that in this case
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the transfer payment depends on the output that changes with time. Hence, there
is incentive for the vendor to adjust his effort level continuously. Moreover, effort
levels of both parties are strictly concave and decreasing in time due to Remark 1.
Besides, both effort levels converge to zero at the project completion time, because
there is no terminal value at the end of the planning horizon. The equilibrium effort
levels presented in Lemma 3 hold for any payment parameter l. After substituting
the equilibrium effort levels given in Lemma 3 to the objective function of the client,
it is easy to see that the value to the client is concave in l. Therefore, the first and
second order conditions with respect to l reveal the optimal payment parameter that
is presented below.
Lemma 4 The optimal transfer payment per unit output to the vendor is given by:
l∗ = k
β
δ
.
Hence, by setting the payment parameter l to the above level, the client maximizes
the value for herself. It is an interesting finding that this term does not depend on
the cost per unit effort terms, the sensitivity of the output with respect to client’s
effort, or the cost elasticity of the client’s effort. Moreover, the optimal share that
the client offers to the vendor l
∗
k
does not depend on any characteristics of the client.
Therefore, from the vendor’s point of view, the share he gets from a project depends
only on the sensitivity of the output to his effort (i.e., β) and the cost elasticity of his
effort level (i.e., δ). More specifically, the vendor is awarded with a bigger share of
the output when the output becomes more sensitive to his effort or if he can decrease
the cost elasticity of his effort.
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2.2.3 Hybrid Contract
In this contract, the objective functions of the client and the vendor, and the
constraints can be written as:
max
u(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt
}
,
max
v(t)
{∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt
}
,
subject to q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt ≥ 0;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
Deriving the closed form solution of this problem is not possible, because this
structure is similar to that in Abel (1881) that has been shown to be analytically
intractable. However, it is possible to derive the closed form solution for special
cases. One such case, for example, is δ = 1. Nonetheless, I present some interesting
experimental results for the hybrid case without any restrictions on the parameter
values. I compare and contrast the performances of the three different settings nu-
merically accompanied by sensitivity analysis on the model parameters. I present
these results, along with many others, in the next section.
2.3 Discussion and Managerial Insights
In this section, I discuss the findings regarding different aspects of the problem
and outline the managerial insights.
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2.3.1 Effort Dependent Structure
I begin with discussing the results for the effort dependent structure. In this
section, I first analyze the behaviors of client’s and vendor’s efforts in the equilibrium.
Next, I study how the net values gained by both parties are impacted by different
parameters.
2.3.1.1 Effort Levels and Payment Term
The equilibrium effort levels can be easily derived using the results of Lemmas 1
and 2. Now, in the next proposition, I analyze the impacts of cc, cv, and k on these
effort trajectories and the optimal payment term per unit vendor’s effort (i.e., p∗)
derived in Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 In the effort dependent structure:
1. As the client’s valuation (i.e., k) increases, efforts of both parties as well as p∗
increase.
du
dk
> 0,
dv
dk
> 0, and
dp∗
dk
> 0.
2. As the cost multiplier term of client (i.e., cc) decreases, efforts as well as p
∗
again increase.
du
dcc
< 0,
dv
dcc
< 0, and
dp∗
dcc
< 0.
3. As the cost multiplier term of vendor (i.e., cv) increases, efforts decrease but
p∗ increases.
du
dcv
< 0,
dv
dcv
< 0, and
dp∗
dcv
> 0.
Clearly, with an increase in the valuation of the project, the client increases
her effort level in order to generate more output. Further, the client increases the
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payment term in order to entice the vendor to exert more effort. As a result, the
vendor also increases his effort level. When the effort becomes less costly for the
client, again the client increases her effort level (see part (b)). Moreover, because of
the complementary nature of the project, the benefit of increased client effort is higher
at the increased level of vendor’s effort (see Equation (2.2)). Hence, interestingly, as
cc decreases, the client increases the payment term in order to ensure a higher effort
level from the vendor as well.
Let us now analyze part (c) of the proposition that is interesting (and somewhat
counterintuitive) in the sense that the impacts of change in cv on effort levels and
payment term are not the same. As the cost multiplier term of the vendor increases,
the vendor tends to decrease his effort level. In order to mitigate this effect, the
client increases the payment term. However this is not sufficient for inducing the
vendor not to decrease his effort in the equilibrium solution. Therefore, because of
the complementary nature of the project, the client also decreases her effort. Next,
I analyze the impacts of other parameters on effort levels and the payment term.
Proposition 2 In the effort dependent structure:2
1. With an increase in output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α), client’s effort
increases iff k > Eαc, and vendor’s effort, as well as p
∗, increases iff k > Eαv.
du
dα
> 0 iff k > Eαc.
dv
dα
> 0 and
dp∗
dα
> 0 iff k > Eαv.
2. With an increase in output elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β), client’s effort
2The threshold values in this proposition and all the subsequent propositions are provided in
Appendix A.
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increases iff k > Eβc, and vendor’s effort, as well as p
∗, increases iff k > Eβv.
du
dβ
> 0 iff k > Eβc.
dv
dβ
> 0 and
dp∗
dβ
> 0 iff k > Eβv.
3. With an increase in cost elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., γ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Eγc, and vendor’s effort, as well as p
∗, decreases iff k > Eγv.
du
dγ
< 0 iff k > Eγc.
dv
dγ
< 0 and
dp∗
dγ
< 0 iff k > Eγv.
4. With an increase in cost elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., δ), effort levels of
parties decrease iff k > Eδc.
du
dδ
< 0 and
dv
dδ
< 0 iff k > Eδc.
When the output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α) increases, the output improves
at a faster rate with an increase in client’s effort (see Equation (2.2)). As a result,
when α increases, the client has an incentive to increase both her effort level and the
payment term to the vendor (in order to incentivize vendor to increase her effort level
as well). However, both of these also increase the cost of the client. Hence, the client
needs to trade-off between the benefit and the cost of increased effort and payment
term. Since the benefit of increased output is higher for high valuation projects (see
Equation (2.1)), the payment term increases with α for such projects. Furthermore,
as the time passes in the collaboration, the benefit of increased effort reduces for
the client. Hence, towards the end of the project, it is less beneficial for the client
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to increase effort even for the high valuation projects. As a result, I find that Eαc
increases in time that has passed in the collaboration and approaches infinity at the
end of the project. This implies that, at the later stages of collaboration, the client
decreases her effort level as α increases, irrespective of her valuation of the output.
The result in part (b) of the proposition can be explained in a similar manner.
More specifically, when the output elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β) increases,
the client has an incentive to increase vendor’s payment in order to extract more
effort from the vendor. However, as explained earlier, it is beneficial for the client
to do so only when the valuation of the project is high enough. Let us now analyze
part (c) of the proposition. Clearly, the client’s effort level is comparatively high
for the high valuation projects (see Proposition 1(a)). Hence, in such projects, an
increase in γ increases the client’s cost at a higher rate (as discussed in Section 2.1.1).
Therefore, the client has an incentive to reduce her effort level with an increase in
γ despite the fact that the reduced effort level decreases the output. This, in turn,
also incentivizes the client to reduce the payment term to the vendor. Consequently,
the vendor reduces his effort level as well.
Finally, as the cost elasticity to vendor’s effort increases, the vendor has an in-
centive to reduce his effort. Hence, due to the collaborative nature of the project,
the client also tends to decrease her effort level. However, the decrease in effort
levels of both parties also decreases the output. Hence, the client needs to balance
the tradeoff between the decrease in output and the increase in cost savings. In the
high valuation projects, the effort levels are higher for both parties. Hence, for such
projects, the reduction in cost because of reduced effort is higher than the decrease
in output. As a result, the effort levels of both parties decrease with an increase in δ.
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2.3.1.2 Net Values to the Parties
So far I have discussed the nature of the optimal payment term and the equilib-
rium effort levels. Now I present and analyze the results for net values gained by
both parties in the project. These results are derived using Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 5 In the effort dependent structure, given the expression of p∗ in Lemma 2:
1. The client’s net value from the project is
T

(γ − α)2cc
α(2γ − α)
(
kTα
γcc
(
1
δcv
) β
δ−1
) γ
γ−α
(p∗)
βγ
(δ−1)(γ−α) −
(
1
δcv
) 1
δ−1
(p∗)
δ
δ−1

 .
2. The vendor’s net value from the project is
T
(
δ − 1
δ
)(
1
δcv
) 1
δ−1
(p∗)
δ
δ−1 .
It is easy to observe in Lemma 5 that the value either party gets from the collab-
oration decreases with the cost per unit effort of the parties. Clearly, this result is
intuitive and expected. Next, I use numerical experiments to derive some interesting
(and not very intuitive) results regarding the relationship between net values to the
parties and output elasticities to effort levels.
Figure 2.1 presents an example with the following parameter values: T = 10,
γ = 2.1, δ = 1.1, k = 3.6, cc = 2, and cv = 1. These values are reasonable in the
sense that vendor’s cost parameters are less than the client’s, i.e., δ < γ and cv < cc.
The value of β is 0.6 and 0.2 in Figures 2.1(a) and 2.1(b), respectively. Therefore,
Figure 2.1(a) (resp., 2.1(b)) represents high (resp., low) output sensitivity to vendor’s
effort. In Figure 2.1(a), client’s net value always increases as the output becomes
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more sensitive to her effort. Let us now elaborate this result. In this example, as α
increases, the client increases her effort level in order to leverage the improved output
elasticity. Hence, because of the complementary nature, the vendor also exerts more
effort. Since the output is highly sensitive to vendor’s effort (i.e., β = 0.6), the value
of incremental increase in output (because of increased efforts) is more than the cost
of increased effort for the client. Therefore, the net value of client always increases
with an increase in α. On the other hand, in Figure 2.1(b), the client’s net value
decreases with α at the low values of α. In this case, since the output elasticity
to vendor’s effort is low (i.e., β = 0.2), the value of incremental increase in output
(because of increased efforts) is less than the cost of increased effort for the client.
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Figure 2.1: Impact of the Output Elasticity to Client’s Effort
In order to check the robustness of these results, I conducted the experiments for
several different parameter settings. The results show that the behaviors presented in
Figure 2.1 are consistent across all scenarios. Furthermore, I find that the results are
similar when vendor’s net value is considered in the experiment instead of client’s net
value. I now summarize the findings of the experiments in the following observation.
30
Observation 1 In the effort dependent structure:
1. When the output sensitivity to effort level is low for both parties, an increase
in the output sensitivity to either parties’ effort may decrease the net values of
both parties.
2. When the output sensitivity to effort level is high for at least one party, an
increase in the output sensitivity to either parties’ effort always increases the
net values of both parties.
2.3.2 Output Dependent Structure
Again, I begin with analyzing the behaviors of client’s and vendor’s efforts in
the equilibrium. After that, I study how the net values gained by both parties are
impacted by different parameters.
2.3.2.1 Equilibrium Effort Levels
Using the results in Lemmas 3 and 4, one can easily characterize the effort levels
of both parties in the output dependent structure. Now I analyze the impacts of
different parameters on these effort levels. Some of these results and their explana-
tions are similar to those in the effort dependent structure. However, since they are
not exactly the same and some of the insights are unique in this setting, I briefly
discuss these results. I begin with studying the impacts of the cost multipliers for
effort levels (i.e., cc and cv) and the client’s valuation (i.e, k).
Proposition 3 In the output dependent structure, efforts of both parties increase
with an increase in k and with a decrease in cc or cv.
du
dk
> 0,
dv
dk
> 0,
du
dcc
< 0,
dv
dcc
< 0,
du
dcv
< 0, and
dv
dcv
< 0.
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Similar to that in the effort dependent structure, the client increases her effort
level with an increase in valuation of the project (i.e., k). Hence, because of the
complementary nature of the project, the vendor also increases his effort. On the
other hand, the client reduces her effort level when her cost per unit effort (i.e., cc)
increases. Again, because of the complementarity, the vendor also decreases his effort.
Finally, the impact of the vendors’ cost per unit effort (i.e., cv) can be explained in a
similar manner. Now, in the next proposition, I present the impacts of α, β, γ, and
δ on the effort levels of both parties.
Proposition 4 In the output dependent structure:
1. With an increase in output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α), client’s effort
increases iff k > Oαc and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Oαv.
du
dα
> 0 iff k > Oαc.
dv
dα
> 0 iff k > Oαv.
2. With an increase in output elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β), client’s effort
increases iff k > Oβc and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Oβv.
du
dβ
> 0 iff k > Oβc.
dv
dβ
> 0 iff k > Oβv.
3. With an increase in cost elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., γ), effort levels of both
parties decrease iff k > Oγc.
du
dγ
> 0 and
dv
dγ
> 0 iff k > Oγc.
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4. With an increase in cost elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., δ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Oδc and vendor’s effort decreases iff k > Oδv.
du
dδ
< 0 iff k > Oδc.
dv
dδ
< 0 iff k > Oδv.
Similar to that in the effort dependent structure, when the output elasticity to
client’s effort (i.e., α) increases, the output improves at a faster rate with an increase
in client’s effort (see Equation (2.2)). As a result, the client has an incentive to
increase her effort level when α increases. Moreover, since vendor’s share of the
output, i.e., l
∗
k
= β
δ
(see Lemma 4), is unaffected by the increase in α, vendor’s
net value increases. Therefore, he has an incentive to increase his effort level as
well. However, increasing their effort levels are costly for both parties. Hence,
they need to consider the trade-off between the benefit and the cost of increased
efforts. Since the benefit of increased output is higher for high valuation projects
(see Equation (2.1)), both the client and the vendor increase their effort levels when
α increases in such projects. Furthermore, as the time passes in the collaboration,
the benefit of increased effort reduces. Hence, towards the end of the project, it
is less beneficial for the parties to increase their efforts even for the high valuation
projects. As a result, I find that the threshold levels in the proposition increase in
time that has passed in the collaboration and approach infinity at the end of the
project. This implies that, at the later stages of collaboration, both parties decrease
their effort levels as α increases, irrespective of the valuation of the output.3
3All of the thresholds in Proposition 4 have similar properties with respect to time but I do not
repeat the related discussion due to brevity.
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Let us now analyze part (b) of the proposition. When the output elasticity to
vendor’s effort (i.e., β) increases, the vendor has an incentive to increase his effort
because of two reasons. First, when β increases, the output improves at a faster
rate with an increase in vendor’s effort (see Equation (2.2)). Second, the payment
received by the vendor increases in β (see Lemma 4). However, as explained earlier,
it is beneficial for the parties to increase their effort levels only when the valuation of
the project is high enough. Next, part (c) of the proposition states that both parties
decrease their effort levels with γ in high valuation projects. In such projects, the
client’s effort level is comparatively high, and therefore her cost increases at a faster
rate with γ. As a result, the client has an incentive to reduce her effort level with
an increase in γ despite the fact that the reduced effort level decreases the output.
Consequently, the vendor reduces his effort level as well.
Finally, as the cost elasticity to vendor’s effort increases, the vendor has an incen-
tive to reduce his effort because of two reasons. First, the payment received by the
vendor decreases with δ (see Lemma 4). Second, with an increase in δ, it becomes
costlier for the vendor to exert more effort. In turn, the client also has an incentive
to decrease her effort level. However, the decrease in effort levels of both parties
also decreases the output. Hence, as explained in the discussion of part (a), the
effort levels of both parties decrease with an increase in δ only for the high valuation
projects.
2.3.2.2 Net Values to the Parties
Using the results in Lemmas 3 and 4, it is easy to derive the net values of the
parties. I present these expressions in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 In the output dependent structure:
1. The client’s net value from the project is:
34
T(
βγ+αδ−2γδ
βγ+αδ−γδ ) (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
 k(δ−β)
δ
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
αδ( kβ2
δ2cv
)βγ) 1γδ−βγ−αδ−cc
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
δ−β( kβ2
δ2cv
)β) γγδ−βγ−αδ 
−1 .
2. The vendor’s net value from the project is:
T(
βγ+αδ−2γδ
βγ+αδ−γδ ) (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
kβδ(( kα(δ−β)γδcc )αδ
(
kβ2
δ2cv
)βγ) 1γδ−βγ−αδ−cv
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
α( kβ2
δ2cv
)γ−α) δγδ−βγ−αδ 
−1 .
In order to derive relationships between the net values to the parties and the
output elasticities to effort levels, I conduct similar experiments as those in Sec-
tion 2.3.1.2. Based on the detailed experiments with several different parameter
settings, I find that the results presented in Observation 1 are also valid for the
output dependent structure. The explanations for these results are also similar to
that in the effort dependent structure, and therefore not repeated here. I further
explore this result by investigating the scenario when the output depends only on
the vendor’s effort. For this case, the impact of output elasticity to vendor’s effort
on the client’s value is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When the output depends only on the vendor’s effort (i.e., α = 0),
the client’s value decreases with β iff β < e
(δ−β)2
2δ(β−2δ) δ
(
cv
Tk
) 1
2 .
This analysis further validates the experimental results presented in Observa-
tion 1. More specifically, α = 0 in this proposition corresponds to part (a) of the
observation. In this case, the proposition shows that the client’s value decreases
with β when β is low. Finally, the experiments show that the results presented in
Observation 1 also hold for the hybrid contract.
2.3.3 Comparison of the Contracts
The purpose of this section is to compare the contracts analyzed in this section.
This study would assist managers of the client firm in selecting the most beneficial
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contract while establishing a co-creation environment with a vendor. Before dis-
cussing the results, I should note that both effort dependent and output dependent
structures are special cases of the hybrid structure. If one restricts the payment terms
p or l to be zero, the hybrid structure becomes a pure output dependent or a pure
effort dependent structure, respectively. Therefore, the hybrid structure cannot be
strictly dominated by any of the other structures. However, the effort dependent and
output dependent structures are more prominent in practice (Løwendahl 2005). Be-
sides, managing a business collaboration with a hybrid contract is more challenging
because of its more complicated nature. Hence, I study under what circumstances
(i) the effort dependent structure or the output dependent structure dominates the
other one, and (ii) the hybrid structure dominates both of the other structures.
Recall that the net values gained by the parties in the effort dependent structure
and the output dependent structure are presented in Lemmas 5 and 6, respectively.
Clearly, it is cumbersome to present the condition analytically when one structure
is more beneficial than the other for the client. Hence, I present a representative
numerical example in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 to illustrate the results. In this example,
the parameter values are: T = 10, γ = 2.5, δ = 1.5, k = 3.6, cc = 2, cv = 3 with
different values of output sensitivity to client’s and vendor’s efforts (i.e., α and β).
In the figures, {H, E, O} stand for the optimal values for the client in hybrid, effort
dependent, and output dependent structures, respectively. Figure 2.2 shows that the
output dependent structure dominates the effort dependent structure only when the
output sensitivity to vendor’s effort is more than 0.7. This implies that if the output
is highly sensitive to vendor’s effort, then it is better for the client to offer a share of
the output to the vendor. I verified that this result holds for other problem instances
as well. Hence, I summarize the finding in the following observation.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of Effort and Output Dependent Structures
Observation 2 If the output sensitivity to vendor’s effort is high, the output depen-
dent structure is better than the effort dependent structure for the client; otherwise
the effort dependent structure is better.
Since the solution of the hybrid structure is not analytically tractable, I numer-
ically determine the optimal transfer payment terms per unit vendor’s effort and
output (i.e., p∗ and l∗ respectively). For the majority of the parameter values, I
observe that the hybrid structure converges to the effort dependent structure and
that both are better than their output dependent counterpart. Interestingly, the
hybrid structure never converged to the output dependent structure in the entire set
of cases I analyzed. As shown in Figure 2.3, the hybrid structure converges to the
effort dependent structure when the output sensitivity to vendor’s effort is roughly
less than 0.5. On the other hand, if it is more than 0.5, the hybrid structure dom-
inates both of the other structures. This also implies that, if the output is more
sensitive to the effort of the vendor, then the client is better off by offering a portion
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of the Hybrid Structure with the Other Structures
of the output to the vendor as well as paying for the vendor’s efforts. I summarize
the findings and discussion in the following observation.
Observation 3 If the output is moderately or highly sensitive to vendor’s effort,
then it is better for the client to offer the hybrid structure. Otherwise, the effort
dependent structure is as good as the hybrid structure and the client does not need to
offer a share of the output to the vendor.
I should also note that, if the effort levels of the parties are high, then the output
sensitivity parameters can be thought of as reflecting the effectiveness levels of the
parties. In other words, the parameters α and β would represent the effectiveness of
the client and the vendor, respectively. Increasing one of these parameters, ceteris
paribus, would result in higher output. Hence, Observation 3 implies that it is better
for the client to offer a share as well as compensate for the effort of the vendor if
he is very effective. This result can be applied to intra-organizational settings as
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well. For example, a firm might be considered as a client in that she is being served
by all of its employees. All employees create value together for the firm and the
executives can be thought of as the vendors that have high effectiveness versus the
normal employees with relatively less effectiveness. Most publicly traded firms offer
their executives incentive-based compensation plans, such as performance shares on
the basis of corporate performance (Ferracone 2011). This compensation scheme
is in parallel to my finding that if the effectiveness of the vendor is high (i.e., an
executive), then the client is better off by offering a share of the output in addition
to paying for the effort level of the vendor.
Finally, I analyze the scenario when α + β is a constant. Changing the sensi-
tivity levels, while keeping their total constant, can be thought of as a shift in the
assignment of responsibilities between the parties in the generation of the output.
This result is presented in Figure 2.4 with T = 10, γ = 2.5, δ = 1.5, k = 3.6, cc = 2,
cv = 3, α + β = 0.9 for the hybrid structure. This figure shows that the client’s
value is higher when the output is highly sensitive to either party’s effort (i.e., high
α or β) compared to the cases where it is equally sensitive to the efforts. In other
words, when a single party assumes most of the responsibility in the collaboration,
the client’s value is higher. This result serves for comparative purposes, because de-
pending on the nature of the project and characteristics of the parties, it may not be
possible to shift the sensitivity of the output dramatically towards any of the parties
in the design phase of the project. Therefore, the important insight here is the fact
that client’s net value would be higher in projects where the output depends more
on the effort level of a single party. Moderate responsibility for both parties in the
generation of the output might not be to the best interest of the client.
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Figure 2.4: Client’s Value with Respect to Assignment of Responsibilities
2.4 Extensions
In this section, I extend the analysis in different directions. First, I allow the
client or the vendor to get utility from the output even after the project is finished in
the following two subsections. Next, I consider a case where effort cost of the vendor
decreases due to training or vendor’s self-learning.
2.4.1 Salvage Value for the Client
Here, I consider that the client gets utility from the output both during the
development time and after it is finished. For brevity, I present the results only for the
effort dependent structure in this setting. Hence, given the salvage value parameter
Sc, the objective function of the client is presented below. Vendor’s objective function
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and other constraints are the same as those discussed in Section 2.2.1.
max
u(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt+ Scq(T )
}
The Hamiltonians for the client and the vendor are the same as before. However,
now λ1(T ) = Sc. This is the only difference from the earlier case. Next, in Lemma 7,
I present the equilibrium effort levels.
Lemma 7 In presence of the salvage value for the client, the equilibrium effort levels
of the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
(
Sc+k(T−t)α
γcc
(
p
δcv
) β
δ−1
) 1
γ−α
; v(t) =
(
p
δcv
) 1
δ−1
.
Now, similar to the earlier structure, the client optimizes the level of p that maximizes
her net value. This optimal payment level (i.e., p∗) is presented in the lemma below.
Lemma 8 In presence of the salvage value for the client, the optimal payment per
unit vendor’s effort is given by:
p∗ =



S
2γ−α
γ−α
c −(Sc+kT )
2γ−α
γ−α

cc


α( 1δcv )
β
δ−1
γcc


−γ
γ−α
+
(Sc+kT )
γ
γ−α
(
Sc+kT−Sc( ScSc+kT )
γ
γ−α
)

( αγcc )α( 1δcv )
βγ
δ−1


1
γ−α
kT(2−αγ )
β
δ ( 1δcv )
−1
δ−1


(γ−α)(δ−1)
(γ−α)δ−βγ
.
As expected, if I set the salvage value to zero, the optimal payment term as well
as the equilibrium effort levels converge to the case with no salvage value. I also find
that if Sc > 0, the optimal payment parameter in this scenario is greater than that in
the no salvage value case. In the presence of salvage value, the output is valuable to
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the client even after the project is completed. Hence, the client provides additional
incentive to the vendor to spend more effort by increasing the payment term. As a
result, due to the collaborative nature, the efforts from both parties are increased.
In turn, the total output generated is more than that in the no salvage value case.
As can be seen in Lemma 7, the terminal effort level of the client is positive in
this case (in contrast, it was zero in the no salvage value case). Next, although the
vendor’s effort in this case is more than that in the no salvage value case, it is again
stationary throughout the collaboration period. Note that if I let Sc
k
→ ∞, or set
k = 0, which implies that the client does not get utility throughout the collaboration
period but only at the project completion time, the model converges to a static
model with no sense of continuous analysis except the accumulation of output that
is valuable only at the end.
Interestingly, the relationship between value and output sensitivity terms that
I discuss in Observation 1 changes its behavior in the salvage value settings. The
mathematical conditions are cumbersome to present here, however, this behavior is
observed in the entire set of problems I analyzed. I summarize this finding in the
following observation.
Observation 4
1. When the ratio of the values received by the client at the end of the project and
during the collaboration (i.e., Sc
k
) is low, an increase in the output sensitivity to
either party’s effort (i.e., α or β) may decrease the net values of both parties.
2. When the ratio of the values received by the client at the end of the project and
during the collaboration (i.e., Sc
k
) is high, an increase in the output sensitivity
to either party’s effort (i.e., α or β) always increases the net values of both
parties.
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Figure 2.5: Client’s Value with Respect to Output Sensitivity to Client’s Effort
This observation is illustrated in Figure 2.5 using the same parameter values as
those in Figure 2.1(b). As shown in Figure 2.5(a), if one increases the importance
of the terminal value in client’s utility, the behavior of decreasing value with output
sensitivity fades away. Figure 2.5(b) considers the same problem instance with Sc
k
=
20 where I observe that this behavior is completely gone. Hence, as stated in the
observation, if Sc
k
is large enough, the net values always increase with the output
sensitivity to effort levels. Next, I study vendor’s salvage value in the following
subsection.
2.4.2 Salvage Value for the Vendor
In this scenario, the vendor is assumed to build reputation or history from what
he has achieved in his previous business collaborations. His success, reflected in the
output, might be considered by other potential clients as a signal of how successful
the vendor would be in his future businesses. This can be considered as a salvage
value of the project to the vendor. For brevity, I present the results only for the
output dependent contract in this setting. Given the salvage value parameter Sv, the
objective function of the vendor and the reservation utility constraint are presented
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below. Client’s objective function and other constraints are the same as those in
Section 2.2.2.
max
v(t)
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt+ Svq(T )
subject to
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt+ Svq(T ) ≥ 0.
Now, in the lemma below, I present the equilibrium effort levels.
Lemma 9 In presence of the salvage value for the vendor, the equilibrium effort
levels for the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
((
(Sv+l(T−t))β
δcv
)β (
(k−l)(T−t)α
γcc
)δ−β) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
,
v(t) =
((
(Sv+l(T−t))β
δcv
)γ−α (
(k−l)(T−t)α
γcc
)α) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
.
By comparing these equilibrium effort levels with those in Lemma 3, it is easy to
see that the effort levels in the presence of salvage value for the vendor are greater
than those without any salvage value given a specific level of the payment parameter
l. Moreover, when Sv = 0, the equilibrium effort levels for both parties converge
to the case with no salvage value. On the other hand, the determination of the
optimal payment parameter l is not possible due to the necessity of integrating
involved functions like Gauss hypergeometric function 2F1 (Gasper and Rahman
2004). However, I further analyzed this case via numerical approximation methods.
The findings are summarized in the following observation.
Observation 5
1. When Sv
k
is low, an increase in the output sensitivity to either party’s effort
(i.e., α or β) may decrease the net values of both parties.
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2. When Sv
k
is high, an increase in the output sensitivity to either party’s effort
(i.e., α or β) always increases the net values of both parties.
These results are similar to those in Observation 4 with salvage value for the
client, and can be explained in a similar manner. Finally, in the next subsection, I
analyze how the training or the self-learning impacts the decisions of the parties.
2.4.3 Training
In practice, the clients might engage in activities like supplier development pro-
grams or training their vendors in order to increase vendor productivity or lower
their participation costs. In return, the client expects better value from the project.
In this section, I consider that due to training or self-learning, the cost per unit effort
for the vendor (i.e., cv) decreases with time. I assume that the training effort is con-
stant throughout the planning horizon. For example, the number of personnel who
are responsible for vendor training might stay constant throughout the collaboration
period.
Specifically, for a given training effort w, I model the change in the cost per unit
effort for the vendor as c˙v = −wcv. It implies that the instantaneous decrease in
the cost is proportional to the training effort and the current level of the cost itself.
This behavior is analogous to the loss of goodwill in advertising models (Nerlove and
Arrow 1962). Hence, I have cv = c0e
−wt. Here, c0 denotes the starting level of the
cost per unit effort. In this scenario, the cost for training is considered as cTw
θT ,
where cT is the cost multiplier for the training effort per unit time and θ is the power
term. I consider θ > 1, which implies that less costly training resources are utilized
first. I can now write the objective functions of the client and the vendor and the
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constraints as:
max
u(t)
∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt− cTwθT,
max
v(t)
∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
c0e
−wtv(t)δdt,
subject to q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
pv(t)dt−
∫ T
0
c0e
−wtv(t)δdt ≥ 0;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
The equilibrium effort levels for both parties are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 10 With training, the equilibrium effort levels for the client and the vendor
are:
u(t) =
(
k(T−t)α
γcc
(
p
δc0
ewt
) β
−1+δ
) 1
−α+γ
; v(t) =
(
p
δc0
ewt
) 1
−1+δ
.
In contrast to the no-learning case, the equilibrium level of the vendor’s effort (i.e.,
v(t)) is not stationary. In fact, it strictly increases with time if the client provides
training to the vendor, i.e., if w > 0. Moreover, client’s effort is no longer strictly
concave and decreasing in time. The first and second order conditions with respect
to time reveal that client’s effort has an increasing-decreasing behavior with the
reflection point at t = T − δ−1
wβ
. On the other hand, if T < δ−1
wβ
, client’s effort strictly
decreases with time similar to that in the no-learning case. Besides, Lemma 10 also
reveals that the equilibrium effort levels of both parties are always greater than their
no training counterparts for a given level of payment per unit effort (i.e., p).
Analytical determination of the optimal payment parameter p and the training
effort level w is not possible. However, I numerically optimize p and w that maximizes
client’s value in a variety of problem instances. In general, for a given payment term
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p, as the training effort increases, the client’s value first increases and then decreases.
However, when the cost elasticity of vendor’s effort (i.e., δ) is low, the client’s value
always decreases with an increase in the training effort. Hence, when δ is low, it
is beneficial for the client to choose the lowest level of training effort, i.e., zero. I
summarize this finding in the following observation.
Observation 6 It is better for the client to provide training only if the cost elasticity
of vendor’s effort (i.e., δ) is high.
I would like to note that, self-learning for the vendor is a special case of the
training model I discuss in this section. In the self learning environment, cT = 0,
and w is not the effort level but the learning rate. This implies that the vendor
becomes more efficient in time because of self-learning, not due to costly training
efforts. I derive the closed form expressions in this case that are not reported due
to brevity. However, my findings confirm that the benefit of vendor’s self-learning
is more beneficial to the client when the cost elasticity of vendor’s effort (i.e., δ) is
high.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the value co-creation environments, considering the fact
that the success of the project depends on both parties, not just the vendor. There-
fore, I analyze a value co-creation environment where the output necessitates the
efforts of both parties. I also consider the fact that both vendor and client may
change their effort levels over time. Moreover, I allow the client to get utility from
the output as it is being developed. Taking these facts into consideration, I examine
three different settings from a differential game perspective. I derived the effort levels
of both parties at the equilibrium and the optimal payment parameters in the con-
tracts. I further present several interesting findings based on the sensitivity analyses
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of the equilibrium effort levels with respect to the parameters representing different
characteristics of the parties.
I also study how different contracts compare under different settings in order to
find the best contract for the client. I find that, as long as the sensitivity of output
to vendor’s effort is not very high, the effort dependent structure is better than the
output dependent structure for the client. On the other hand, if the output is very
sensitive to the effort of the vendor, then the client should offer payments based on
output in order to give enough incentive to the vendor to spend more effort and
generate more value together. If the selection includes the hybrid structure as well
and if the output is moderately or highly sensitive to vendor’s effort, it is better for
the client to utilize a hybrid contract. This implies that the vendor should be offered
a share of the output, as well as payments related to the effort he spends in the
generation of the output. If the output is not much sensitive to vendor’s effort, the
client should prefer an effort dependent structure.
I also find that, if the output becomes more sensitive to the effort levels of either
party, the client’s value does not always increase. Similarly, the parties might not
always increase their effort levels if the output becomes more sensitive to any of the
effort levels. On the other hand, if the client receives substantial value from the
project at the end of the collaboration, then the client’s value always increases if
the output becomes more sensitive to her effort. Finally, I consider that the client
may offer training to their vendors in order to increase their productivity or lower
their participation costs. I show that the client should provide training to only those
vendors that have relatively high costliness.
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3. IMPLICATIONS OF DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN VALUE
CO-CREATION ENVIRONMENTS
3.1 Problem Definition and the First Best Scenario
Unlike Section 2, in this section, I assume that neither the client firm nor the
vendor firm is aware of the other party’s effort level throughout the collaboration.
This leads the client with a double moral hazard problem, and I explore its implica-
tions for the collaboration in this section. I consider in this section a more general
setting and hence the contracts are more flexible. Rather than just sharing revenues,
or making a payment solely based on vendor’s effort level without any other fixed
payment term (which is the case in Section 2), I consider in this section that the
contracts can also include fixed payment terms. The settings and the problems I
am answering are different in Sections 2 and 3, yet some of the variables are defined
very similarly to each other. In addition, some of the results and findings are very
similar as well. However, for the sake of completeness, I provide all definitions in
this section as well.
In this study, I consider a business setting where a client and a vendor enter into
a collaborative agreement. The client’s objective is to find the contract that will
maximize her value, i.e., the difference between the value of the output and all costs
related to the collaboration. On the other hand, the vendor maximizes his value in
any setting, which is the difference between the payment he receives and the costs
related to participating in the collaboration. As discussed in the introduction section,
the client and the vendor receive on-going value from the project. Therefore, the
settings I analyze incorporate both strategic decision making and dynamic changes.
Hence, I model the problem as a differential game. As discussed earlier, I consider
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problem settings that differ based on whether the effort levels are monitored or not.
Next, I introduce our model starting with the input parameters of the parties.
3.1.1 Input Parameters
I denote the effort levels of the client and the vendor at time t by u(t) and v(t),
respectively. These levels represent the resources, like labor-hours, exerted by each
party. The total time horizon of the collaboration is denoted by T . I model the
cost of client’s effort with a general power term structure as ccu(t)
γ. Note that the
commonly used quadratic cost function (e.g., Tsay and Agrawal 2000) is a special
case of this structure. Here, cc is the cost multiplier for client’s effort. The parameter
γ is considered to be more than 1 to reflect the fact that the marginal cost of effort
increases with the level of effort. In other words, the client utilizes her least costly
options first. Similarly, the cost for the vendor is cvv(t)
δ with the corresponding cost
multiplier cv and the cost elasticity term δ > 1. I also refer to γ and δ as costliness of
client and vendor, respectively. Clearly, the cost parameters cc and cv can be easily
estimated using the cost structures of the firms. The cost elasticities of client’s and
vendor’s effort level (i.e., γ and δ, respectively) can also be estimated based on firms’
overtime policies, hire-fire policies, etc.
In general, the effort levels are not observable or verifiable. However, in some
environments, the effort levels can be monitored. Monitoring relieves the double
moral hazard problem. However, if the effort levels are monitored, the costs related
to monitoring need to be taken into account. In practice, IT enabled services and
cross-located personnel mainly help in monitoring these efforts. Specifically, Inter-
net has facilitated real-time access to information across supply chains that enables
decision models and software to take actions for streamlining supply chain oper-
ations (Swaminathan and Tayur 2003). RosettaNet (www.rosettanet.org) and GS1
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(www.gs1.org) are global standards organizations that develop common platforms for
communication between the firms to enable collaboration and automation of trans-
actions across industries and in global supply chains. Some of the benefits of these
standards and other IT enabled services are real-time data transfer and automated
communication that enable firms to reduce contracting costs (Erhun and Keskinocak
2011). IT, if successfully combined with processes and strategies, creates an envi-
ronment that fosters timely reporting, interaction, and visibility that are required in
a value co-creation environment. In addition, the parties in the collaboration gen-
erally have personnel located in the other party’s sites, and they may hold regular
meetings, conference calls, presentations, etc. Thus, the effort level of each party can
be monitored with some cost.
In the problem settings I analyze, if one party’s effort level is monitored, the other
party’s effort level can be inferred from the output that is observable. Therefore,
monitoring both parties’ effort levels is not optimal. Hence, in this section, only
vendor’s effort is monitored if the client chooses to do so. Monitoring cost comprises
of fixed and variable costs. I denote the fixed component as Fm, e.g., investments
in IT technologies. In addition, it is more costly to observe the effort if the effort
level is increased. In other words, it is easier to observe the vendor’s effort if it is
low. As the vendor increases his effort level and utilizes other more costly options
such as overtime, monitoring of these efforts should increase as well. Hence, similar
to the cost of vendor’s effort, the variable portion of monitoring cost at time t can
be written as cmv(t)
δ. I would like to note that considering a power term different
than δ in the monitoring cost does not change the key insights of this section. In this
formulation, the parameter cm is the cost multiplier for monitoring vendor’s effort.
Next, I discuss the output parameters of the model.
51
3.1.2 Output Parameters
In many business settings, the client gets utility from the output as the collab-
oration is in progress.1 Therefore, I model the output, which I denote by q(t), as
continuous, doubly differentiable, strictly concave for positive effort levels, and non-
decreasing in effort levels. Furthermore, the instantaneous increase in output is due
to the collaborative work between the client and the vendor. Therefore, both par-
ties need to exert effort in order to generate output. Similar to the other studies,
the output is considered to be a Cobb-Douglas function (Cohen et al. 1996, Kim
and Nettessine 2012). This implies that if one party exerts higher levels of effort,
then the other party will have incentive to do so as well. More specifically, I model
the instantaneous increase in the output as q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β with α, β ≥ 0, and
α + β < 1.2 The Cobb-Douglas functional form is flexible in the sense that it can
represent a traditional setting where the vendor assumes the whole responsibility in
the generation of the output. This is possible by setting α to 0.
Several past studies empirically justify using Cobb-Douglass functional form for
the speed of improvement in output in automotive and food industries, e.g., see Co-
hen et al. (1996). Here, the parameters α and β represent the output elasticity (or
sensitivity) to client’s and vendor’s efforts, respectively, that can be easily estimated
using the data from the past projects. The relative weight of the output elasticity
parameters should be different across different business settings. For example, in a
traditional setting, where the vendor assumes almost all responsibility in the gen-
1As discussed in the introduction section, I do not rule out the possibility that the parties receive
value also at the end of the collaboration. I study such a setting in Section 3.5.
2The constraint α+ β < 1 is actually related to the concavity of the output function. In effect,
one does not need to assume α + β < 1 if a set of more relaxed conditions, i.e., α < γ and β < δ
holds. If these relaxed conditions are also not satisfied, then it would mean that there is increasing
return to scale. Hence, in such a case, the parties could increase their effort levels arbitrarily to
produce more output in a less costly manner. Clearly, it does not make practical sense, and therefore
I impose this constraint.
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eration of the output, α should be close to 0. On the other hand, if it is a value
co-creation setting, then both of these parameters should be greater than 0.
Since the client gets value from the project while it is being developed, I can
define it as ∫ T
0
kq(t)dt. (3.1)
I would like to note that I do not discount the net values of the parties in my
analyses since the planning horizon is usually short to medium term. However, it is
easy to modify the model for long term planning horizons by including the discount
factor. I find that the consideration of the discount factor does not affect the key
insights of this section. In the above equation, k is used to convert the output to
a utility measure. One possible interpretation of k is dollar value per unit output.
Hence, I also refer to k as the valuation of the project. From the discussion above,
one can write q(t) as
q(t) =
∫ t
0
u(s)αv(s)βds; q(0) = 0. (3.2)
All the notations are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.1.3 Model Preliminaries
In the settings I analyze, the client is the principal and the vendor is the agent.
Building the discussion in the reverse setting is also possible without any further
complication. The client offers a business relationship to the vendor and the vendor
accepts it if the gain is more than his reservation utility. These reservation utilities
are denoted by Rc and Rv for client and vendor, respectively. If the offer is accepted
by the vendor, both parties start working together and select and adjust their effort
levels dynamically. I begin with analyzing the first best (FB) contract.
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Symbol Definition
cc Cost multiplier for client’s effort
cv Cost multiplier for vendor’s effort
cm Cost multiplier for monitoring vendor’s effort
Fm Fixed portion of the cost for monitoring vendor’s effort
k Valuation of the project (i.e., client’s value per unit output)
Rc Reservation utility of the client
Rv Reservation utility of the vendor
Sc Salvage value of the client
Sv Salvage value of the vendor
α Output elasticity (or sensitivity) to the client’s effort level, α ≥ 0
β Output elasticity (or sensitivity) to the vendor’s effort level, β > 0
γ Cost elasticity (costliness) of the client’s effort level, γ > 1
δ Cost elasticity (costliness) of the vendor’s effort level, δ > 1
T Length of planning horizon
q(t) Output at time t (state variable)
u(t) Level of client’s effort at time t (control variable)
v(t) Level of vendor’s effort at time t (control variable)
l Transfer payment per unit output (decision variable)
Fd Fixed transfer payment (decision variable)
H(.) Transfer payment function (decision variable)
Table 3.1: List of Parameters and Variables in Section 3
3.1.4 First Best
The first best setting represents the ideal case. Here, the client and the vendor
behave as if they are a single firm and the effort levels are observable and verifiable.
As a result, total value that could be generated in the collaboration is maximized.
Therefore, I compare the first best solution with the solutions of the output depen-
dent and effort dependent contracts in Section 3.4 in order to study their relative
performances. The single objective in the first best case is to maximize profits that is
the difference between the total value of the output and the participation costs of the
parties. Therefore, one can write the unified objective function and the constraints
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as the following:
max
u(t),v(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt
}
(3.3)
subject to
q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β; (3.4)
∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt ≥ Rc +Rv; (3.5)
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0. (3.6)
As discussed, the objective function in Equation (3.3) is simply the difference
between the total value generated in the collaboration and the cost of effort for the
client and the vendor. Equation (3.4) depicts how the output accumulates over time.
In addition, the client and the vendor would collaborate only if they can generate
value together more than the total of their reservation utilities Rc and Rv. This fact
is reflected in Constraint (3.5). Lastly, Constraint (3.6) states the technical detail
that the effort levels cannot be negative. The solution of this optimal control problem
is provided in the following lemma. All of the proofs are available in Appendix B.
Lemma 11 The optimal effort levels for the client and the vendor in the first best
scenario are:
u(t) =
(
kα(T−t)
γcc
) δ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
(
βγcc
αδcv
) β
γ(δ−β)−αδ
,
v(t) =
(
kβ(T−t)
δcv
) γ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
(
αδcv
βγcc
) α
γ(δ−β)−αδ
.
It is easy to see that the optimal effort levels presented in Lemma 11 decrease as
the project progresses (i.e., as t increases). When the client and the vendor choose
these effort levels, the total value generated in the collaboration is as provided in the
lemma below.
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Lemma 12 The total value generated in the collaboration is:
T (γ(δ−β)−αδ)2
((2γ−α)δ−βγ)γδ (kT )
γδ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
((
α
ccγ
)αδ (
β
cvδ
)βγ) 1γ(δ−β)−αδ
.
The client and the vendor collaborate if the value presented in Lemma 12 is more
than the total of their reservation utilities, i.e., if Constraint (3.5) is satisfied. Later,
I use this first best value to compare it with the values in other models.
3.1.4.1 Time-Variable Value
In some environments, unit value of the output in the collaboration might be more
in the later stages of the project. Therefore, I analyze what happens if client’s value
per unit output k is not constant but increases in time, i.e., dk(t)
dt
> 0. Should the
effort levels increase as the project progresses, or should they again decrease similar
to that in Lemma 11? I find that the effort levels still decrease through time even if
the output becomes more valuable towards the end of the collaboration. In addition,
I find that considering k as time-invariant or time-variant does not change the main
insights of this section. Therefore, for simplicity, I treat k as a time-invariant constant
hereafter in this section.
3.2 Unobservable Effort Levels
First best approach assumes that (i) effort levels are observable or verifiable, and
(ii) the objective of both parties is to maximize the total value in the collaboration.
However, in many real business settings, effort levels of parties are not observable
and parties have different and often conflicting objectives. Therefore, a double moral
hazard problem arises in many business settings. Accordingly, in this section, I
assume that effort levels of both parties are not observable. Therefore, the client
cannot transfer payments based on vendor’s effort level. Clearly, the client can
observe her own effort level and can infer the vendor’s effort by observing the output.
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However, she cannot write a contract based on vendor’s effort. The reason is that
in cases of breaches of the contract, the court should be able to verify the effort
levels of both parties. However, neither party can verify or prove their effort levels
to the court. Hence, such a contract is not practicable. Therefore, the client offers
the vendor a portion of the output and a fixed fee, i.e.,
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt + Fd. Here, l
denotes the transfer payment per unit output, and Fd is the fixed fee. The structure
of the costs for both client and vendor stays unchanged compared to the first best
model. Hence, the objective functions of client and vendor, and the constraints can
be written as:
max
u(t),l,Fd
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt− Fd
}
,
max
v(t)
{∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+ Fd −
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt
}
,
subject to
q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt− Fd ≥ Rc;∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+ Fd −
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt ≥ Rv;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
In this setting, the client chooses her equilibrium effort level u(t) and the vendor
chooses his equilibrium effort level v(t). The first constraint shows the evolution of
output through time. The second and third constraints state that the client and
vendor will participate in the collaboration only if they receive value more than or
equal to their reservation utilities. The solution of this differential game for a given
l reveals the equilibrium effort levels of the parties that is presented in the lemma
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below assuming that the participation constraints hold.
Lemma 13 When the effort levels are not monitored, the equilibrium effort levels
for the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
(
(T − t)δ
(
lβ
δcv
)β (
(k − l)α
γcc
)δ−β) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
,
v(t) =
(
(T − t)γ
(
lβ
δcv
)γ−α(
(k − l)α
γcc
)α) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ
.
Effort levels of both parties are strictly concave and decreasing in time. This
is because 1
(γ−α)δ−βγ > 0 is satisfied as shown in Remark 2 that is provided in Ap-
pendix B. In addition, both effort levels converge to zero at the project completion
time, because there is no terminal value at the end of the planning horizon. These
results are in line with the first best scenario. In the next subsection, I derive the
optimal payment terms based on Lemma 13.
3.2.1 Optimal Payment Terms
In this contract, the client makes the vendor’s participation constraint binding.
The reason is that the client has no incentive to leave any value more than needed in
order to make the vendor participate in the collaboration. Hence, Fd = −
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt + Rv. After substituting Fd and the equilibrium effort levels provided
in Lemma 13 into the objective function of the client, it is easy to observe that the
client’s value is concave in l. Therefore, the first and second order conditions with
respect to l reveal the optimal payment parameters that I present in Lemma 14. As
discussed, the fixed fee that is provided in the same lemma is calculated in a way
such that the vendor’s net utility is equal to his reservation utility.
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Lemma 14 When effort levels of both parties are not observable, the optimal pay-
ment per unit output, and the fixed payment terms are given by:
l∗ = k
β(γ − α)−√αβ(γ − α)(δ − β)
βγ − αδ ,
F ∗d = T
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
(γ−α)δ−βγ
(γ − α)δ − βγ
(2γ − α)δ − βγ l
∗
((
(k − l∗)α
γcc
)αδ (
l∗β
δcv
)βγ) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ (
β − δ
δ
)
.
By setting the payment parameters l and Fd to the levels presented in Lemma 14,
the client maximizes the total value in the system and her utility. This is because
the vendor receives only his reservation utility irrespective of the other parameter
values. It is an interesting finding that the optimal payment term l∗ does not depend
on the cost per unit effort terms for both parties, i.e., cc and cv. I show in the proof
of this lemma that l∗ is between 0 and k, hence I can think of l
∗
k
as the optimal share.
The output elasticity terms α and β, and the cost elasticity terms γ and δ might be
similar in different client-vendor dyads. Therefore, in a given industry or even across
different industries, one would expect to see common share terms (e.g., 50%-50%, or
60%-40%) in revenue-sharing contracts irrespective of the participation costs of the
parties, and the client’s valuation of the project. This fact is actually evidenced in
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), and I complement their finding in the case of
continuous value co-creation settings. On the other hand, the fixed payment term
F ∗d depends on the cost per unit effort terms for both parties. Therefore, one would
expect more variability in this fixed term in contracts. This finding is also observed
in real business settings (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995).
As I discussed, the optimal payment term l∗ is insensitive to the per unit cost
terms cc and cv. Now, in the next proposition, I summarize the behavior of l
∗ with
respect to output and cost elasticity terms α, β, γ, and δ.
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Proposition 6 The optimal payment parameter l∗ strictly decreases with α and δ,
and strictly increases with β and γ.
Proposition 6 implies that if the output becomes more sensitive to client’s effort
(i.e., if α increases) or if vendor’s marginal cost parameter increases (i.e., if δ in-
creases), then the optimal payment term decreases. This result can be explained as
follows. As α increases, the ratio of output sensitivity to cost sensitivity with respect
to client’s effort (i.e., α/γ) increases. This ratio represents client’s productivity in a
sense. Similarly, β/δ represents vendor’s productivity. Therefore, as either α or δ
increases, the relative productivity of the client (i.e.,
α/γ
β/δ
) increases. Hence, the client
tends to assume more responsibility in the collaboration. In other words, the client
attempts to reduce the effort level of the vendor that is achieved by reducing the
payment term. Using the similar argument, if the output becomes more sensitive to
vendor’s effort (i.e., if β increases) or if client’s marginal cost parameter increases
(i.e., if γ increases), the relative productivity of the vendor increases. Hence, in this
case, it is beneficial for the client to increase the optimal payment term in order to
entice vendor to work more in the collaboration.
3.2.2 Behavior of Effort Levels
Using the results in Lemmas 13 and 14, I can easily characterize the effort levels
of both parties in the double moral hazard case. Clearly, efforts of both parties
increase with k and decrease with cc or cv. Let us first explain this result. The client
increases her effort level with an increase in valuation of the project (i.e., k) in order
to increase the output. Hence, because of the complementary nature of the project,
the vendor also increases his effort. On the other hand, the client reduces her effort
level when her cost per unit effort (i.e., cc) increases in order to reduce her effort cost.
Again, because of the complementarity, the vendor also decreases his effort. Finally,
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the impact of the vendors’ cost per unit effort (i.e., cv) can be explained in a similar
manner. Now, in the next proposition, I present the impacts of output sensitivity
parameters and marginal cost terms on the effort levels of the parties.
Proposition 7 In the output dependent structure:3
1. With an increase in output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α), client’s effort
increases iff k > Oαc and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Oαv.
2. With an increase in output elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β), client’s effort
increases iff k > Oβc and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Oβv.
3. With an increase in cost elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., γ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Oγc, and vendor’s effort decreases iff k > Oγv.
4. With an increase in cost elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., δ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Oδc and vendor’s effort decreases iff k > Oδv.
When the output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α) increases, the output improves
at a faster rate with an increase in client’s effort (see Equation (3.2)). As a result,
the client has an incentive to increase her effort level when α increases. Moreover,
because of the complementary effort levels, the vendor has an incentive to increase
his effort level as well. However, increasing their effort levels are costly for both
parties. Hence, they need to consider the trade-off between the benefit and the cost
of increased efforts. Since the benefit of increased output is higher for high valuation
projects (see Equation (3.1)), both the client and the vendor increase their effort
levels when α increases in such projects. Furthermore, as the time passes in the
collaboration, the benefit of increased effort reduces. Hence, towards the end of the
3The threshold values in this proposition and all the subsequent propositions are provided in
Appendix B.
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project, it is less beneficial for the parties to increase their efforts even for the high
valuation projects. As a result, I find that the threshold levels in the proposition
increase with the time elapsed in the collaboration and approach infinity at the end
of the project. This implies that, at the later stages of collaboration, both parties
decrease their effort levels as α increases, irrespective of the valuation of the output.
All of the thresholds in Proposition 7 have similar properties with respect to time
but I omit the details due to brevity.
Let us now analyze part (b) of the proposition. When the output elasticity to
vendor’s effort (i.e., β) increases, the output improves at a faster rate with an increase
in vendor’s effort (see Equation (3.2)). Hence, with an increase in β, the vendor has
an incentive to increase his effort level. However, as explained earlier, it is beneficial
for the parties to increase their effort levels only when the valuation of the project
is high enough. Next, part (c) of the proposition states that both parties decrease
their effort levels with an increase in cost elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., γ) for high
valuation projects. In such projects, the client’s effort level is comparatively high,
and therefore her cost increases at a faster rate with γ. As a result, the client has
an incentive to reduce her effort level with an increase in γ despite the fact that
the reduced effort level decreases the output. Consequently, the vendor reduces his
effort level as well. Finally, as the cost elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., δ) increases,
it becomes costlier for the vendor to exert more effort. As a result, the vendor has
an incentive to reduce his effort level with an increase in δ. In turn, the client also
has an incentive to decrease her effort level. However, the decrease in effort levels of
both parties also decreases the output. Hence, as explained in the discussion of part
(a), the effort levels of both parties decrease with an increase in δ only for the high
valuation projects.
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3.2.3 Client’s Net Value
Given the optimal payment terms in Lemma 14, I can calculate client’s value that
is presented below.
Lemma 15 When effort levels of both parties are not observable, client’s net value
is T
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
(γ−α)δ−βγ (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
((
(k−l∗)α
γcc
)αδ (
l∗β
δcv
)βγ) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ (
k − (k−l∗)α
γ
− l∗β
δ
)
−Rv,
where l∗ = k
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ .
In Section 3.4, I analyze the behavior of the client’s net value in the output
dependent contract, and compare it with that in the first best solution and in the
contract discussed in the next section.
3.3 Monitoring Vendor’s Effort
If the effort levels of both parties are not observable, the client has a double
moral hazard problem as I analyze in the previous section. However, as discussed in
Section 3.1.1, in some settings, the vendor’s effort can be made observable or verifi-
able through IT systems, regular meetings, site visits, submitting progress reports,
etc. The cost for making vendor’s effort observable has a fixed portion Fm as well as
the variable part cmv(t)
δ, as discussed in Section 3.1.1. I consider that the vendor
assumes the monitoring costs. However, I show later that the allocation of the moni-
toring costs between the client and the vendor does not affect the performance of the
contract. In this environment, the payment function H(.) can be written in terms of
what is observable, i.e., output and vendor’s effort. The client maximizes her value
by optimizing the effort trajectory u(t) throughout the planning horizon. Similarly,
the vendor optimizes his effort trajectory v(t) for all t. Hence, the objective functions
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of the client and the vendor, and the constraints can be written as:
max
u(t)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−H (.)
}
,
max
v(t)
{
H (.)−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm
}
subject to
q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−H (.) ≥ Rc;
H (.)−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm ≥ Rv;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
Because the vendor’s effort is observable and the client’s effort can be inferred
from the output, the double moral hazard problem turns into a standard principal
agent model with perfect information. In the next subsection, I introduce a contract
that coordinates this setting.
3.3.1 Optimal Contract when the Vendor’s Effort is Monitored
Now I present an optimal contract below where the client covers vendor’s total
cost and reservation utility if the vendor exerts effort more than a threshold.
Proposition 8 When the vendor’s effort is monitored, the optimal payment term is
as follows:
H(.) =


∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v¯(t)
δdt+ Fm +Rv, if v(t) ≥ v¯(t).
0, if v(t) < v¯(t).
Here, v¯(t) is the value of v(t) in the solution of Problem P discussed below.
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Problem P:
max
u(t),v(t)
∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm,
subject to q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm ≥ Rc +Rv;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
Because the client can write the contract based on vendor’s effort, he requests
the vendor to exert the effort level that would maximize the value in the system.
Therefore, v¯(t) is the solution of the following system that considers both parties as
a unified firm. The client chooses her effort level as a best response to vendor’s effort
v(t), and covers only the effort cost of the vendor and the costs related to monitoring
in addition to his reservation utility. Hence, the client claims all of the net value
in the collaboration. This is the reason why the allocation of the monitoring cost
(between the client and the vendor) does not affect the performance of the contract
as discussed earlier.
Given the above system, it is easy to derive the equilibrium effort levels of the
parties that are presented in Lemma 16. Obviously, if the value generated is less than
the total of the reservation utility terms, i.e., Rc+Rv, the parties do not collaborate.
Lemma 16 When the vendor’s effort is monitored, the equilibrium effort levels for
the client and the vendor are:
u(t) =
(
k(T−t)α
γcc
) δ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
(
βγcc
αδ(cv+cm)
) β
γ(δ−β)−αδ
,
v(t) =
(
k(T−t)β
δ(cv+cm)
) γ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
(
αδ(cv+cm)
βγcc
) α
γ(δ−β)−αδ
.
The equilibrium level of client’s effort (i.e., u(t)) presented in Lemma 16 is strictly
concave and decreasing with time. Furthermore, the client exerts no effort at the end
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of the planning horizon, because she does not have any utility from the collaboration
after the project ends. This creates an incentive for the vendor to exert no effort at
the end of the project as well.
3.3.2 Behavior of Effort Levels
In this section, I analyze the impacts of different characteristics of the client and
the vendor on the effort trajectories presented in Lemma 16. I begin with the impacts
of cc, cv, and k on the effort levels in the next proposition.
Proposition 9 When the vendor’s effort level is monitored:
1. As the client’s valuation (i.e., k) increases, effort levels of both parties increase.
2. As the cost multiplier term of the parties (i.e., cc and cv) or cost of monitoring
vendor’s effort (i.e., cm) decrease, effort levels of both parties increase.
Clearly, with an increase in the valuation of the project, the client increases her
effort level in order to generate more output. This entices the vendor to increase
his effort level as well. Next, when exerting effort becomes less costly for the client
(i.e., cc decreases), the client increases her effort level (see part (b)), and therefore
the vendor also increases his effort. Similarly, for the vendor, when either the unit
effort cost (i.e., cv) or the cost of monitoring effort (i.e., cm) decreases, he increases
his effort level. As a result, the client also increases her effort level. Next, I analyze
the impacts of other parameters on effort levels and the payment term.
Proposition 10 When the vendor’s effort level is monitored:
1. With an increase in output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α), client’s effort
increases iff k > Eαc, and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Eαv.
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2. With an increase in output elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β), client’s effort
increases iff k > Eβc, and vendor’s effort increases iff k > Eβv.
3. With an increase in cost elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., γ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Eγc, and vendor’s effort decreases iff k > Eγv.
4. With an increase in cost elasticity to vendor’s effort (i.e., δ), client’s effort
decreases iff k > Eδc, and vendor’s effort decreases iff k > Eδv.
The output improves at a faster rate with an increase in client’s effort when
the output elasticity to client’s effort (i.e., α) increases (see Equation (3.2)). As
a result, the client has an incentive to increase her effort level for the purpose of
improving output when α increases. Subsequently, the client tends to request more
effort from the vendor by utilizing the contract presented in Proposition 8. However,
increased efforts increase the participation costs of the client and the vendor in the
collaboration. Therefore, the client should consider the trade-off between the benefits
and the costs of increased efforts. Since the benefit of increased output is higher for
high valuation projects (see Equation (3.1)), both parties increase their effort levels
with α for such projects. In addition, the benefit of increased effort reduces in the
later stages of the collaboration. Thus, the client has less incentive to increase her
effort even for the high valuation projects towards the end of the project. In effect,
I find that Eαc increases in time and approaches infinity at the end of the project.
Therefore, irrespective of her valuation of the output, the client decreases her effort
level as α increases at the later stages of collaboration. I would like to note that all
of the thresholds in Proposition 10 have similar properties with respect to time. In
addition, other parts of the proposition can be explained similarly. Hence, I do not
repeat the discussion due to brevity.
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3.3.3 Client’s Net Value
Given the equilibrium effort levels presented in Lemma 16 and the contract pre-
sented in Proposition 8, I can derive the net value of the client that is presented
below. By design of the contract, the vendor receives only his reservation utility.
Lemma 17 When the vendor’s effort is monitored, client’s net value is:
T (γ(δ − β)− αδ)2
((2γ − α)δ − βγ)γδ (kT )
γδ
γ(δ−β)−αδ
((
α
ccγ
)αδ (
β
(cv + cm) δ
)βγ) 1γ(δ−β)−αδ
− Fm −Rv.
Now I analyze the behavior of client’s value and several other results in the
following section.
3.4 Discussion and Managerial Insights
In this section, I discuss our findings and outline managerial insights regarding
how the value generated in the collaboration is affected by different characteristics
of the parties and which contract is better under different circumstances.
3.4.1 Client’s Net Value
As discussed earlier, when the effort levels are not observed, an output dependent
contract is utilized. On the other hand, when the effort level of the vendor is moni-
tored, an effort dependent contract is used. In this subsection, I present the results
and insights that are similar for both of these contracts. First, in both contracts,
with the help of the fixed fee, the client extracts all value from the collaboration
leaving the vendor only his reservation utility. Hence, I use client’s value and total
value interchangeably in this section. Next, it is easy to observe from Lemmas 15
and 17 that the value client gets from the collaboration increases with client’s valu-
ation of the project, i.e., k, and decreases with the cost per unit effort of the parties,
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i.e., cc and cv. In addition, client’s value decreases with the parameters related to
monitoring vendor’s effort, i.e., cm and Fm, if his effort is monitored. Clearly, these
results are expected. Now I present some other results that are not very intuitive
(and maybe somewhat counter-intuitive). In this direction, Proposition 11 discusses
how the client’s value is affected by the output sensitivity to effort levels.
Proposition 11 In both output dependent and effort dependent contracts, when the
output sensitivity to client’s or vendor’s effort (i.e., α or β) is low, an increase in
the same output sensitivity decreases the net value of the client.
d(Client’s Value)
dα
< 0 when α is low, and d(Client’s Value)
dβ
< 0 when β is low.
Intuitively, if the output becomes more sensitive to the effort level of either party,
client’s net value should increase. However, as shown in Proposition 11, when the
relative responsibility in the generation of the output is low for either the client
(i.e., α is low) or the vendor (i.e., β is low), then increasing the responsibility of the
same party does not necessarily increase client’s value (or total value). However,
after the sensitivity increases substantially, the value starts to increase. This result
is illustrated using two examples in Figure 3.1. In this figure, I consider a scenario
where the effort level of the vendor is monitored with the following parameter values:
T = 10, γ = 3, δ = 2.5, k = 10, cc = 2, cv = 1.2, and cm = 0.3. These values are
reasonable in the sense that the vendor’s cost parameters are less than those of the
client, i.e., δ < γ and cv < cc. Further, the value of β is 0.8 in Figure 3.1(a), and the
value of α is 0.5 in Figure 3.1(b).
In both Figures 3.1(a) and 3.1(b), the client’s net value increases with the sen-
sitivity parameters only if these sensitivity parameters are not low. Let us now
elaborate this result. As the sensitivity to the client’s effort (i.e., α) increases, the
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Figure 3.1: Impact of the Output Elasticity Parameters on Client’s Value
client increases or decreases her effort level (see Propositions 7 and 10). Let us first
consider the scenario when the client’s effort increases with α. In this case, when α
is low, with an increase in α, the value of incremental increase in output (because of
increased efforts) is less than the cost of increased effort for the client. On the other
hand, when α is not low, since the output is relatively more sensitive to the effort
levels, the value of incremental increase in output (because of increased efforts) is
more than the cost of increased effort for the client. The similar argument exists for
the case when the client’s effort decreases with α. Hence, as shown in Figure 3.1(a),
when α is low, the client’s net value decreases with α, but the reverse is true at
the higher values of α. The behavior with respect to β (in Figure 3.1(b)) can be
explained similarly.
3.4.2 Comparison with the First Best
The first best approach assumes that the client and the vendor act as a single firm.
In addition, it is assumed that the effort levels are observable and verifiable. Hence,
first best presents the maximum value that can be generated in the collaboration. In
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this subsection, I examine how the contracts compare with the first best case under
different circumstances. I start with the output dependent contract that is utilized
in the double moral hazard case.
3.4.2.1 Performance of the Output Dependent Contract
First, I conduct a numerical study to analyze how the percentage difference in
client’s value between the first best scenario and the output dependent contract
changes with the output sensitivity parameters α and β. In this study, I find that
as the output becomes more sensitive to the effort of either party, the percentage
difference increases. In other words, the disadvantage of the unobservable effort
levels amplifies when the output becomes more sensitive to the effort of either party.
This is attributed to the fact that the client faces a more severe double moral hazard
problem when the output becomes more sensitive to the effort of either party. The
details of this numerical study are omitted for brevity, but I summarize the finding
in the following observation.
Observation 7 The percentage difference in client’s value between the first best sce-
nario and the output dependent contract increases as the output becomes more sensi-
tive to either the client’s effort or the vendor’s effort (i.e., either α or β increases).
I next analyze a scenario where the total of the sensitivity parameters (i.e., α+β),
is kept constant, instead of keeping one sensitivity parameter constant while varying
the other. Changing the sensitivity parameters while keeping their total constant
can be thought of as a shift in the assignment of responsibilities between the parties
in the generation of the output. This analysis is presented in Figure 3.2 with k = 12,
T = 10, γ = 1.9, δ = 1.7, cc = 2, cv = 1.6, and α + β = 0.9. Figure 3.2(a) shows that
the client’s value is higher when the output sensitivity is comparatively higher to one
party’s effort (i.e., higher α or β) compared to the case where the output is almost
71
equally sensitive to the efforts of both parties (i.e., α ≈ β). In other words, when
a single party assumes most of the responsibility in the collaboration, the client’s
value is higher. This result serves for comparative purposes, because depending on
the nature of the project and the characteristics of the parties, it may not be possible
to shift the sensitivity of the output dramatically towards any of the parties in the
design phase of the project. Therefore, the important insight here is the fact that
the client’s net value would be higher in projects where the output depends more
on the effort level of a single party. Moderate responsibilities for both parties in the
generation of the output might not be to the best interest of the client in the output
dependent contract. Now I summarize this finding below.
Observation 8 In the output dependent contract, the client’s value is higher when
the output sensitivity is comparatively higher to one party’s effort (i.e., higher α or
β) compared to the case when the output is almost equally sensitive to the efforts of
both parties (i.e., α ≈ β).
Figure 3.2(a) does not provide any intuition regarding how the output dependent
contract compares with the first best and whether the decreasing-increasing behavior
is due to the game that is played between the parties. Therefore, in Figure 3.2(b),
I present the percentage difference in client’s net value between the first best case
and the output dependent contract (while keeping α + β constant). Based on the
finding in Observation 7, I may expect that as the output becomes more sensitive
to the vendor’s effort (i.e., as β increases), the client will face a more severe double
moral hazard problem. Therefore, one may conclude that the performance differ-
ence between the first best case and the output dependent contract increases with
β. However, as Figure 3.2(b) suggests, this intuition is not correct. When the out-
put depends more on either party’s effort, the performance difference between the
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Figure 3.2: Output Dependent Contract: Impact of the Assignment of Responsibili-
ties between the Parties
contracts is less. One possible explanation is that when the output depends more on
the vendor’s effort, the vendor assumes most of the responsibility in the generation
of the output. This corresponds to high β values on the right hand side of the graph.
On the other hand, when the output depends more on the client’s effort, the client
assumes most of the responsibility in the generation of the output. This corresponds
to low β values on the left hand side of the graph. Therefore, because of the low
responsibility of either party, the client has a “one-sided” moral hazard problem on
both ends of the graph. However, when the output depends on both parties’ efforts,
the client faces a “double” moral hazard problem. Therefore, the output dependent
contract performs worst around the middle of the horizontal axis in the figure. These
findings are summarized in the following observation.
Observation 9 The percentage difference in client’s net value between the first best
case and the output dependent contract is lower when the output sensitivity is com-
paratively higher to one party’s effort (i.e., higher α or β) compared to the case when
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the output is almost equally sensitive to the efforts of both parties (i.e., α ≈ β).
3.4.2.2 Performance of the Effort Dependent Contract
The first two results of the output dependent contract (i.e., Observations 7 and
8) are also valid in the effort dependent contract. Hence, for brevity, I do not discuss
these results in detail. However, the third result (i.e., Observations 9) is not valid
here. More specifically, when the total of the output sensitivity parameters (i.e.,
α + β) is kept constant, the percentage difference in client’s net value between the
first best case and the effort dependent contract always increases with β (compared
to the increasing-decreasing behavior in the output dependent contract). I illustrate
this result in Figure 3.3 using k = 12, T = 10, γ = 1.9, δ = 1.7, cc = 2, cv = 1.2,
cm = 0.3, and α + β = 0.9. Since the vendor’s effort is monitored in the effort
dependent contract, the client does not face a moral hazard problem as it is the
case in Figure 3.2(b). This explains why the behavior in Figure 3.3 is not inverse
U-shaped. I summarize this result in the following observation.
Observation 10 When the total of the output sensitivity parameters (i.e., α + β)
remains constant, the percentage difference in client’s net value between the first
best case and the effort dependent contract increases with the output sensitivity to
vendor’s effort (i.e., β).
Now, in the next subsection, I compare output dependent and effort dependent
contracts, and derive the conditions when one of them is preferred over the other.
3.4.3 Comparison of the Contracts
In this section, I compare the output dependent contract and the effort dependent
contract with respect to different characteristics of the parties. This analysis would
assist managers of the client firm in selecting the most beneficial contract while estab-
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lishing a value co-creation environment. Compared to the first best case, the output
dependent contract has inefficiency due to unobservable effort levels. On the other
hand, the effort dependent contract has inefficiency due to costs pertaining to the
monitoring of vendor’s efforts. Recall that the client’s net value in output dependent
and effort dependent contracts are presented in Lemmas 15 and 17, respectively.
If the cost multiplier for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., cm) or the fixed portion
of the cost for monitoring (i.e., Fm) increases, the client tends to utilize the output
dependent contract as it does not require the monitoring of vendor’s effort. These
results are monotonic as expected. However, as I study in this section, other charac-
teristics of the parties affect client’s selection of the contract in non-monotonic ways.
In the next proposition, I begin with studying how vendor’s cost multiplier term cv
affects which contract is better.
Proposition 12 When the fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is
negligible, output dependent contract dominates the effort dependent contract iff the
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vendor’s cost multiplier term (i.e., cv) is sufficiently low. More specifically, the output
dependent contract dominates iff
cv <


(
(γ−α)δ−βγ
(γ−α)(δ−β)+
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
) (γ−α)δ−βγ
βγ
(
βγ−αδ
α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
)αδ
βγ
βγ−αδ
cm
(
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
) −
1
cm


−1
.
When the cost multiplier term cv is low, the vendor’s equilibrium effort is rela-
tively high, and therefore the total monitoring cost is high. Hence, in such a case,
the severity of the double moral hazard problem is less than the costs related to
monitoring vendor’s effort. Therefore, as shown in Proposition 12, when it is less
costly for the vendor to exert effort, the client should choose not to monitor vendor’s
effort and utilize the output dependent contract. If the fixed cost for monitoring
vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is not negligible, then the threshold value for cv is higher
than the value presented in Proposition 12. I do not present the expression due to
brevity, but the key insight remains the same.
Proposition 12 reveals another interesting finding. When Fm is not significant,
client’s valuation of the project (i.e., k) and the cost multiplier for client’s effort (i.e.,
cc) do not play a role in determining which contract is better, as they do not appear
in the threshold expression in Proposition 12. Recall that the client’s valuation of the
project and her participation cost affect the equilibrium effort levels of both parties,
and more importantly, the client’s net value in the project. The reason why they do
not affect which contract is better is that the percentage changes in client’s net value
in both of these contracts are the same as k or cc varies. However, I find that if the
fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is significant, k and cc indeed affect
76
the contract choice. In such a case, if vendor’s cost multiplier term cv is more than
the threshold presented in Proposition 12, then an increase in k favors the effort
dependent contract while an increase in cc favors the output dependent contract. On
the other hand, if cv is below that threshold, then an increase in k favors the output
dependent contract, while an increase in cc favors the effort dependent contract.
Let us now analyze how output sensitivity parameters α and β affect which
contract is better. It is not possible to derive the thresholds with respect to α
and β analytically, because the difference in client’s value between the contracts is
highly nonlinear with respect to them. Hence, I present two representative numerical
examples in Figure 3.4. In these graphs, “EDC” and “ODC” represent the regions
where the effort dependent contract and the output dependent contract, respectively,
are preferred. The phrase “NO” denotes the region where no contract is feasible,
and therefore there is no collaboration. In this example, the parameter values are:
T = 10, γ = 2.1, δ = 1.7, k = 12, cc = 2.0, cv = 1.0, cm = 0.3, Rc = 400, and
Rv = 200 with different values of output sensitivity to client’s and vendor’s efforts.
In Figure 3.4(a), the fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is zero. On
the other hand, in Figure 3.4(b), Fm = 14. In other words, Fm is not negligible in
Figure 3.4(b).
Figure 3.4(a) reveals that the output dependent contract dominates the effort
dependent contract only when the output sensitivity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β) is
considerably higher than the output sensitivity to client’s effort (i.e., α). However,
if the output is equally sensitive to both parties’ efforts or relatively more sensitive
to client’s effort, the effort dependent contract yields more value to the client. In
addition, I observe from both figures that when the output sensitivity to the effort
levels of both parties are very low, they do not collaborate (see the left-bottom area
labeled with “NO”). In such a case, neither contract can generate more value than
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the total reservation utilities of the parties.
As stated earlier, the difference between the settings depicted in Figures 3.4(a)
and 3.4(b) is that the fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is not
negligible in Figure 3.4(b). In this figure, the set of parameter values where the
output dependent contract dominates the effort dependent contract is not convex.
This might not be intuitive at first, but can be explained as follows. For example,
in Figure 3.4(b), when α = 0.20 and β is lower than 0.15, the output dependent
contract dominates. The reason is that, in such a case, the output does not depend
highly on neither of the parties’s effort levels, and the net value of the client is low.
Hence, the client avoids paying the fixed payment term for monitoring and chooses
to use the output dependent contract. On the other hand, when α = 0.20 and β
is between 0.15 and 0.45, the effort dependent contract dominates. This is because
when the output depends on the effort levels of both parties, the severity of the double
moral hazard problem increases as discussed in Section 3.4.2.1. However, when
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α = 0.20 and β is more than 0.45, again the output dependent contract dominates.
In this case, the vendor exerts relatively more effort and the cost of monitoring is
increased. In addition, because the client spends relatively less effort compared to
the vendor, severity of the double moral hazard problem is decreased as explained in
Section 3.4.2.1. I verified that these results hold for other problem instances as well.
Hence, I summarize these findings in the following observation.
Observation 11
1. When the fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is negligible, the
output dependent contract is better than the effort dependent contract only when
the output sensitivity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β) is considerably higher than the
output sensitivity to client’s effort (i.e., α). However, if the output is equally
sensitive to both parties’ efforts or relatively more sensitive to client’s effort,
the effort dependent contract yields more value to the client.
2. When the fixed cost for monitoring vendor’s effort (i.e., Fm) is not negligible,
the set of parameters where the output dependent contract dominates the effort
dependent contract is non-convex and is similar to that in Figure 3.4(b).
Now, in the next section, I present some interesting extensions of the base model
and provide useful insights.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, I study two additional settings. First, I study pure revenue-
sharing settings4 where the parties share the output without the transfer of a fixed
fee. After that, I allow the client or the vendor to get utility from the output even
4A through discussion of the pure revenue sharing is discussed in Section 2 as the output de-
pendent contract. For the sake of completeness, I am providing the discussion and details here as
well.
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after the project is finished. In the next subsection, I start with analyzing the pure
revenue-sharing contracts.
3.5.1 Pure Revenue-Sharing
Pure revenue-sharing contracts that have no fixed payment components are used
in some collaboration environments (Gil and Lafontaine 2012). In these settings, the
client and the vendor collaborate, and they share the output. Because the contract
is written only in terms of the output, there is no need to monitor the effort level of
either party in this setting. For simplicity, I consider that the reservation utilities of
both parties are zero in this setting. However, the key findings and insights do not
change in the presence of positive reservation utilities.
Recall that, in the output dependent contract, the client extracts all the value
from the collaboration by adjusting the fixed payment term (see Section 3.2). As a
result, the vendor’s value in the output dependent contract is same as his reservation
utility. However, there is no fixed payment term in the pure revenue-sharing case.
Hence, in this case, the vendor’s value is more than his reservation utility in the
equilibrium. Nonetheless, the equilibrium effort levels in the pure revenue-sharing
case for any payment parameter l are the same as those in the output dependent
contract (see Lemma 13). After substituting these effort levels into the client’s
objective function, I observe that the client’s value is concave in l. Hence, the first
and second order conditions with respect to l reveal the optimal payment parameter
that is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 18 The optimal transfer payment per unit output to the vendor in the pure
revenue-sharing setting is given by: l∗ = k β
δ
.
Using the results in Lemmas 13 and 18, it is easy to derive the net values of both
parties. I present these expressions in the next lemma.
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Lemma 19 In the pure revenue-sharing setting:
1. The client’s net value from the project is:
T(
βγ+αδ−2γδ
βγ+αδ−γδ ) (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
 k(δ−β)
δ
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
αδ( kβ2
δ2cv
)βγ) 1γδ−βγ−αδ−cc
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
δ−β( kβ2
δ2cv
)β) γγδ−βγ−αδ 
−1 .
2. The vendor’s net value from the project is:
T(
βγ+αδ−2γδ
βγ+αδ−γδ ) (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
kβδ(( kα(δ−β)γδcc )αδ
(
kβ2
δ2cv
)βγ) 1γδ−βγ−αδ−cv
(
( kα(δ−β)γδcc )
α( kβ2
δ2cv
)γ−α) δγδ−βγ−αδ 
−1 .
As discussed, the client cannot extract all the value in the pure revenue-sharing
setting. Therefore, the client picks the payment term that maximizes only her
value. On the other hand, the optimal payment term in Section 3.2 (i.e., l∗ =
k
αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
αδ−βγ ) maximizes the total value generated in the system. Therefore,
setting the payment term to k β
δ
generates lower total value than that in the output
dependent contract. It is easy to show that k β
δ
is less than k
αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
αδ−βγ
when β is not small. Hence, I obtain the following result.
Proposition 13 When the output sensitivity to vendor’s effort (i.e., β) is not low,
the payment term offered in the pure revenue-sharing contract is less than the required
amount to maximize the total value in the collaboration.
Although the client’s value and the total value generated in the pure revenue-
sharing contract is different from those in the output dependent contract, most of the
findings in the output dependent contract holds in the pure revenue-sharing setting.
For example, Proposition 7 (with different threshold values), Proposition 11, and
the behavior depicted in Figure 3.2 are all valid in the pure-revenue sharing case.
Finally, in the next section, I analyze the effects of salvage value on the dynamics of
the collaboration.
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3.5.2 Salvage Value
Here I consider that the client or the vendor gets utility from the output both
during the collaboration period and after the collaboration. For example, the client
can use the output even after the collaboration ends. In this scenario, the value
obtained after the collaboration period can be considered as a salvage value. On the
other hand, the vendor can build reputation or history from his business collabora-
tion. His success, reflected in the output, might be considered by other potential
clients as a signal of how successful the vendor would be in his future businesses.
This can be considered as a salvage value of the project to the vendor.
For brevity, I present the results only for the effort dependent contract in this
section. Hence, given the salvage value parameters Sc and Sv for the client and
the vendor, the objective functions of the parties and the constraints are presented
below.
max
u(t),H(.)
{∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−H (.) + Scq(T )
}
,
max
v(t)
{
H (.)−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm + Svq(T )
}
.
subject to
q˙(t) = u(t)αv(t)β;∫ T
0
kq(t)dt−
∫ T
0
ccu(t)
γdt−H (.) + Scq(T ) ≥ Rc;
H (.)−
∫ T
0
(cv + cm)v(t)
δdt− Fm + Svq(T ) ≥ Rv;
u(t) ≥ 0; v(t) ≥ 0.
The contract that coordinates this setting is very similar to the contract presented
82
in Proposition 8. Hence, I omit the details. However, I present the equilibrium effort
levels in the following lemma.
Lemma 20 In presence of the salvage values for both client and vendor, their equi-
librium effort levels in the effort dependent contract are:
u(t) =
((
(Sc+Sv+k(T−t))α
γcc
)δ (
βγcc
αδ(cv+cm)
)β) 1γ(δ−β)−αδ
,
v(t) =
((
(Sc+Sv+k(T−t))β
δ(cv+cm)
)γ (
αδ(cv+cm)
βγcc
)α) 1
γ(δ−β)−αδ
.
This lemma shows that the optimal effort levels decrease in time similar to that
in the no salvage value scenario. However, the terminal effort levels here are positive
due to the salvage value. Next, similar to the earlier case, the client covers only
the effort cost of the vendor and the costs related to monitoring in addition to the
vendor’s reservation utility. Let us denote the total of the salvage value terms with S,
i.e, S = Sc+Sv. As expected, if I set S to zero, the equilibrium effort levels converge
to the case with no salvage value. In addition, I would like to note that if I let
S
k
→∞ or set k = 0 (that implies that the client does not get utility throughout the
collaboration period but only at the project completion time), our model converges
to a static model with no sense of continuous analysis except the accumulation of
output that is valuable only at the end.
Most results remain valid in this setting compared to those in the effort dependent
contract studied in Section 3.3. However, the relationship between value and output
sensitivity terms discussed in Proposition 11 and Figure 3.1 changes its behavior
when the parties have salvage value in the project. The analytical conditions are
cumbersome to present, however, the following behavior is observed in the entire set
of problem instances I analyzed.
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Observation 12
1. When the ratio of the total salvage value to the ongoing value during the col-
laboration (i.e., S
k
) is low, an increase in the output sensitivity to either party’s
effort (i.e., α or β) may decrease the client’s net value.
2. When the ratio of the total salvage value to the ongoing value during the collab-
oration (i.e., S
k
) is high, an increase in the output sensitivity to either party’s
effort (i.e., α or β) always increases the client’s net value.
Observation 12 is illustrated in Figure 3.5 using T = 10, β = 0.4, γ = 3, δ = 2.5,
k = 12, cc = 2, cv = 1.2, and cm = 0.3. As shown in Figure 3.5(a), if I increase
the importance of the terminal value in the collaboration, the behavior of decreasing
client’s value with output sensitivity fades away. Figure 3.5(b) considers the same
problem instance with S
k
= 20 where I observe that this behavior is completely gone.
Hence, as stated in the observation, if S
k
is large enough, the client’s net value always
increases as the output becomes more sensitive to the effort of either party.
S = 0
S  k = 2
S  k = 4
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Α
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Client's Value
(a) Low Terminal Value
S  k = 20
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Α
5000
6000
7000
8000
Client's Value
(b) High Terminal Value
Figure 3.5: Value to the Client with Respect to the Output Sensitivity to Client’s
Effort
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3.6 Conclusions
In the business settings I analyze, such as consulting, IT services, and audit-
ing, the traditional view of analyzing supplier-client or consultant-client relationship
needs to be re-visited in light of the fact that the output of these relationships de-
pend on the effort levels of both parties, not just the vendor’s efforts. Therefore, I
analyze a value co-creation environment where the output necessitates the efforts of
both parties.
In this section, I also consider the fact that the effort levels of the parties may
not be monitored. This leads to a double moral hazard problem, however, the client
may choose to observe the effort level of the vendor with a cost. In addition, both
parties may change their effort levels dynamically. Moreover, I allow the client to
get utility from the output as it is developed. Considering all these facts, I examine
two different settings from a differential game perspective. I derive the equilibrium
effort levels of the client and the vendor as well as the optimal payment parameters
or contracts. Next, I present several interesting findings based on the sensitivity
analyses of the equilibrium effort levels with respect to the parameters representing
different characteristics of the parties. The client’s valuation of the project and the
progress in the collaboration play an important role in the behavior of the effort
levels. Depending on these factors, the equilibrium effort levels might increase or
decrease with the changes in the output sensitivities to effort levels and the cost
elasticities of efforts.
I also compare the performances of different contracts in order to find the best one
for the client under different circumstances. This analysis also reveals whether the
vendor’s effort should be monitored or not. I find that, as long as the participation
cost of the vendor is not very low, his effort should be monitored and the client should
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use an effort dependent contract. Otherwise, the client should not monitor vendor’s
effort, and should operate under double moral hazard with an output dependent
contract. Another interesting finding is that, if the sensitivity of output to vendor’s
effort is relatively higher than the sensitivity to client’s effort, the client should use
the output dependent contract and should not monitor vendor’s effort.
I also find that, under certain circumstances, an increase in the sensitivity of the
output to either parties’ effort level does not necessarily increase the net values of the
parties. However, if the relative value received at the end of the collaboration is high
(compared to the on-going utility received), any increase in the output sensitivity
to either party’s effort level always increases the net value. Finally, I consider the
pure revenue-sharing contracts and find that the total value generated in such an
environment is lower than that in the output dependent contract.
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4. IMPACT OF INVENTORY ON RECOMMENDATION SYSTEMS FOR DVD
RENTAL FIRMS
4.1 Problem Description
Most of the major DVD-rental firms, such as Netflix and Blockbuster, offer sub-
scription based plans to their customers. The operations of Netflix, for example, are
divided into two main categories: online streaming and DVD rentals by mail. These
two services are complementary to each other rather than separate, because not all
movie titles are available for streaming. As of 2012, Netflix offered around 60,000
titles for streaming versus more than 140,000 titles in DVD format (Liedtke 2012).
The customers are in need of DVDs for completeness as well as simplicity, and also if
they do not have high speed broadband (Netflix 2012). Besides, the contribution of
domestic DVD service to the total profit of Netflix in the second quarter of 2012 was
$134 million, whereas the domestic online streaming contributed only $83 million.
On the other hand, international streaming resulted in a loss of $89 million (Netflix
2012). Netflix expects to achieve profitability in the international markets over the
long-term. These numbers suggest that the DVD service keeps the company afloat.
Accordingly, Netflix CEO Hastings noted that their goal is to keep the DVD service
as healthy as possible for many years to come (Grover and Edwards 2011). Hence,
in this section, I restrict the analysis to DVD rentals by mail.
Customers arrive at the websites of DVD-rental firms and request movies that are
sent by mail based on their availability. Although they differ in the sophistication
level, most of these firms utilize recommender systems. Figure 4.1 shows a snapshot
of the recommendation pages presented to two different customers of Netflix at the
same time. This figure illustrates that the number of recommendations and the
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Figure 4.1: Recommendations to Two Different Customers by Netflix
list of recommended movies differ across customers. Note that, in the short run,
recommendations just shift demand from one product to another in subscription
based settings, rather than creating new demands as in the case of e-commerce
websites (such as Amazon.com).
In the context of DVD-rental firms, the satisfaction of a customer depends on
the availability of the movie she requests (Hastings et al. 2008, Shih et al. 2009).
Therefore, these firms need to satisfy the demands of as many customers as possible.
Given the number of customer arrivals in a given time period, the problem of max-
imizing the expected customer satisfaction is equivalent to minimizing the portion
of the expected demand that cannot be satisfied due to the unavailability of movies.
Hence, the objective is to find the best combination of recommendations to influence
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customer demand such that the highly available movies are shipped more and the
unsatisfied demand is minimized. Another factor that influence customer satisfaction
is whether they are recommended the movies they value higher. I control this aspect
of satisfaction by allowing the model to pick only those movies that are expected to
be liked by the customer.
An important input for the model is the rating estimates of movies by the users.
Since several past studies have presented effective algorithms for estimating ratings, I
consider that these rating values are exogenous to the model. However, I examine and
analyze the impact of the prediction quality of recommender system on the solution.
Besides, since the DVD-rental firms may have millions of users and thousands of
movie titles, sometimes clustering has been utilized for both movies (Milkman et al.
2009, Jedidi et al. 1998) and users (Bassamboo et al. 2009, Bassamboo and Randhawa
2007) in order to make operational decisions. In the similar fashion, I also define the
model at the cluster level. Note that such modeling is very general in the sense that
the firms can always use the movies and/or customers at the individual level (e.g.,
by setting the number of movie clusters as the total number of movies) when the
computational resources are sufficient. This is an important issue to clarify because
computational resources are becoming less costly and more readily available with
the advent of newer technologies, such as cloud computing (Thibodeau 2012). For
example, Netflix wants to move as much as 95% of their IT services to the cloud (Velte
et al. 2009).
If the computational resources are not sufficient, then one needs to utilize cluster-
ing. The clustering may result in the loss of individual level information, but it helps
us in utilizing inventory information in a more effective manner. I show later that
clustering in the setup does not deteriorate the quality of the solution significantly.
Moreover, the solution obtained using clustering can be easily tailored to implement
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at the individual level (I discuss it in detail in Section 4.1.4). I also show that the
solution obtained by utilizing inventory information (using customer clusters) out-
performs the one obtained without utilizing inventory information (but using the
individual customer information). For a detailed review on clustering, the readers
can refer to Jain et al. (1999). Next, I discuss the model in detail.
4.1.1 Problem Formulation
I begin with presenting the stochastic version of the problem where demand
and inventory are random variables. However, as mentioned in the introduction
section, my analyses are based on a deterministic approximation. Hence, I present
the deterministic model and a detailed justification of this approximation in the
next subsection. Since the firms use a threshold level to maintain trust, I consider
only those movies as candidates for recommendation for which the estimated rating
is above the threshold. The difference between the proposed policy and the all-
inclusive policy is that the latter recommends all movies above the threshold whereas
the former chooses an optimal subset among those movies. Clearly, the number of
recommendations in such policies is not constant, as shown in Figure 4.1.
Let nit be the number of customers arriving from user cluster i in time period t.
Several empirical studies have shown that nit can be estimated effectively using past
data, and therefore it can be treated as deterministic (Chung 2010, Lehmann and
Weinberg 2000). Next, let us denote the set of user clusters by U , the set of movie
clusters by J , and the time horizon by T . In the model, a customer requests exactly
one movie in each arrival. Without any loss of generality, I can treat multiple requests
as multiple arrivals. The decision variable xijt denotes the proportion of customers in
cluster i that are recommended movie cluster j in period t. For the implementation
purpose, xijt can also be interpreted as the proportion of movies in cluster j that
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are recommended to customers in cluster i in period t. The stochastic model is now
presented below. I summarize the parameters and variables in Table 4.1.
minE
[
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈J
(
d˜jt − K˜jt
)+]
(4.1)
subject to
d˜jt =
∑
i∈U
e˜ijt; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.2)
e˜ijt ∼ B(nit, Aijt); i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.3)
K˜jt = K˜j(t−1) − d˜j(t−1) +
(
d˜j(t−1) − K˜j(t−1)
)+
+ W˜j(t−1); j ∈ J ; ∀t (4.4)
W˜j(t−1) =
t−1∑
s=1
[
d˜js −
(
d˜js − K˜js
)+]
Qs(t−1); j ∈ J, , t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.5)
R′ijt = Rij + (Rmax −Rij) xijtE; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.6)
Aijt =
R′ijt∑
s∈J R
′
ist
; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.7)
0 ≤ xijt ≤ 1; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.8)
xijt = 0; (i, j) /∈ V, i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.9)
The objective is to minimize the expected value of the total dissatisfaction of cus-
tomers. As discussed before, I can state it as the total number of movie requests that
are not fulfilled throughout the planning horizon. In a given time period t, demand
for a specific movie cluster j is stochastic and denoted by d˜jt. The available inventory
of movie cluster j in period t is another stochastic variable K˜jt except when t = 1,
i.e., the starting inventory levels are known. I would like to note that the DVD-rental
firms usually can not replenish their inventories in real-time. The main reason is that,
in the DVD rental context, most DVDs are acquired with revenue-sharing contracts,
and these contracts do not allow the DVD rental firms to purchase new DVDs. More
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specifically, DVD purchase quantities for a movie are determined one to four weeks
before the movie is available for renting to consumers (Chung 2010). Therefore, I
do not allow the model to replenish inventories. However, the model can be easily
modified to consider a scenario where the inventory can be replenished. Overall,
the dissatisfaction for movie cluster j in period t can be written as
(
d˜jt − K˜jt
)+
.
Consequently, the expectation of the total dissatisfaction throughout the planning
horizon for all movies can be written as in Equation (4.1).
Constraint set (4.2) decomposes demand d˜jt based on the user cluster it stems
from. Here, e˜ijt is the demand for movie cluster j that is requested by users in cluster
i in period t. I can state that e˜ijt ∼ B(nit, Aijt), i.e., e˜ijt is binomially distributed
with mean Aijtnit and variance Aijt(1 − Aijt)nit as constraint set (4.3) presents.
Here, Aijt is the probability that a user in user cluster i requests a movie in movie
cluster j in period t. Next, the constraint set (4.4) denotes the evolution of available
inventory K˜jt over time. The first term on the right hand side is the random variable
that denotes the available inventory of movie cluster j in the previous time period.
The second term and the terms in the parentheses together denote the negative of
the amount of movies shipped in the previous period. More specifically, the second
term is the total demand in the previous period, and the parentheses denotes the
demand that could not be satisfied. The last term W˜j(t−1) denotes the number of
returns of movies from cluster j in period (t− 1) that are available to ship in period
t. Now the constraint set (4.5) states that the returns are a function of the number
of shipped DVDs in the earlier periods. Here, Qst indicates the proportion of all the
movies rented in period s that are returned in period t. Based on the rental and
return data, it is easy to estimate Qst, e.g., Chung (2010) estimates Qst using data
collected from Blockbuster. Moreover, Chung (2010) shows that it is reasonable to
consider Qst as deterministic.
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Symbol Definition Remarks
Parameters
U Set of customer clusters Index i: i ∈ U
J Set of movie clusters Index j: j ∈ J
T Planning horizon Index t : t = 1, 2, . . . , T
θ Threshold level for recommendation Higher value implies that
less movies are available
for recommendation
E Effectiveness of the recommender system
nit Number of arrivals
Qst Proportion of all the movies rented in 1 ≤ s ≤ t
period s that are returned in period t
Rij Estimated rating for the movies
Rmax Maximum possible rating Usually 5 or 10
V Set of pairs for which estimated ratings are (i, j) ∈ V ∀Rij > θ
above threshold
Variables
R′ijt Perceived utility of movies after
recommendations are shown
Aijt Probability of requesting a movie
K˜jt Inventory of movies available for shipping Random Variable
e˜ijt Demand of movie cluster j in period t Random Variable
from user cluster i
d˜jt Total demand of movie cluster j in period t Random Variable
W˜jt Number of returns Random Variable
Zjt Expected demand that cannot be satisfied
xijt Proportion of customers in cluster i that are Decision Variable
recommended movie cluster j in period t
Table 4.1: List of Parameters and Variables in Section 4
Constraint set (4.6) is central to the discussion that the recommendations affect
the rental decisions of customers. This argument is similar to that in Fleder and
Hosanagar (2009) where the perception about a movie increases due to recommen-
dations, as if the recommendations were advertisements. This constraint set states
that if the movie cluster j is not recommended to a user in cluster i in period t (i.e.,
if xijt = 0), then there is no increase in the perception of the utility of the movie
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for that customer (i.e., R′ijt = Rij). Otherwise, if the recommendation is made (i.e.,
xijt > 0), the perception increases by the amount (Rmax −Rij) xijtE. The term in
the parenthesis is the difference between maximum possible rating and actual rating.
Parameter E denotes the percentage increase in the difference term because of the
recommendation. Since the firms recommend only those movies that have ratings
above a threshold, the change in customer perception level is always positive. There-
fore, I consider E > 0. It is easy for the firms to estimate the value of E by observing
the increase in perceived utility after recommendations are shown. Although trust is
affected by the recommendations conformity with the taste of the users, its dynam-
ics should be observed in longer time periods during which the customers adapt the
use of recommendation system based on their past experiences (Kim et al. 2009).
Since I solve the problem for short time horizons, I do not consider E as a variable.
Nevertheless, I present some interesting insights regarding the effect of changing the
threshold level on customer satisfaction in short-run.
For each customer cluster and each time period, the constraint set (4.7) scales
the perceived values of the movies and assigns them to Aijt, which is the probability
that a specific customer in cluster i will request a movie from cluster j in time
period t. Thus, Aijt is a function of both the raw rating estimates and all of the
recommendations shown to the user. This is actually a variant of the constant-utility
attraction model (Tang 2010), which stems from Luce’s theory of strict utility (Luce
1959). Next, the constraint set (4.8) defines the bounds for the parameter values. As
explained earlier, the all-inclusive policy, i.e., the prevalent industry practice, is to
recommend a movie cluster j to a customer from cluster i only if the corresponding
rating estimate is above a threshold level. This is what the constraint set (4.9)
depicts by defining V such that (i, j) ∈ V ∀Rij > θ. One can easily set θ = 1 to
contain all of the movies in the set of recommendable movies. However, in order to
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ensure that the model does not recommend movies to users that they will not like,
I incorporate the constraint set (4.9) into the formulation.
4.1.2 Justification of a Deterministic Approximation
Since the stochastic model is analytically intractable, I need to simplify it in
order to derive useful managerial insights. The analysis of the distribution of the
demand for movie cluster j in period t, i.e., d˜jt, reveals that it can be approxi-
mated reasonably well and treated as a deterministic variable. Since d˜jt =
∑
i∈U e˜ijt
(see Equation (4.2)), I begin with the analysis of e˜ijt. As discussed earlier, e˜ijt
is binomially distributed with mean Aijtnit and variance Aijt(1 − Aijt)nit. How-
ever, based on the de Moivre-Laplace theorem, which is essentially a special case
of the central limit theorem, one can approximate the binomial distribution with
the normal distribution with mean Aijtnit and variance Aijt(1 − Aijt)nit (Box et
al. 1978). This is a good approximation when the following condition is satisfied:∣∣∣(1/√nit) (√(1−Aijt)/Aijt −√Aijt/(1−Aijt))∣∣∣ < 0.3. Netflix ships around 2 million
DVDs per day (Bond 2011). If the number of user clusters is taken as 10, then
the average value of nit is 200, 000. On the other hand, Aijt would be in the range of
0.02 to 0.20 depending on the number of movie clusters that are around 8 to 15. For
nit = 200, 000 and Aijt = 0.05, the left hand side of above condition is 0.0051. Clearly
this is much less than 0.3, and therefore the normal distribution is a reasonably good
approximation.
Since the sum of normal random variables is also normally distributed, the de-
mand for the movie cluster j in period t, i.e, d˜jt =
∑
i∈U e˜ijt, is a normal random
variable with mean
∑
i∈U Aijtnit and variance
∑
i∈U Aijt(1 − Aijt)nit (Ross 2009).
Therefore, 99.7% of the values lie around 3 standard deviations of the mean.
It is easy to see in the problem that the variance of d˜jt is quite small compared
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to its mean value. This implies that most of the values of demand for a specific
movie cluster are grouped around the mean. Consequently, for the analysis, one
can approximate d˜jt by its mean value
∑
i∈U Aijtnit. For example, when the num-
bers of user cluster and movie cluster are 10 and 8 respectively, with the average
values of nit and Aijt (i.e., nit = 200, 000 and Aijt = 0.125), the standard devi-
ation is
√∑
i∈U Aijt(1− Aijt)nit = 467.70 and mean is
∑
i∈U Aijtnit = 250, 000.
Hence, the coefficient of variation is only 0.187%. This implies that the demand
would be around ± 0.561% of the mean with probability 0.9973. More specifically,
Pr
[
248, 597 < d˜jt < 251, 403
]
≈ 0.9973.
Thus, in the analysis henceforth, I consider the demand for movie cluster j in
period t, i.e., d˜jt, as deterministic and denote it by djt. Treating demand as determin-
istic also results in deterministic returns and inventory. This follows by substituting
W˜j(t−1) (from Equation 4.5) and the starting inventory level Kj1 into Equation (4.4)
and by rewriting Equation (4.4) recursively for each K˜jt. Therefore, now I denote
the available inventory and the number of returns by Kjt and Wjt, respectively. Al-
though I approximate the stochastic model as a deterministic variant, I later analyze
the impacts of errors in return probability and inventory levels. Now, I introduce
the deterministic variant of the problem below.
min
xijt
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈J
Zjt (4.10)
subject to
Zjt ≥
∑
i∈U
Aijtnit −Kjt; j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.11)
Kjt = Kj(t−1) −
∑
i∈U
Aij(t−1)ni(t−1) + Zj(t−1) +Wj(t−1); j ∈ J, ∀t (4.12)
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Wj(t−1) =
t−1∑
s=1
[∑
i∈U
Aijsnis − Zjs
]
Qs(t−1); j ∈ J, t = 2, 3, . . . , T (4.13)
R′ijt = Rij + (Rmax −Rij) xijtE; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.14)
Aijt =
R′ijt∑
s∈J R
′
ist
; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.15)
0 ≤ xijt ≤ 1, Zjt ≥ 0; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.16)
xijt = 0; (i, j) /∈ V, i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4.17)
In the deterministic model, I introduce the variable Zjt that denotes the unsat-
isfied demand for each movie cluster j in period t. Hence, Zjt = (djt −Kjt)+. One
can further write Zjt ≥
∑
i∈U Aijtnit − Kjt, because djt =
∑
i∈U Aijtnit. Since Zjt
explicitly appears in the objective function as a minimization term, the inequality
Zjt ≥
∑
i∈U Aijtnit − Kjt becomes an equality when the available inventory is less
than demand. On the other hand, if the available inventory is more than demand,
then Zjt would become zero because it is defined as a nonnegative term. This is
reflected in the constraint set (4.11). Other constraints are the deterministic analogs
of the constraint sets in the stochastic version. Clearly, the presented model is non-
linear because of the constraint set (4.15). However, in order to use a linear solver, I
can easily linearize it using standard linearization techniques. The linearized version
is presented in Appendix C.
4.1.3 Comparison of the Stochastic Version and the Deterministic Approximation
In order to strengthen the validity of the deterministic approach, I conduct a
simulation study to examine the effect of using mean values for the random variables
rather than treating them as stochastic. The analysis presented earlier suggests that
the percentage coefficient of variation of demand for a movie cluster in a given time
period is around 0.187%. Here, I examine how this measure is affecting the quality of
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Problem Problem Size Objective Value Comparison
Class |U | |J | T MAPD PCV
1 15 15 12 0.064% 0.07%
2 10 15 12 0.057% 0.07%
3 15 8 12 0.052% 0.07%
4 10 8 12 0.002% 0.00%
5 15 15 7 0.032% 0.04%
6 10 15 7 0.042% 0.05%
7 15 8 7 0.034% 0.04%
8 10 8 7 0.003% 0.00%
Table 4.2: Deterministic vs Stochastic
the solution in the deterministic approximation. To this end, I compare the objective
function value of the deterministic problem (DO) with that of a simulation study
(SO) where the demand process is treated as a random event. The proximity of
these values supports the validity of the deterministic demand assumption. Table 4.2
summarizes the findings.
I carried out simulation for 8 different scenarios in a full factorial design where
I set |U | to 10 and 15; |J | to 8 and 15; and T to 7 and 12. For each problem
class, I run the simulation 100 times. In the table, I report the mean absolute
percentage difference (MAPD) between the objective values, i.e.,
∣∣SO−DO
DO
∣∣ × 100.
The average value of MAPD across all scenarios is less than 0.04%. Moreover, the
percentage coefficient of variation (PCV), i.e., Standard Deviation
Mean
× 100, is also reported
in Table 4.2. Clearly, PCV is also very small indicating that the deterministic model
is a good approximation.
4.1.4 Implementation at the Individual Customer Level
As discussed earlier, the decision variable xijt can be interpreted in the following
two ways: (i) the proportion of users in cluster i to whom each movie in cluster j
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should be recommended in period t, and (ii) the proportion of movies in cluster j
that should be recommended to each user in cluster i in period t. The DVD-rental
firms can implement the results of the model using either of these interpretations
(depending on the strategies of the firm). For example, if xijt = 0.60 for a given
i, j, and t, and the firm adopts the second interpretation, then 60% of the movies
in cluster j should be recommended to each user in cluster i in period t. Moreover,
within cluster j, the firm can strategically choose those 60% of the movies for recom-
mendation that have higher availability. Further, this selection of movies may also
take into account the customers’ individual rating values in order not to recommend
them movies below the rating threshold. Finally, the firm should not recommend
those movies to a customer that have already been watched by her earlier. Using
all these implementation strategies, the firm can use the cluster level results of the
model in an effective manner.
The individual constraints discussed above do not alter the overall effects of the
clustered recommendations, because the effects of random terms cancel out when the
overall effect of individual recommendations is calculated. This can be proved in the
similar manner as the justification of deterministic approximation in Section 4.1.2.
Further, I would also like to re-emphasize that the firms can always use the movies
and/or customers at the individual level (e.g., by setting the number of movie clusters
as the total number of movies) when the computational resources are sufficient.
4.2 Solution Approaches
The solution of the deterministic problem defined in the previous section pro-
vides managers with recommendation decisions throughout the planning horizon.
However, in practice, once the solution is implemented for a period, the managers
can re-solve the problem in the next period with the consideration of realized demand
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and returns. Hence, depending on whether the problem is solved in each period or
only once at the start of the planning horizon, there are two solution approaches. I
call them the dynamic and the static approaches, respectively.
4.2.1 Dynamic Approach
I begin with presenting the dynamic solution approach where the arrival and
return events are observed after each time period and the available inventory is
updated accordingly. The decision variable, as discussed earlier, is the proportion
of users in each cluster to whom each movie cluster should be recommended in each
period. In the dynamic approach, the problem is solved for the remaining planning
horizon in any given period but the solution is implemented only for that period.
The reason is that the firm re-solves the problem in each period with the updated
inventory information. I find that the realistic instances of this problem cannot be
solved to optimality in a reasonable amount of time using the state-of-the-art integer
programming solvers. The problem becomes harder to solve as the problem size
increases in user clusters, movie clusters, or the time horizon. Therefore, I develop
an efficient and effective heuristic called the dynamic heuristic.
The dynamic heuristic is similar to the rolling horizon problem that is used for
solving stochastic dynamic programs (SDP). Due to the curse of dimensionality, it
is difficult to solve many SDPs to optimality in a reasonable amount of time. The
rolling horizon approach is used as a proxy under such circumstances (Alden and
Smith 1992). Similar to the rolling horizon problems, in the dynamic heuristic, a
horizon length of H periods is chosen such that it is possible to solve the problem
in a reasonable amount of time. Then, in every period t, the deterministic problem
is solved where the decisions are the recommendations for periods t, t+ 1, . . . , t+H
and the objective is to minimize the expected customer dissatisfaction over the same
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horizon. In this step, only the recommendations for period t are implemented. Then,
the horizon rolls, i.e., the demand and return realization in period t is observed, the
inventory position is updated for period t + 1, a new problem corresponding to the
new planning horizon [t+1, t+H+1] is solved, and the recommendations are utilized
for period t+1 only. This procedure is repeated until the end of the planning horizon
is reached. The dynamic heuristic is practicable, easy to implement, runs quickly,
and provides very good solutions for a wide variety of realistic problem instances.
Moreover, this heuristic can be easily extended for the static approach that I discuss
in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Static Approach
In the static approach, the firm solves the problem based on the expected values
of parameters once at the beginning of the planning horizon, and utilize this solution
for all periods. Since the problem is solved only once at the beginning of the plan-
ning horizon, inventory is not updated to their realized values in this model. This
is the fundamental difference between the static and dynamic approaches. However,
the static approach is useful for various reasons: (i) The solution of the static ap-
proach presents the expected value of the dissatisfaction over the planning horizon,
and therefore it is useful for performance comparison purposes. (ii) As will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection, the dynamic approach outperforms the static solution
only under special circumstances. (iii) The static approach is more amenable to an-
alytical analyses as compared to the dynamic approach, and therefore it helps us in
deriving useful managerial insights. (iv) Not all DVD-rental firms have capability to
acquire timely information for each step of the dynamic approach. (v) If the costs re-
lated to obtaining/updating real time inventory information and solving the problem
repetitively in each period are high, then the firm may adopt the static approach.
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Similar to that in the dynamic approach, it is not possible to solve problems of
realistic sizes to optimality in the static approach. Therefore, I modify the dynamic
heuristic in order to solve the static approach of the problem and call it the static
heuristic. Its difference from the dynamic heuristic is that the rentals and returns
are not observed, but expectations of these events are used to update the parameters
in each period. The dynamic approach is more informative than the static in the
sense that the realized data is used to update inventory in each period. However, as
I discuss next, the dynamic approach is not always better than its static counterpart.
4.2.3 Comparison between Dynamic and Static Approaches
I compare the performances of dynamic and static approaches in an experimental
setting. In this experiment, I create two types of variations in the probability values.
First, in order to introduce randomness, I draw individual request probabilities from
their respective distributions around their mean values. Such randomness captures
the fact that I consider clusters in the problem formulation and that the individual
values may be different from the cluster means. Second, I incorporate bias in the
estimation of the request probabilities by changing the mean value itself. Specifically,
in the experiment, the errors in mean values are varied from -10% to +10%. In other
words, I consider that the demand for a movie cluster might be underestimated or
overestimated by the firm during optimization.
Figure 4.2 depicts the percentage gain that can be achieved by switching from
the static approach to the dynamic approach with varying amount of error in the
estimation of request probabilities. I present the results for two problem instances.
Problem instance 1 represents a critically balanced system where the expected de-
mand for some movie clusters are close to their available inventories. In such a case,
the information about the realization of demand is important to the rental firm.
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Figure 4.2: Percentage Gain by Using Dynamic Heuristic
Therefore, dynamic heuristic is better in shifting demand towards more available
titles in this problem instance. As a result, the total dissatisfaction for the dynamic
approach is comparatively lower. Moreover, the performance gain slightly increases
with an increase in the error in request probabilities (for both underestimation and
overestimation).
On the other hand, problem instance 2 depicts a case where the demand and
requests for the movie clusters are not too close. In this case, the difference between
static and dynamic solutions is very small, i.e., at most 0.1%, and almost insensitive
to the estimation error. I ran the experiment for other problem instances, and the
results are consistent with those presented in Figure 4.2. Hence, I summarize this
finding in the following observation.
Observation 13 When the demand and inventory are close to each other for some
movies, it is better for the firm to adopt dynamically as long as the benefits outweigh
the costs involved in implementing the dynamic solution. However, when no movie
cluster is expected to have demand and requests to be close, the firm may consider
using the static approach. It would help them in saving the costs related to collecting
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and updating parameter values in real-time and solving the problem in each period.
4.2.4 Performance of the Static Heuristic
In order to examine the performance of the static heuristic, I compare its solution
with the optimal solution for a variety of problem instances in realistic parameter
ranges. I design a full factorial experiment where I set |U | to 8, 10, and 12; |J | to 10
and 12; and T to 7 and 10. For each of the twelve problem classes, there are twelve
problem instances in which I set E to three different values (0.15, 0.20, and 0.25),
vary the total demand randomly around its mean by 20%, and set Qst parameters
to represent two different return patterns.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 4.3 where each row represents
a problem class. In each problem instance, I calculate the reported comparison value
as the difference between the heuristic value and the optimal value divided by the
optimal value. Whenever the optimal solution could not be obtained, I use the best
lower bound on the optimal solution. Hence, the performance of the heuristic is
Problem Problem Size Objective Value Comparison
Class |U | |J | T Min Max Median Average
1 8 10 7 0% 2.8% 0.3% 0.6%
2 8 10 10 0% 9.2% 0.0% 2.2%
3 8 12 7 0% 4.4% 0.2% 0.7%
4 8 12 10 0% 3.3% 0.0% 0.8%
5 10 10 7 0% 13.2% 0.0% 1.5%
6 10 10 10 0% 5.4% 0.2% 1.1%
7 10 12 7 0% 9.7% 0.2% 1.6%
8 10 12 10 0% 6.4% 0.4% 1.3%
9 12 10 7 0% 8.0% 0.2% 1.2%
10 12 10 10 0% 6.3% 0.1% 0.6%
11 12 12 7 0% 10.8% 0.2% 1.7%
12 12 12 10 0% 1.9% 0.1% 0.4%
Table 4.3: Performance of the Heuristic
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sometimes better than that reported in Table 4.3. The sub-problems of the heuristic
are generated in C++ and solved using CPLEX 12.1.0.
As can be seen in Table 4.3, the heuristic is able to obtain the optimum solution for
at least one problem instance in each problem class (because the minimum difference
in each row is 0%). The median difference is 0.1% and the average difference is only
1.1%. The solutions differ more than 10% in only 1.4% of the cases. As mentioned
earlier, I use the best lower bound for the comparison whenever the optimal solution
could not be obtained. For some of the large problem instances, the bound gets
worse. Therefore, the large gap for some of the problem instances may be because of
the worse bounds rather than the performance of the heuristic. Nonetheless, with the
heuristic, I am able to find good quality solutions in comparatively much less time.
Since the optimal value could not be obtained for many instances, I do not report
the comparison of the solution times. However, it takes the heuristic an average of
16.3 seconds to find the solution on a 2.40 GHz Intel dual-core processor with 4.00
GB of RAM.
4.3 Results and Managerial Insights
Since the solution of the dynamic approach depends on the realizations of demand
and returns, it is difficult to study it in an analytical setting. On the other hand,
the static approach considers expected values for optimization. Hence, I use static
approach to derive analytical results and present useful managerial insights. In the
following subsections, I first derive the conditions under which the all-inclusive policy
provides the optimal solution. Next, I numerically compare the performances of
the all-inclusive policy and the heuristic. Then, I examine the impact of error in
inventory information on the quality of the solution. After that, I analyze the trade-
offs in choosing different threshold levels for recommendations. Finally, I compare
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the performance of my solution methodology with an individualized recommendation
policy and then show the non-optimality of simple greedy heuristics that the DVD
firms can utilize in their recommendation decisions. The conditions presented in all
of the analytical results in this section, except one, utilize the original parameters of
the problem. In other words, the managers can directly check the conditions using
the parameter values, without solving any optimization problem.
4.3.1 Sub-optimality of the Prevalent Industry Practice
In this section, I analyze the conditions that are necessary and sufficient for
the prevalent industry practice (i.e., the all-inclusive policy) to be optimal. I also
argue that these conditions are unrealistic and hence the all-inclusive policy will
perform sub-optimal in real business settings. I first define and interpret some basic
expressions that will be useful in presenting the results. In the all-inclusive policy, if
the rating is more than the threshold, i.e., (i, j) ∈ V , the perceived utility of a movie
cluster j is Rij + (Rmax −Rij)E due to the constraint set (4.14) and the fact that
the movie cluster is recommended to all users in cluster i, i.e., xij = 1. Similarly, if
the rating is less than the threshold, i.e., (i, j) /∈ V , then xij = 0 and the perceived
utility of the movie is unchanged at level Rij. Therefore, after the all-inclusive policy
recommendations, the sum of perceived utilities for user cluster i over all the movie
clusters can be written as
Si =
∑
s∈J :(i,s)∈V
[Ris + (Rmax −Ris)E] +
∑
s∈J :(i,s)/∈V
Ris. (4.18)
Hence, as shown in constraint set (4.15), the probability that a user in cluster i
requests movie cluster j is: (a)
Rij+(Rmax−Rij)E
Si
if (i, j) ∈ V, or (b) Rij
Si
if (i, j) /∈ V. As
a result, the total demand for movie cluster j in period t after the recommendations
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of all-inclusive policy is
Fjt =
∑
i∈U :(i,j)∈V
[Rij + (Rmax −Rij)E]nit
Si
+
∑
i∈U :(i,j)/∈V
Rijnit
Si
, (4.19)
where nit denotes the number of requests from users in cluster i in period t. Using
these expressions, I present Proposition 14 below. Proofs are available in Appendix C.
Proposition 14 The prevalent industry practice is optimal iff at least one of the
following three conditions is satisfied:
(a) The parameter values are such that the expected demand for all movie clusters
are greater than their inventories when everything above threshold is recom-
mended (i.e., all-inclusive policy).
(b) The expected demands for the movie clusters that have at least one (i, j) pair
in set V (i.e., the movie clusters that are in the set of recommendable movie
clusters for at least one user cluster) are less than their inventories after the
recommendations are shown using all-inclusive policy. The movie clusters in
which no (i, j) pair is in set V do not need to satisfy this condition.
(c) There is no movie cluster that is recommendable to any user cluster.
Using Equations (4.18) and (4.19), one can restate these conditions mathematically
as:
1. Fjt ≥ Kjt; ∀j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
2. Fjt ≤ Kjt; ∀j ∈ J : ∃γ ∈ U : (γ, j) ∈ V, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
3. V = ∅.
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It is important to note that the conditions presented in the proposition represent
extreme cases and are unlikely to happen in realistic settings. Further, since these
conditions are if-and-only-if, a better recommendation policy can be derived when
neither of these conditions satisfy. Therefore, I can conclude that the prevalent
industry practice is not optimal for realistic problem instances, and a better solution
methodology may be able to improve customer satisfaction.
Let us now analyze the conditions presented in the proposition. In part (a), the
firm utilizes its entire inventory in the all-inclusive policy, and cannot satisfy more
demand using any other methodology. Therefore, the industry practice is optimal.
On the other hand, in part (b), demand is satisfied as much as possible for the
movies that are recommended to at least one customer cluster. In this case, since
all of the movies with ratings above the threshold are offered, the demands for the
other movies are minimized. Hence, although the demands for these movies may not
be all satisfied, they are at their minimum levels. Therefore, the all-inclusive policy
is again optimal. Finally, in part (c), neither the all-inclusive policy nor the optimal
policy can recommend anything. Hence, the all-inclusive policy is optimal.
It is also important to note that the conditions presented in Proposition 14 need
to be satisfied throughout the planning horizon. All-inclusive policy is not clairvoyant
in the sense that it does not consider future demand and returns. Hence, even if the
conditions in the proposition are satisfied in a given period, the all-inclusive policy
might not be optimal over the planning horizon. For example, consider the following
case: In a time period before the demand for a movie cluster is expected to increase
(e.g., Christmas and Christmas themed movies), the condition in part (b) is satisfied.
However, since the demand for Christmas related movies is expected to increase in
the next period, the optimal policy that generates more surplus inventory in the
current period for Christmas movies will perform better than those policies that are
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myopic such as the all-inclusive policy. In summary, the current industry practice
is not optimal in almost all non-trivial cases not only because it does not optimize
decisions for a given period, but also because it is not forward-looking.
4.3.2 Comparison of the All-Inclusive Policy with the Proposed Heuristic
The preceding subsection argues and shows that the all-inclusive policy performs
sub-optimal in realistic business settings. In this subsection, I complement this
finding and examine numerically how much the all-inclusive policy is inferior to my
proposed solution approach. To this end, I compare the all-inclusive policy with the
proposed heuristic for different problem classes with realistic parameter ranges. The
experiment has a full factorial design where I set |U | to 8 and 10, |J | to 10 and 12, and
T to 10 and 12, in order to generate eight problem classes. For each of these problem
classes, I generate eight problem instances by setting E to 0.25 and 0.30, varying total
demand randomly around its mean by 20%, and setting Qst parameters to represent
two different return patterns. In each of these problem instances, I simulate the all-
inclusive policy and compare it to the heuristic solution. The reported performance
values are calculated as the difference between the solutions of all-inclusive policy
and heuristic divided by the solution of the all-inclusive policy. As can be seen in
Table 4.4, the solutions differ by as much as 59%. On the other hand, there are some
instances where the difference is around 2% but never the same. Overall, the average
difference between these two solutions is 11%. These results further strengthen my
analytical finding that the prevalent industry practice is sub-optimal.
4.3.3 Impact of Error in Inventory Information on the Quality of the Solution
The findings I have discussed so far clearly indicate that, because of the sub-
optimality of the all-inclusive policy, it is important to consider inventory explicitly
in recommendation decisions. However, the level of inventory may not always be
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Problem Problem Size Objective Value Comparison
Class |U | |J | T Min Max Median Average
1 8 10 10 3.4% 17.5% 10.9% 10.4%
2 8 10 12 2.2% 14.9% 7.1% 7.9%
3 8 12 10 4.1% 59.3% 6.8% 13.7%
4 8 12 12 3.1% 15.3% 5.9% 6.7%
5 10 10 10 4.1% 55.9% 19.9% 23.0%
6 10 10 12 2.4% 25.5% 5.9% 8.8%
7 10 12 10 4.6% 13.7% 5.5% 7.3%
8 10 12 12 2.9% 21.1% 9.9% 10.4%
Table 4.4: Performance of the Prevalent Industry Practice
estimated with perfect accuracy. Hence, I examine the impact of error in inventory
information on the quality of the solution. First, a given instance of the prob-
lem is solved with incorrect inventory levels, and the recommendation decisions are
recorded. Next, this set of decisions is utilized to simulate what would happen with
the correct inventory levels. In each time period, the inventory for each movie clus-
ter is varied between 70% to 130% of the corresponding actual levels, with 10%
increments across different experiments. Hence, a specific problem instance is solved
seven times. In these experiments, {|U |, |J |, T} are set to {4, 5, 6}, and E to 0.25. I
solve different problem instances by varying the number of requests (nit), the start-
ing inventory levels (Kjt), and the rating values (Rij). The findings, however, do
not change across these instances and can be categorized in two groups. Hence, I
present the solution of only two representative problem instances for each group in
Figure 4.3.
In Figure 4.3, I present the performance gap between the all-inclusive policy and
the static heuristic. Here, problem instance 1 represents cases where the inventory
has either ample shortages or surpluses for most of the movie clusters. On the other
hand, problem instance 2 is one of the scenarios where most of the movie clusters
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have expected demand and inventory close to each other. Hence, the second instance
represents a critically balanced system. As expected, when both methods utilize the
accurate inventory levels, i.e., when the horizontal axis equals to 0, the performance
gap between the all-inclusive policy and the static heuristic is at the maximum level
(for both problem instances).
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Figure 4.3: Gap between the All-inclusive Policy and the Static Solution
Figure 4.3 also shows that when the inventory is underestimated (i.e., negative
values on the x-axis), the percentage gap remains almost unchanged with very little
deterioration in problem instance 1. On the other hand, problem instance 2 exhibits
a different behavior. Here, the quality of the solution diminishes rather quickly, and
there is almost no benefit of using the solution procedure I present in this section
when the underestimation error is more than 20%. Now I analyze the overestimation
case (i.e., positive values on the x-axis). In problem instance 1, the performance
gap diminishes rapidly if the inventory level is overestimated. However, the static
heuristic still performs better than the all-inclusive policy. On the other hand, in
problem instance 2, the deterioration in the quality of the solution is more dramatic.
When the overestimation error is more than 10%, the static approach performs even
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worse than the all-inclusive policy.
In general, the static approach tries to shift demand from movies that have ex-
pected shortages to movies that have expected excess supplies. Hence, even if the
inventory is underestimated, the static approach still tries to increase the demand
of movies that have excess supplies. However, because of the underestimation, some
portion of the inventory of such movies are not utilized that could otherwise at-
tract those customers that are looking for popular movies (with expected shortages).
Therefore, I observe that underestimation errors do not deteriorate the quality of
the solution for problem instance 1. However, such errors impact the quality of the
solution in problem instance 2, because it is a critically balanced system.
On the other hand, when there is overestimation error, the static approach as-
sumes that the firm should be able to satisfy demand with the ample inventory.
As a result, it does not shift demand among movies as much as it actually needs
to. Hence, the quality of the solution deteriorates quickly. I observe that, in both
problem instances, the quality of the solution worsens quickly with overestimation
errors. However, because the performance gap even with no error is low in the second
problem instance, the static solution becomes worse than the all-inclusive policy. I
would also like to note that the problem instance 1 is more likely to be encountered
in practice, because most movies either have excess demand (i.e., newly released hot
movies) or excess supply (i.e., old movies).
Therefore, an important question arises. What does a firm need to do if there is
high uncertainty regarding the inventory levels? Clearly, the answer depends on the
firm’s expected demand and inventory level. I summarize the answer to this question
in the following observation based on the findings discussed above.
Observation 14 If the firm does not have a critically balanced system, it could in-
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tentionally underestimate the inventory. The reason is that, in these environments,
underestimation does not deteriorate the quality of the solution substantially. On the
other hand, if the firm has a critically balanced inventory, underestimation as well as
overestimation might hurt the quality of the solution. Therefore, intentional underes-
timation should not be very high. However, the dynamic solution approach performs
better than the static approach in critically balanced systems. Hence, especially if
there is also high uncertainty regarding the inventory levels, the firm should utilize
the dynamic approach and slightly underestimate its inventory.
In the next subsection, I examine the issue that the DVD-rental firms encounter
regarding the trade-off between short term profitability and long term customer trust
in the recommendations.
4.3.4 Effect of Trust in the Recommender System
As discussed earlier, there are two different effects of the recommendation thresh-
old θ. In the short-term, when the recommendation threshold is lowered, there is
more flexibility in offering movie clusters. Hence, in the short-run, the firm is able to
shift the demand better among the movies. On the other hand, if the firm chooses
a lower threshold level, the customers would perceive that they are offered movies
which they do not value highly. Hence, they may accept less and less recommenda-
tions in the long-run. This concept is referred to as trust in the recommendation
literature (Andersen et al. 2001, Tintarev and Masthoff 2007) and implicitly captured
by the parameter E in my model.
As discussed by Kim et al. (2009), the dynamics of trust should be analyzed in
the long-run. Hence, while keeping E constant, I first derive an upper bound on the
value of reducing threshold level in the short-run. Next, I experimentally study the
effect of lowering the threshold level. For simplicity, I present the analytical results
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for one period, and therefore ignore the subscript for time period in the expressions.
Furthermore, before presenting the generalized result, I present the result for the
scenario when the threshold level is reduced from its maximum value.
First, I define and interpret some basic expressions that will be useful in present-
ing the results. If the recommendation threshold is set to its maximum value, then
clearly there are no recommendations. Hence, in this case, the perceived utility terms
are unchanged. Therefore, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, the demand for a movie clus-
ter j is Fj =
∑
i∈U
Rij∑
s∈J Ris
ni. Now, the dissatisfaction for this movie cluster can be
written as Gj = (Fj −Kj)+. Finally, the total dissatisfaction for all movies becomes
H =
∑
j∈J Gj. In the similar manner, the amount of unused inventory for the movie
cluster j is Ij = (Kj − Fj)+.
By decreasing the recommendation threshold, the firm has the option of recom-
mending some movies that may increase their demands. However, the maximum
increase in demand for a movie cluster is possible when only that movie cluster is
recommended to the users. This bound on increase in demand for movie cluster j
can be expressed as
Qj =
∑
p∈U :(p,j)∈V
(
Rpj + (Rmax −Rpj)E∑
s∈J Rps + (Rmax −Rpj)E
− Rpj∑
s∈J Rps
)
np.
Now, using these expressions, I present the following proposition.
Proposition 15 If the recommendation threshold is reduced from its maximum value
(i.e., Rmax) to θ1, then an upper bound on the increase in customer satisfaction is
the minimum of the following two values:
(a) The total dissatisfaction when θ is set to Rmax.
(b) The summation of the minimum of following two values over each movie cluster
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that became recommendable with the new threshold θ1: (b1) the amount of
unused inventory when θ is set to Rmax, and (b2) the maximum increase in
demand with the new threshold.
Mathematically, I can restate the condition as:
min
[
H,
∑
j∈J :∃(p,j)∈V min(Ij, Qj)
]
.
Note that the condition presented in Proposition 15 is based on exogenous pa-
rameter values, similar to that in Proposition 14. Hence, managers can use this
condition to analyze the benefit of reducing the threshold level without solving the
model. Based on the discussion in Proposition 15, I now generalize the result for the
impact of switching threshold level between any two values.
Proposition 16 An upper bound on the increase in customer satisfaction when de-
creasing the threshold value from θ1 to θ2 is the minimum of the following two values:
(a) The total dissatisfaction when the threshold is set to θ1.
(b) The summation of the minimum of following two values over each movie cluster
that became recommendable with the new threshold θ2: (b1) the amount of un-
used inventory when the threshold is set to θ1, and (b2) the maximum increase
in demand with the new threshold θ2.
Mathematically, this condition can be restates as:
min
[∑
j∈J max
(
0, Dθ1j −Kj
)
,
∑
j∈J ;Vj 6=∅min
[
max(0, Kj −Dθ1j ), G
]]
,
where i ∈ Vj ∀θ1 < Rij < θ2. Dθ1j = demand of movie cluster j with optimal
recommendations at θ = θ1, and G =
∑
i∈U :Rij>θ1
(
Rij+(Rmax−Rij)E∑
s∈J Ris+(Rmax−Rij)E −D
θ1
j
)
.
Unlike other propositions, in Proposition 16, the condition requires us to know
the demand with the optimal set of recommendations for movie cluster j at the
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Figure 4.4: Impact of Recommendation Threshold on Customer Dissatisfaction
beginning threshold value θ1. Actually, a more loose bound (not reported because
of brevity) can be calculated without the need of solving the problem. However,
once I derive this demand, I can easily obtain this upper bound on the increase in
customer satisfaction when decreasing the threshold value to any other level. This is
an important result for managers because it helps them in estimating the gain that
may potentially be achieved by decreasing the threshold value from the current level
to another level.
Propositions 15 and 16 show that the bound on the amount of gain obtained by
reducing the threshold level is problem specific. I further study this phenomenon
using a variety of problem instances. The findings can be broadly grouped into two
scenarios. In Figure 4.4, I plot the results for two problem instances representing
each of these scenarios. Clearly, the total dissatisfaction is lowest when the recom-
mendation threshold is set to its minimum value (i.e., 1). In Figure 4.4, the y-axis
is the percentage increase in total dissatisfaction if the recommendation threshold
is increased from the minimum level. For problem instance 1, there is no effect of
switching the threshold from 1 to 2. However, after this value, the effect of switching
the threshold level becomes significant. The total dissatisfaction more than dou-
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bles when the threshold is increased to its maximum value 5. On the other hand,
problem instance 2, which is actually an extreme case, shows no sensitivity to the
threshold level at all. Therefore, managers should decide on the threshold level by
simulating their own problems and deciding on the level that balances short-term
gains and long-term customer trust. Next, in the following subsection, I study how
my proposed approach compares with an individualized recommendation policy.
4.3.5 Comparison with an Individualized Recommendation Policy
As discussed earlier, the purpose of clustering is to reduce the number of variables
in the optimization model in order to make it tractable. However, although the
proposed methodology provides a near-optimal solution, it loses the information at
the individual customer level. Hence, it is meaningful to compare the proposed
methodology with an individualized policy where the solution is obtained without
clustering the customers. Hence, I design an individualized policy and compare it
with the proposed optimization model. This study would help us in analyzing the
benefit of optimization at the cost of losing individual information. In this section,
I also discuss how the clustering impacts the quality of the solution.
The individualized policy is based on the prevalent industry practice, i.e., all-
inclusive policy. However, in order to make a more conservative comparison, I con-
sider that the individualized policy is more sophisticated than the all inclusive policy.
Let us now describe the details of this individualized policy. The individualized pol-
icy is actually a heuristic that begins by checking whether the estimated rating of
a specific movie cluster for a specific user is above the recommendation threshold.
If this condition is satisfied, then the requests and shipments of this specific movie
cluster are checked for the previous period. If all of the requests were satisfied in
the prior period, then this movie cluster is recommended to this specific customer;
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Percentage Variation Average Percentage Improvement
0 6.0
5 6.2
10 6.1
20 6.2
30 6.9
Table 4.5: Comparison between the Individualized Policy and the Dynamic Solution
else this movie cluster is not recommended to this customer. Next, I compare the
dynamic heuristic with the individualized policy explained above. The results are
presented in Table 4.5.
In this experiment, I draw individual rating values within a cluster around the
cluster mean with some variations. This captures the fact that the individual rating
values within a cluster may be different from the cluster mean. I consider five dif-
ferent levels of variations within clusters (i.e., 0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30%). Here,
0% variation indicates that all individual rating values within a cluster are equal
to the cluster mean. In the remaining four levels, the individual rating values are
drawn around their cluster means with the corresponding variations. Each of these
five levels of variations is presented in a row in Table 4.5. For each level of variation,
I consider 40 problem instances by varying the parameter values in realistic ranges.
In the second column of Table 4.5, I compare the performances of dynamic heuris-
tic and individualized policy. More specifically, I present the average percentage
improvement (across 40 problem instances) in using the dynamic heuristic over the
individualized policy.
First and foremost, the results show that the solutions are not sensitive to the
variations within clusters at any level of variation. This implies that the clustering
does not worsen the solution in this context, and therefore the clustering approach
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considered in this section is reasonable. Finally, the results also show that the im-
provement in using dynamic heuristic over individualized policy is more than 6.0%
at any level of variation. This clearly indicates that it is beneficial to utilize the
proposed dynamic heuristic even though it optimizes the recommendation decision
at the cluster level.
Finally, I present two examples in the following proposition where seemingly
logical or greedy heuristics are shown to be non-optimal.
Proposition 17
(a) Even when the demand is less than the available inventory for a movie cluster,
it may not be optimal to offer this highly available movie to everybody.
(b) Even when the demand for a movie cluster is more than its available inventory,
it may be optimal to recommend it to some customers.
Proposition 17 suggests that it may be difficult to obtain a good solution using
simple greedy heuristics. Hence, there is a need to design a heuristic that can exploit
the structure of the problem effectively, such as the one proposed in Section 4.2. In
the next section, I present the optimal recommendation policies for the DVD-rental
firms in special cases and provide interesting managerial insights.
4.4 Optimal Recommendation Policies for Special Cases
The goal of this section is to characterize the optimal solution under special cases.
These results would provide some guidance for the managers about the solution of
the general case. Also, I discuss that, under certain conditions, the managers may
directly use this optimal solution without solving the optimization model.
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4.4.1 Two Movie Clusters, One User Cluster, and Arbitrary Number of Periods
In this subsection, for ease of discussion, I begin with a restricted case where
the number of movie clusters and user clusters are two and one, respectively. For
example, the two movie clusters may represent high and low rated movies. In ad-
dition, for brevity, I present the results for the single period case in Proposition 18.
However, the multiple period case is trivial to develop from this proposition. In this
proposition, I ignore the subscripts for customer cluster and time period, because
of their singularity. Before presenting the proposition, I define δ = (R1+R2)K1−R1n
(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) .
As shown in Appendix C, this is the value of the effectiveness parameter that would
make demand for movie cluster 1 equal to its inventory when it is recommended to
all users. A less restricted case with arbitrary number of user clusters is analyzed in
the next subsection.
Proposition 18 For one user cluster, two movie clusters, one period, and R1 > θ:
1. If the expected demands for both movie clusters are less than the respective
inventories, then an optimal policy is to recommend nothing, i.e., x1 = x2 = 0.
2. If the expected demands for both movie clusters are more than the respective
inventories, then again an optimal policy is to recommend nothing, i.e., x1 =
x2 = 0.
3. If only one movie cluster has surplus inventory (say cluster 1) and this available
inventory is greater than the total demand (i.e., n ≤ K1), then an optimal policy
is: x1 = 1, x2 = 0.
4. If only one movie cluster has surplus inventory (say cluster 1) and this available
inventory is less than the total demand (i.e., n > K1), then an optimal policy
is: x1 = min
[
δ
E
, 1
]
, x2 = 0.
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In part (a) of the proposition, the firm is able to meet all the demand before any
recommendations. Therefore, there is no need to recommend anything. In part (b),
both movie clusters are requested more than the firm can supply. Hence, again there
is no need to recommend anything, because the firm is already utilizing its entire
inventory and it is not possible to meet more demand. In part (c), the movie cluster 1
has more inventory than the total demand. Increasing the demand for movie cluster
1 is offset by the equal decrease in the demand for movie cluster 2. Here, it is optimal
to increase the demand for movie cluster 1 as much as possible, because its demand
can never be more than its inventory.
Finally, in part (d) of the proposition, the idea is to increase the demand for
movie cluster 1 as much as possible but not more than its inventory. The surplus
inventory cannot be utilized fully if the effectiveness parameter E is less than δ.
Therefore, in this case, it is optimal to recommend movie cluster 1 to everybody
with expected unsatisfied demand equal to
(
R2n
R1+(Rmax−R1)E+R2 −K2
)+
. If E is more
than δ, then recommending movie cluster 1 to everybody will result in expected
shortage in movie cluster 1. Hence, setting x1 =
δ
E
is optimal because it makes the
demand and inventory for movie cluster 1 equal. In parts (c) and (d), it is optimal
not to recommend movie cluster 2 to anybody because its demand increases in x2.
4.4.2 Two Movie Clusters, Arbitrary Number of User Clusters, and Arbitrary
Number of Periods
Next, I consider a more general case with two movie clusters and any number of
user clusters. Before presenting the results, I denote
γ =
(R′s1 +Rs2)
(
K1 −
∑
i∈U\s
(
R′i1
R′i1+Ri2
ni
))
−R′s1ns
(Rmax −R′11)
(
n1 −K1 +
∑
i∈U\s
(
R′i1
R′i1+Ri2
ni
)) .
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I explain later that this is a critical value of the effectiveness parameter when the
demand of movie cluster 1 is set equal to its inventory. For brevity of discussion, I
present the results for only one period in the proposition below where I ignore the
subscript for time.
Proposition 19 For two movie clusters, one period, and any number of user clus-
ters:
(a) If the expected demands for both movie clusters are less than the respective
inventories, then an optimal policy is to recommend nothing, i.e., xij = 0;
∀i, j.
(b) If the expected demands for both movie clusters are more than the respective
inventories, then again an optimal policy is to recommend nothing, i.e., xij = 0;
∀i, j.
(c) If only one movie cluster has surplus inventory (say cluster 1), then an optimal
set of recommendations can be obtained by using the following steps:
(i) Sort and re-label the customer clusters according to Ri1 values, and find
k such that Rk1 > θ and R(k+1)1 ≤ θ.
(ii) Initialization: s = 0, xi2 = 0 ∀i.
(iii) Increase s by 1. If s > k, then the optimal solution is: xi1 = 1 for
i ≤ k, xi1 = 0 for i > k, and xi2 = 0 ∀i, and terminate. Oth-
erwise (i.e., when s ≤ k), set xp1 = 0 for p > s, and denote R′i1 =

Ri1 + (Rmax −Ri1)E i < s
Ri1 i ≥ s
(iv) If ns − K1 +
∑
i∈U\s
(
R′i1
R′i1+Ri2
ni
)
< 0, then set xs1 = 1, and go to Step
(iii). Otherwise, go to Step (v).
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(v) If E < γ, then set xs1 = 1, and go to Step (iii). Otherwise, set the
recommendations as: xi1 = 1 for i < s, xs1 =
γ
E
, xi1 = 0 for i > s, and
xi2 = 0 ∀i, and terminate.
The explanations for parts (a) and (b) are similar to those for Proposition 18.
Also, similar to Proposition 18, in part (c), one should aim to increase the demand
for movie cluster 1 as much as possible without making it more than its inventory.
In this case, there is one equation, namely the demand-inventory balance equation
for the movie cluster 1, but there are k unknowns. I propose a solution methodology
which follows from the observation that the recommendation of movie cluster 1 to
a specific user cluster does not affect the demand of movies for other user clusters.
Hence, an optimal solution is to check (starting from the first user cluster) whether
recommending movie cluster 1 to user cluster s can increase the demand of movie
cluster 1 to the starting inventory level K1. Step (iv) checks whether it is possible to
increase the demand up to the inventory level by recommending only up to the user
cluster s. If it is not enough, then the proposed policy is to recommend movie cluster
1 to everybody in the user cluster and go back to step (iii) to restart the procedure
for the next user cluster. Otherwise, in step (v), I check whether the efficiency of the
recommendations is below γ. In such a case, recommending movie cluster 1 to user
cluster s does not increase its demand more than the inventory level, therefore I set
xs1 = 1. Otherwise, xs1 is set to
γ
E
so that the demand for movie cluster 1 equals
to its inventory, and the optimal policy is stated at the end of step (v). Else, the
procedure revisits step (iii) for the next user cluster.
4.4.3 Managerial Insights
There are two key advantages of the results presented in this section. First,
Proposition 19 can be applied to settings for any number of user clusters. Hence,
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when users are very diverse in their preferences, utilizing the procedure described in
the proposition can provide an individualized solution to managers. Second, when
the diversity of the rating estimates are low, the firm may be able to group movies
into two clusters without sacrificing much information about movies. If the firm
is able to do so, Proposition 19 would provide them the explicit structure of the
optimal solution. The managers may use this information effectively in making
different strategic and tactical decisions. However, when the diversity of the rating
estimates are high, the firm may not be able to group movies into two clusters
effectively. In other words, the negative impact of grouping movies into two clusters
may be more than the gain from the characterization of optimal solution. In such
cases, the firm should rather utilize the methodology discussed in Section 4.1.1 with
higher number of movie clusters. However, even for these cases, the managers may
utilize the solution presented in Proposition 19 to derive some insights regarding the
structure of the solution.
I would also like to mention that the optimal procedure presented in Proposi-
tion 19 can be extended to settings where the number of movie clusters is more than
two (but not very high). Clearly, the procedure starts getting cumbersome as the
number of movie clusters increases. However, since the computational efficiency is
increasing substantially with time, one may be able to solve these procedures for
higher number of movie clusters. The details are omitted for brevity.
4.5 Conclusions
This study builds on the argument that the recommendations should be tailored
according to both the preferences of users and the inventory information. DVD-
rental firms usually do not consider the inventory of the movies explicitly while
making recommendations. The analytical and experimental results show that this
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prevalent industry practice is sub-optimal, and the customer satisfaction can be
improved significantly by considering inventory in recommendation decisions.
I propose a practicable dynamic solution approach where the future decisions
are based on the observation of actual rental and return events in current and past
periods. The related analysis reveals that it is beneficial for the firm to adopt dynam-
ically when the system is critically balanced, i.e., demand and inventory are close
to each other for some movies. However, if the system is not critically balanced,
then the firm may consider the solution of the static approach. It may help them
in saving the costs related to updating parameter values and solving the problem in
each period. On the other hand, if there is high uncertainty regarding the inventories
and if the system is critically balanced, I show that the static approach might be
slightly inferior to the prevalent industry practice. In this case, I propose utilizing
the dynamic approach and intentionally underestimating inventories as quick recipes
to the DVD-rental firms.
Next, I analyze the impact of the recommendation threshold level on short-term
profitability and long-term customer trust trade-off. The results indicate that the
gain from changing the threshold level is problem-specific. Hence, the managers need
to carefully analyze their business settings in order to choose the best threshold level
that will balance profitability in the short-term and user trust in the long-term.
In addition, I discuss how the proposed methodology can be utilized by the DVD
rental firms at the individual customer level. Finally, I present the optimal solution
in the case of two movie clusters, any number of user clusters, and any number of
time periods. When the diversity of the rating estimates are low, the firm may be
able to group movies into two clusters without sacrificing much information about
movies. In such a case, the managers can characterize the optimal procedure that
would help them in making different strategic and tactical decisions.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I present three essays where I study coordination and col-
laboration settings within and across companies. In the first essay, I study the
relationship between a client and a vendor in value co-creation environments. I con-
sider that the client gets utility from the project throughout the development period.
The output is contingent on the effort levels of each party and I allow these effort
levels to be dynamic. Hence, the client needs to optimally decide the terms of the
payment so as to maximize the project output and minimize its cost.
Taking these characteristics of the collaboration into consideration, I examine
three differential game settings. I derive the effort levels of the client and the vendor
at the equilibrium and the optimal payment parameters in the contracts. I also study
how different contracts compare under different settings in order to find the best one
for the client. The result is that, if the output is not very sensitive to vendor’s
effort, the effort dependent structure is better than the output dependent structure
for the client. On the other hand, if the output is very sensitive to the effort of the
vendor, then the client should offer payments based on output in order to give enough
incentive to the vendor to spend more effort and generate more value together.
Moreover, if the client’s contract selection also includes the hybrid structure, and
if the output is moderately or highly sensitive to vendor’s effort, the hybrid contract
is better for the client. This implies that the vendor should be offered a share of the
output, as well as payments related to the effort he spends in the generation of the
output. If the output is not much sensitive to vendor’s effort, the client should prefer
an effort dependent structure. I further present several interesting findings based on
the sensitivity analyses of the equilibrium effort levels and value of the client with
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respect to the parameters representing different characteristics of the parties. Finally,
I consider that the client may offer training to their vendors in order to increase their
productivity or lower their participation costs. I show that the client should provide
training to only those vendors that have relatively high costliness.
In the second essay, I study another value co-creation environment. In this case,
unlike the first essay, I assume that the effort levels are not observable but might be
monitored and examine two different settings from a differential game perspective.
My analysis reveals that the client’s valuation of the project and the progress in the
collaboration play an important role in the behavior of the effort levels. Depending
on these factors, the equilibrium effort levels might increase or decrease with the
changes in the output sensitivities to effort levels and the cost elasticities of efforts.
Moreover, I compare the performances of different contracts in order to find the
best one for the client under different circumstances. This analysis also reveals
whether the vendor’s effort should be monitored or not. I find that, as long as the
participation cost of the vendor is not very low, his effort should be monitored and
the client should use an effort dependent contract. Otherwise, the client should
not monitor vendor’s effort, and should operate under double moral hazard with an
output dependent contract. Another finding is that, if the sensitivity of output to
vendor’s effort is relatively higher than the sensitivity to client’s effort, the client
should use the output dependent contract and should not monitor vendor’s effort. I
also consider pure revenue-sharing contracts and find that the total value generated
in such an environment is lower than that in the output dependent contract.
In the third essay, I consider a subscription based rental organization. In these
environments, the satisfaction of customers depends on the availability of requested
products. Hence, it is important for these firms to satisfy as much demand as pos-
sible. Recommender systems, in a DVD-rental context, are typically used to help
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customers in finding the right movies for them. However, DVD-rental firms usually
do not consider the inventory of the movies explicitly while making recommenda-
tions. My results show that this prevalent industry practice is sub-optimal, and
the customer satisfaction can be improved significantly by considering inventory in
recommendation decisions. I propose two recommendation approaches to the firms
depending on the nature of their business, i.e., whether or not they have a critically
balanced system. I also analyze the impact of the recommendation threshold level
on short-term profitability and long-term customer trust trade-off. The results in-
dicate that the gain from changing the threshold level is problem-specific. Hence,
the managers need to carefully analyze their business settings in order to choose the
best threshold level that will balance profitability in the short-term and user trust
in the long-term. Finally, I present the optimal solution for some special cases of the
problem.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS IN SECTION 2
Proof of Remark 1
Because of the bounds on the parameter values, one can easily write:
(γ − α)δ − βγ = γδ − αδ − βγ > γδ − (1− β)δ − βγ ≥ γδ −max(γ, δ) > 0.
This remark is utilized in many of the following proofs in Section 2 with or without
mention.
Proof of Lemma 1
The Hamiltonians for the client and the vendor (i.e., Hc(t) and Hv(t), respec-
tively) can be written as below (Arrow and Kurz 1970):
Hc(t) = kq(t)− ccu(t)γ − pv(t) + λ1(t)u(t)αv(t)β, and
Hv(t) = pv(t)− cvv(t)δ + λ2(t)u(t)αv(t)β.
The multipliers λ1(t) and λ2(t) are given by:
λ1(t) = −∂Hc(t)∂q(t) = −k, and λ2(t) = −∂Hv(t)∂q(t) = 0,
Solution of the above differential equations with the boundary conditions λ1(T ) = 0,
and λ2(T ) = 0 gives λ1(t) = −kt+ kT , and λ2(t) = 0.
The equilibrium behavior necessitates the derivatives of the Hamiltonians’ with
respect to the control variables to be zero. Hence, I need to solve the following
system of equations
∂Hc(t)
∂u(t)
= 0, and ∂Hv(t)
∂v(t)
= 0.
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Thus, after substituting the values of λ1(t) and λ2(t), I have:
−γccu(t)−1+γ + αu(t)−1+αv(t)β(−kt+ kT ) = 0, and
p− δcvv(t)−1+δ = 0.
The solution of the above equation system results in the presented equilibrium
levels. Second order conditions for this differential game is satisfied, because the
Hamiltonians are strictly concave. It is also easy to check that the vendor’s reser-
vation utility is positive with any p value so that the last constraint in the model is
satisfied due to the starting assumption that δ > 1. Besides, I do not need to impose
a constraint stating that the utility for the client would be nonnegative. This is be-
cause p = 0 is already a trivial solution to the differential game that has nonnegative
returns to the client.
Proof of Lemma 2
If I substitute the equilibrium values of the effort levels into the maximization
problem of the client, and take the integrals, I have the following problem:
maxp k
T (γ−α)γcc
kα(2γ−α)
(
kTα
γcc
(
p
δcv
) β
δ−1
) γ
γ−α
−cc T
2γ−α
γ−α (γ−α)
2γ−α
(
kα
γcc
(
p
δcv
) β
δ−1
) γ
γ−α
−pT
(
p
δcv
) 1
δ−1
.
Given this parametric equation that is observed in the equilibrium, the client can
maximize over the payment per unit effort, i.e., p. First order condition with respect
to p reveals the reported critical value and shows that it is unique. Second order
condition is involved to examine. However, it is easy to show that ∃p that results in
positive value to the client for all set of parameter values. Moreover, there exists an
upper bound for p above which the value for the client is negative. The lower bound
for p is obviously zero. Besides, I can disregard the reservation utility constraint for
the vendor, because it is always satisfied. Therefore, the constraint set is compact.
Hence, due to Weierstrass Theorem (Patrick 2009), the reported p value is the global
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maximum.
Proof of Lemma 3
The Hamiltonians for the client and the vendor (i.e., Hc(t) and Hv(t), respec-
tively) can be written as below (Arrow and Kurz 1970):
Hc(t) = kq(t)− ccu(t)γ − lq(t) + λ1(t)u(t)αv(t)β, and
Hv(t) = lq(t)− cvv(t)δ + λ2(t)u(t)αv(t)β.
The multipliers λ1(t) and λ2(t) are given by:
λ1(t) = −∂Hc(t)∂q(t) = −k + l, and λ2(t) = −∂Hv(t)∂q(t) = −l.
Solution of the above differential equations with the boundary conditions λ1(T ) = 0,
and λ2(T ) = 0 results in λ1(t) = (k− l)(T − t), and λ2(t) = l(T − t). The equilibrium
behavior necessitates the derivatives of the Hamiltonians’ with respect to the control
variables to be zero. Hence, I need to solve the following system of equations
∂Hc(t)
∂u(t)
= 0, and ∂Hv(t)
∂v(t)
= 0.
Thus, after substituting the values of λ1(t) and λ2(t), I have:
−γccu(t)γ−1 + (k − l)(T − t)αu(t)α−1v(t)β = 0, and
−δcvv(t)−1+δ + l(T − t)βu(t)αv(t)β−1 = 0.
The solution of the above equation system results in the presented equilibrium
levels. Second order conditions for this differential game is satisfied, because the
Hamiltonians are strictly concave. It is also easy to check that the vendor’s reserva-
tion utility is positive with any l with 0 < l < k so that the last constraint in the
model is always satisfied.
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Proof of Lemma 4
If I substitute the equilibrium values of the effort levels into the maximization
problem of the client, and take the integrals, I have the following objective after I
rearrange the terms:
maxl
T
βγ+αδ
βγ+δ(α−γ) (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
(k−l)(( (k−l)αγcc )αδ( lβδcv )βγ
) 1
−βγ−αδ+γδ−cc
(
( (k−l)αγcc )
−β+δ
( lβδcv )
β
) γ
γδ−βγ−αδ


−1 .
Given this parametric equation that is observed in the equilibrium, the client can
maximize over the transfer payment per output parameter, i.e., l. First order condi-
tion with respect to l reveals the reported critical value, i.e., l = k β
δ
, and shows that
it is unique. Second order condition reveals that l = k β
δ
is a local maximum. The
upper and lower bounds for l are obviously k and zero. Besides, I can disregard the
reservation utility constraint for the vendor, because it is always satisfied. Therefore,
the constraint set is compact. Hence, due to Weierstrass Theorem (Patrick 2009),
the reported l value is the global maximum.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels (when the pay-
ment term is set to its optimal level) and the optimal payment term with respect to
the corresponding parameters.
Proof and Threshold Values of Proposition 2
The proof follows from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels (when the pay-
ment term is set to its optimal level) and the optimal payment term with respect to
the corresponding parameters. The threshold values are:
Eαc = e
β(βγ+(α−γ)δ)
δ2(2γ−α)
− (βγ+(α−γ)δ)2
αδ2(γ−α)
(
γcc
α(T−t)
) (βγ+(α−γ)δ)2
δ2(α−γ)2
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
Tβ(γ−α)
)β
δ (γcc
Tα
)β(γ2(δ−β)+α2δ)
δ2(α−γ)2 ,
Eαv =
1
T
e
−((γ−α)δ−βγ)(γ−α)
γδ(2γ−α)
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
β(γ−α)
)β
δ (γcc
α
)1−β
δ ,
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Eβc =
1
T
e
−((γ−α)δ−βγ)
γδ
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
β(γ−α)
)1−α
γ (γcc
α
)α
γ ,
Eβv =
1
T
e
−((γ−α)δ−βγ)(γ−α)
βγ2
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
β(γ−α)
)1−α
γ (γcc
α
)α
γ ,
Eγc =
e
((γ−α)δ−βγ)((α2+2γ2)(β−δ)+αγ(3δ−2β))
γδ(2γ−α)(γ−α)(δ−β)
( γccα(T−t))
((γ−α)δ−βγ)2
−δ(γ−α)2(δ−β)
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
Tβ(γ−α)
) δ
β ( γccTα )
αβ(2γ(δ−β)−α(2δ−β))
−δ(α−γ)2(δ−β)
,
Eγv =
1
T
e
−((γ−α)δ−βγ)(γ−α)
γδ(2γ−α)
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
β(γ−α)
)β
δ (γcc
α
)1−β
δ ,
Eδc =
1
T
e
2(βγ+(α−γ)δ)
γδ
(
δ2cv(2γ−α)
β(γ−α)
)1−α
γ (γcc
α
)α
γ .
Proof of Lemma 5
This result is obtained by substituting the equilibrium effort levels and the opti-
mal payment term presented in Lemmas 1 and 2 into the objective functions of the
client and the vendor in the effort dependent model.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof follows from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels (when the payment
term is set to its optimal level k β
γ
) with respect to the corresponding parameters.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels (when the pay-
ment term is set to its optimal level k β
γ
) with respect to the corresponding parameters.
The threshold values are:
Oαc =
1
T−te
(δ−β)(βγ+(α−γ)δ)
αδ2
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)1−β
δ
(
δ2cv
β2
)β
δ
,
Oαv =
1
T−te
βγ+(α−γ)δ
γδ
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)1−β
δ
(
δ2cv
β2
)β
δ
,
Oβc =
1
T−te
βγ+(α−γ)δ
γδ
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)α
γ
(
δ2cv
β2
)1−α
γ
,
Oβv =
1
T−te
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(α(β−2δ)+2γ(δ−β))
βγ2(δ−β)
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)α
γ
(
δ2cv
β2
)1−α
γ
,
Oγc =
1
T−te
βγ+(α−γ)δ
γδ
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)1−β
δ
(
δ2cv
β2
)β
δ
,
Oδc =
1
T−te
βγ+(α−γ)δ
γδ
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)α
γ
(
δ2cv
β2
)1−α
γ
,
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Oδv =
1
T−te
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2βγ+2αδ−2γδ−αβ)
δγ(γ−α)(β−δ)
(
γδcc
(δ−β)α
)α
γ
(
δ2cv
β2
)1−α
γ
.
Proof of Lemma 6
This result is obtained by substituting the equilibrium effort levels and the opti-
mal payment term presented in Lemmas 3 and 4 into the objective functions of the
client and the vendor in the output dependent model.
Proof of Proposition 5
One can derive this result by solving the output dependent payment model with
α = 0, and checking the sensitivity of the client’s value with respect to β.
Proof of Lemmas 7, 8, 9, and 10
These proofs are similar to the proofs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS IN SECTION 3
Proof of Lemma 11
The Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem can be written as below (Arrow
and Kurz 1970):
H(t) = kq(t)− ccu(t)γ − cvv(t)δ + λ(t)u(t)αv(t)β.
Control variables u(t) and v(t) that are presented in the lemma are derived from
solving the following set of equations.
∂H(t)
∂u(t)
= −γccu(t)γ−1 + αu(t)α−1v(t)βλ(t) = 0,
∂H(t)
∂v(t)
= −δcvv(t)δ−1 + βu(t)αv(t)β−1λ(t) = 0,
λ˙(t) = −∂H(t)
∂q(t)
= −k, and
λ(T ) = 0.
Finally, since the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in u and v, the solution presented
in the lemma is global maximum.
Proof of Lemma 12
Total value is calculated by substituting the optimal effort levels presented in
Lemma 11 into the objective function presented in Equation (3.3).
Remark 2
Remark 2 The following condition satisfies: (γ − α)δ − βγ > 0.
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Proof: (γ − α)δ− βγ = γδ− αδ− βγ > γδ− (1− β)δ− βγ ≥ γδ−max(γ, δ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 13
The Hamiltonians for the client and the vendor (i.e., Hc(t) and Hv(t), respec-
tively) can be written as below (Arrow and Kurz 1970):
Hc(t) = kq(t)− ccu(t)γ − lq(t)− Fd + λ1(t)u(t)αv(t)β, and
Hv(t) = lq(t) + Fd − cvv(t)δ + λ2(t)u(t)αv(t)β.
The multipliers λ1(t) and λ2(t) are given by:
λ˙1(t) = −∂Hc(t)∂q(t) = −k + l, and λ˙2(t) = −∂Hv(t)∂q(t) = −l.
Solution of the above differential equations with the boundary conditions λ1(T ) = 0
and λ2(T ) = 0 results in λ1(t) = (k− l)(T − t), and λ2(t) = l(T − t). The equilibrium
behavior necessitates the derivatives of the Hamiltonians with respect to the control
variables to be zero. Hence, I need to solve the following system of equations
∂Hc(t)
∂u(t)
= 0, and ∂Hv(t)
∂v(t)
= 0.
Thus, after substituting the values of λ1(t) and λ2(t), I have:
−γccu(t)γ−1 + (k − l)(T − t)αu(t)α−1v(t)β = 0, and
−δcvv(t)−1+δ + l(T − t)βu(t)αv(t)β−1 = 0.
The solution of the above equation system results in the presented equilibrium
levels. The Second order conditions for this differential game are also satisfied,
because the Hamiltonians are strictly concave.
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Proof of Lemma 14
The client does not leave any value to the vendor above his reservation utility.
Hence, Fd = −
∫ T
0
lq(t)dt+
∫ T
0
cvv(t)
δdt+Rv. After I substitute Fd and the equilib-
rium effort levels into the maximization problem of the client, and take the integrals,
I have the following objective after rearranging the terms:
max
l
T
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
(γ−α)δ−βγ (γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ
((
(k−l)α
γcc
)αδ (
lβ
δcv
)βγ) 1(γ−α)δ−βγ (
k − (k−l)α
γ
− lβ
δ
)
−Rv.
Given this parametric equation that is observed in the equilibrium, the client can
maximize over the transfer payment per output parameter, i.e., l. First order condi-
tion w.r.t. l reveals that there are two critical values, i.e., k
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ and
k
β(γ−α)+
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ . I show below that the first root is between 0 and k.
Assume first that βγ − αδ < 0. Then, k β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ < k iff αβ − βγ +√
αβ(γ − α)(δ − β) < αδ − βγ. This inequality further reduces to the condition
β(γ − α) < α(δ − β) that is satisfied because of the assumption βγ − αδ < 0. On
the other hand, k
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ > 0 iff
√
αβ(γ − α)(δ − β) > β(γ − α). This
inequality further reduces to the condition α(δ − β) > β(γ − α) that is satisfied due
to the assumption βγ − αδ < 0. Therefore, under the assumption that βγ − αδ < 0,
the first root is between 0 and k. If βγ −αδ > 0, then the proof that shows the first
root is between 0 and k is almost identical. Hence, I omit that part due to brevity.
In a similar manner, the second root can be shown to be either less than 0 or
more than k. In addition, the second order condition reveals that the first root, i.e.,
l = k
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ , is a local maximum. The upper and lower bounds for l are
obviously k and zero. Besides, I can disregard the reservation utility constraint for
the vendor, because it is always satisfied. Therefore, the constraint set is compact.
Hence, due to Weierstrass Theorem (Patrick 2009), the reported l value is the global
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maximum.
Proof of Proposition 6
I provide the proof for d l
∗
dα
< 0. Other proofs are similar, hence omitted. First
observe that
(βγ − 2αβ + αδ)2 − 4αβ(γ − α)(δ − β) = (βγ − αδ)2 > 0. Hence,
(βγ − 2αβ + αδ)2 > 4αβ(γ − α)(δ − β).
Positive root of (βγ−2αβ+αδ)2 = 0 is βγ−2αβ+αδ, because βγ−2αβ+αδ >
β2 − 2αβ + α2 = (α− β)2 ≥ 0. Therefore, I have:
βγ − 2αβ + αδ > 2
√
αβ(γ − α)(δ − β). (5.1)
I use this inequality to show that d l
∗
dα
< 0. Now, let us write
d l∗
dα
=
kβγ(β−δ)
(
βγ−2αβ+αδ−2
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
)
2
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)(βγ−αδ)2 .
Here, kβγ(β−δ)
2
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)(βγ−αδ)2 < 0, because α < γ and β < δ. Therefore
d l∗
dα
< 0 iff
−
(
βγ − 2αβ + αδ − 2√αβ(γ − α)(δ − β)) < 0.
Hence, due to inequality (5.1), I conclude that d l
∗
dα
< 0.
Proof and Threshold Values of Proposition 7
The equilibrium effort levels with the optimal payment parameter (i.e., l∗ =
k
β(γ−α)−
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ−αδ ) is presented below:
u(t) =

 (T−t)δ
(
kα(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
)δ−β
(
kβ(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(αδ−βγ)cv
)−β


1
(γ−α)δ−βγ
,
v(t) =

 (T−t)γ
(
kα(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
)α
(
kβ(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(αδ−βγ)cv
)−γ+α


1
(γ−α)δ−βγ
.
The threshold values presented below follow from the derivatives of these effort
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levels with respect to the corresponding parameters.
Oαc =
1
T−t
e
((γ−α)δ−βγ)(2α2(β−δ)δ+γ(3βγ(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ)+2αγ(δ2−β2))
2αδ2(α−γ)(αδ−βγ)(
α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
) δ−β
δ
(
β(β(α−γ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(αδ−βγ)cv
)β
δ
,
Oαv =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2α3δ−γ2
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)+αγ2(2β+δ)−α2γ(2β+3δ))
2δγ α(α−γ)(−βγ+αδ)
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv


γ−α
γ
(
α
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δcv
β2(γ−α)γcc
)βγ+(α−γ)δ
−δγ
(
α(αβ−αδ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
)α
γ
,
Oβc =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2β3γ−β2(2α+3γ)δ+β(2α+γ)δ2−
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ2)
2β(β−δ)(βγ−αδ)γδ
(
α
√
αβ(γ−α)(δ−β)δcv
β2(γ−α)γcc
)βγ+(α−γ)δ
γδ
(
α(αβ−αδ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
) δ−β
δ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(αδ−βγ)cv
)β
δ
,
Oβv =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2β2γ(−α+γ)+2β(α−γ)(α+γ)δ−γ
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ+3α(γ−α)δ2)
2βγ2(β−δ)(βγ−αδ)(
α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
)α
γ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv
) γ−α
γ
,
Oγc =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2α2(β−δ)δ+γ(3βγ(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ)+2αγ(δ2−β2))
2(α−γ)γδ(β−δ)(−βγ+αδ)(
α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
) δ−β
δ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv
)β
δ
,
Oγv =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(−γ2
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)+2α3δ+αγ2(2β+δ)−α2γ(2β+3δ))
2(α−γ)αδγ(−βγ+αδ)

α(αβ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)−αδ)
γ(βγ−αδ)cc


α(δ−β)
αδ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv
) (δ−β)(γ−α)
αδ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv
) (βγ+(α−γ)δ)
αδ
,
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Oδc =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2β3γ−β2(2α+3γ)δ+β(2α+γ)δ2−
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ2)
2βγ(β−δ)δ(βγ−αδ)

α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc


βγ+(α−γ)δ
βγ
(
α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
) (γ−α)(δ−β)
βγ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(αδ−βγ)cv
) γ−α
γ
,
Oδv =
1
T−t
e
(βγ+(α−γ)δ)(2β2γ(γ−α)+2β(α−γ)(α+γ)δ−γ
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ)δ+3α(γ−α)δ2)
2(α−γ)(β−δ)δγ(−βγ+αδ)(
α(α(β−δ)+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
γ(βγ−αδ)cc
)α
γ
(
β(αβ−βγ+
√
αβ(α−γ)(β−δ))
δ(−βγ+αδ)cv
) γ−α
γ
.
Proof of Lemma 15
Client’s value is derived by substituting the equilibrium effort levels and the opti-
mal payment terms (presented in Lemmas 13 and 14, respectively) into the objective
function of the client.
Proof of Proposition 8
In this contract, the client covers all the costs due to exerting efforts and the
monitoring of vendor’s effort. However, the client leaves no value in addition to
these costs and the reservation utility of the vendor.
Proof of Lemma 16
The equilibrium effort levels are derived by solving the optimal control problem
Problem P. The proof is similar to the earlier proofs, and therefore the details are
omitted.
Proof of Proposition 9
These results follow from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels (when the
payment term is set to its optimal level) with respect to the corresponding parame-
ters.
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Proof and Threshold Values of Proposition 10
These results follow from the derivatives of equilibrium effort levels with respect
to the corresponding parameters. The threshold values are:
Eαc = e
−(δ−β)((γ−α)δ−βγ)
αδ2
γcc
(T−t)α
(
αδcv
βγcc
)β
δ
,
Eαv = e
−((δ−β)γ−αδ)
γδ δcv
(T−t)β
(
βγcc
αδcv
) δ−β
δ
,
Eβc = e
−((δ−β)γ−αδ)
γδ
γcc
(T−t)α
(
αδcv
βγcc
) γ−α
γ
,
Eβv = e
−(γ−α)((γ−α)δ−βγ)
βγ2 δcv
(T−t)β
(
βγcc
αδcv
)α
γ
,
Eγc = e
−((δ−β)γ−αδ)
γδ
γcc
(T−t)α
(
αδcv
βγcc
)β
δ
,
Eγv = e
−(γ(δ−β)−αδ)
γδ δcv
(T−t)β
(
βγcc
αδcv
) δ−β
δ
,
Eδc = e
−((δ−β)γ−αδ)
γδ
γcc
(T−t)α
(
αδcv
βγcc
) γ−α
γ
,
Eδv = e
−((γ−α)δ−βγ)
γδ δcv
(T−t)β
(
βγcc
αδcv
)α
γ
.
Proof of Lemma 17
The value is derived by substituting the equilibrium effort levels in Lemma 16
and the function H(.) in Proposition 8 into the objective function of the client.
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Proof of Proposition 11
Here I show the proof for the effort dependent contract, and for only with respect
to α. Other parts of the proof are similar, and therefore I omit them. It is easy
to show that, when the vendor’s effort is monitored, client’s net value presented in
Lemma 17 increases in α if and only if:
γδ(βγ+(α−γ)δ)+(βγ+(α−2γ)δ) ln
[
(kT )−γδ
(
α
γcc
)βγ−γδ (
β
δ (cv + cm)
)−βγ]
> 0.
This condition can be rewritten as:
(
α
γcc
)δ−β
(kT )δ
(
β
δ (cv + cm)
)β
> eδ
(γ−α)δ−βγ
(2γ−α)δ−βγ . (5.2)
Hence, it is apparent that left side of the inequality
(
α
γcc
)δ−β
(kT )δ
(
β
δ(cv+cm)
)β
→
0 as α→ 0. However, right hand side eδ (γ−α)δ−βγ(2γ−α)δ−βγ → eδ γ(δ−β)γ(2δ−β) > 0 as α→ 0. Therefore
with low values of α, Inequality (5.2) would not satisfy. This implies that the client’s
net value decreases in α when α is low.
Proof of Proposition 12
The condition in this proposition is derived by comparing the client’s value in
both contracts that are presented in Lemmas 15 and 17.
Proofs of Lemmas 18, 19, and 20
These proofs are similar to the proofs of Lemmas 14, 15, and 16. Hence, I omit
them due to brevity.
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Proof of Proposition 13
I derive this result by a direct comparison of the expressions in Lemmas 14 and
18.
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APPENDIX C
LINEARIZED MODEL, AND PROOFS OF LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS IN
SECTION 4
Linearized Model
For linearization, I replace constraint sets (4.14) and (4.15) by the following sets of
constraints when Rmax = 5. Similar constraints can be easily written for any other
value of Rmax.
bijt + 2cijt + 4qijt ≤ Rij + (Rmax −Rij) xijtE + 0.5; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
bijt + 2cijt + 4qijt ≥ Rij + (Rmax −Rij) xijtE − 0.5; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
bijt + 2cijt + 4qijt ≤ Rmax; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T∑
s∈J
fijst + 2
∑
s∈J
gijst + 4
∑
s∈J
hijst − bijt − 2cijt − 4qijt = 0; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, ∀t
fijst ≤ bist; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
bist + Aijt − 1 ≤ fijst ≤ Aijt; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
gijst ≤ cist; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
cist + Aijt − 1 ≤ gijst ≤ Aijt; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
hijst ≤ qist; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
qist + Aijt − 1 ≤ hijst ≤ Aijt; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, s ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
bijt, cijt, qijt ∈ {0, 1}; i ∈ U, j ∈ J, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
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Proof of Proposition 14
I first prove the proposition for a single period and then extend it to the multiple
period case. Hence, I omit the time index in the discussion below.
Sufficiency: If at least one of the conditions in parts (a), (b), or (c) is satisfied,
then the current industry practice is optimal.
In both parts (a) and (b), the left hand side indicates the expected demand for
a movie cluster after the recommendations are made using the all-inclusive policy.
Hence, the condition in part (a) implies that expected demand for all of movie
clusters is greater than or equal to their corresponding available inventories after
the recommendations. Therefore, the firm is utilizing its entire inventory using the
all-inclusive policy and cannot satisfy more demand in any other policy. Hence, the
all-inclusive policy is optimal. On the other hand, the condition in part (b) implies
that the expected demand for the movie clusters that are in the set of recommendable
movie clusters for at least one user cluster (movie clusters that have at least one pair
above the threshold) is below or equal to their corresponding available inventories
after the recommendations. Hence, in this case, all-inclusive policy satisfies the
demand for such movie clusters. On the other hand, because all of the movies above
the threshold are recommended, the demands for the movies for which all rating
values are below the threshold level are minimized. Hence, although the demands
for these movie clusters cannot be all satisfied, they are at their minimum anyways.
Therefore, the all-inclusive policy is again optimal. In part (c), no recommendations
can be made in any policy. Hence, every policy are the same and optimal. Extending
the argument for the multiple period case is now easy. In each period, if either the
entire inventory is shipped or all of the demands are satisfied as much as possible
using the all-inclusive policy, then this policy is optimal. Hence, the conditions are
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sufficient in the multiple period case as well.
Necessity: If the all-inclusive policy is optimal, then at least one of the conditions
in parts (a), (b), or (c) is satisfied.
For this part of the proof, I use contraposition. First, I divide the set of movie
clusters into three subsets B, C, and D as follows: (i) Set B contains those movie
clusters for which expected demand is more than inventory after the recommenda-
tions are made using the all-inclusive policy, (ii) Set C contains those movie clusters
for which expected demand is less than inventory after the recommendations are
made using the all-inclusive policy, and (iii) Set D contains those movie clusters for
which expected demand is equal to inventory after the recommendations are made
using the all-inclusive policy. Then, the only condition not covered in parts (a), (b),
and (c) of the proposition is the following:
i. |B| ≥ 1 and ∃(γ, b) ∈ V : γ ∈ U ; b ∈ B.
ii. |C| ≥ 1.
These conditions state that (i) the set B is not empty, and at least one movie cluster
in this set is recommendable to at least one user cluster, and (ii) there is at least one
movie cluster in set C. If the all-inclusive policy is used to make the recommenda-
tions, then the demand for a movie cluster j ∈ J can be written as
∑
i∈U :(i,j)∈V
Rij + (Rmax −Rij)Exij
α + β + η
ni +
∑
i∈U :(i,j)/∈V
Rij
α + β + η
ni, (5.3)
where α =
∑
p∈B:(i,p)∈V (Rip + (Rmax −Rip)Exip) +
∑
p∈B:(i,p)/∈V Rip,
β =
∑
q∈C:(i,q)∈V (Riq + (Rmax −Riq)Exiq) +
∑
q∈C:(i,q)/∈V Riq,
η =
∑
v∈D:(i,v)∈V (Riv + (Rmax −Riv)Exiv) +
∑
v∈D:(i,v)/∈V Riv.
Consider a policy where the recommendations for the movie clusters that belong
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to set B and that have at least one (i, j) pair in set V is lowered by a positive amount
, i.e., xib = 1− , b ∈ B, ∀{i, b} ∈ V ; and the recommendations for the other movie
clusters that belong to sets C and D are not changed. Clearly, the value of α will
decrease with  unless Rib = Rmax. Since Rib is defined in the continuous domain
and it represents an aggregate measure, it is reasonable to consider that Rib values
are at least marginally smaller than Rmax. In summary, one can state that the value
of α will decrease with , whereas the values of β and η will remain unchanged.
Therefore, the denominator in Equation (5.3) will decrease with .
Furthermore, the numerator of Equation (5.3) will remain unchanged with  for
the movie clusters in sets C and D. Therefore, the demand for movie clusters in
sets C and D will increase with . It is also easy to see that the demand for movie
clusters in set B will decrease with . Therefore, there exists an  such that the
demand for the movie clusters in set B is decreased no less than their corresponding
inventory level. In this scenario, a portion of the demand for the movie clusters in
Set B is shifted to sets C and D. The unsatisfied demand shifted from Set B to Set
D is again not satisfied, however, at least some portion of the demand shifted to Set
C is satisfied. Therefore, total dissatisfaction is less in this policy. Hence, I have
shown that the presented conditions are necessary and sufficient for the optimality
of the all-inclusive policy in the single period problem.
Now let us consider the multiple period case for this part of the proof. The
proof for the necessity part again follows from contraposition. Suppose, in the all-
inclusive policy, neither of the conditions presented in the proposition is satisfied for
at least one time period, say this period is s. The proof so far implies that another
recommendation policy, say new-policy, is optimal in period s. Hence, if utilized,
the new-policy reduces the total dissatisfaction in period s by a positive amount, say
∆z. Therefore, the all-inclusive policy saves some inventory in the amount of ∆z in
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period s compared to this new policy. However, this same amount, i.e., ∆z, is the
additional number of customers not satisfied in period s compared to the new-policy.
Out of the extra shipments made with the new-policy, there will be returns next
period by the amount of Qss∆z. Therefore, because of the returns, the available
inventory in the all-inclusive policy is more than its counterpart in the new policy
by only (1 − Qss)∆z in period s + 1. Thus, if s = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, depending on
the demand realization in period s+ 1, the all-inclusive policy is inferior to the new
policy in the range of ∆z to Qss∆z. If s = T , then the all-inclusive policy is inferior
to the new policy by ∆z. Hence the new-policy is better than the all-inclusive policy,
and therefore the all-inclusive policy is not optimal. This implies that the conditions
presented in the proposition are necessary for each and every period.
Proof of Proposition 15
The upper bound presented in the proposition is actually the minimum of three
different values. The first one is the total dissatisfaction when the recommendation
threshold θ is set to Rmax in which case nothing is recommended. This is based on
the fact that dissatisfaction is a nonnegative number, i.e., the expected amount of
demand that cannot be satisfied. Hence, no policy can decrease the dissatisfaction
level below zero. Moreover, if the recommendation threshold is reduced, then some
movie clusters enter into the set of recommendable movies to different user clusters.
The second expression states that by being able to recommend a specific movie, the
dissatisfaction can at most be decreased by the amount of corresponding unused
inventory in the case when θ is set to Rmax. Finally, for this specific movie, the
maximum increase in demand for the users for which the recommendation can be
made is calculated in the last term.
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Proof of Proposition 16
This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 15, and hence omitted.
Proof of Proposition 17
Part (a): I use an example to show the sub-optimality of xij = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ V for a
movie cluster j which has more inventory than its demand. In this example, |J | = 2,
|U | = 1, T = 1, n > K1, and R1,R2 > θ. Hence, I can omit the indices for both user
clusters and periods whenever it does not cause any confusion. Furthermore, the
demand for movie 1 (resp., movie 2) is less (resp., more) than its available inventory
before any recommendations are made. For an arbitrary instance of this problem,
assume that x1 = 1 (if (1, 1) ∈ V ) is the optimal policy. However, I show later
in Proposition 18 that the optimal x1 is given by x1 = min
[
(R1+R2)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , 1
]
.
Therefore, when (R1+R2)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) < 1 is satisfied, the optimal x1 is less than 1. This
completes the proof for part (a).
Part (b): Again, I construct a counter-example to show the sub-optimality of
xij = 0 ∀(i, j). In this example, |J | = 3, |U | = 1, T = 1, n > (K1 +K2), and R1, R2,
R3 > θ. I ignore the indices for user clusters and time periods in this proof whenever
it does not cause any confusion. Moreover, the movie cluster 1 has surplus inventory,
and movie clusters 2 and 3 have more demand than corresponding inventories before
any recommendations are made. I set x2 = x3 = 0, and find the x1 that makes the
demand for movie cluster 1 equal to its inventory: x1 = min
[
(R1+R2+R3)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , 1
]
.
Now, consider the case where (R1+R2+R3)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) < 1. Therefore, demand for movie
cluster 1 is equal to K1. By setting x1 =
(R1+R2+R3)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , x2 = 0, x3 = 0, demands
for movie clusters 2 and 3 are (n−K1)R2
R2+R3
and (n−K1)R3
R2+R3
, respectively. For optimality
of this policy, one of the following two conditions should hold (n−K1)R2
R2+R3
≥ K2 and
(n−K1)R3
R2+R3
≥ K3; or (n−K1)R2R2+R3 ≤ K2 and
(n−K1)R3
R2+R3
≤ K3.
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In the first case, demands for movie clusters 2 and 3 are more than their in-
ventories. Hence, they are decreased as much as possible by shifting the demand
to movie cluster 1 by shipping all K1 units. In the second case, there are no more
demand shortages for movie clusters 2 and 3. In both cases, the optimal is obtained
by setting x1 =
(R1+R2+R3)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , and x2 = x3 = 0. However, consider a third case
where (n−K1)R2
R2+R3
≤ K2 and (n−K1)R3R2+R3 ≥ K3. In this case, by recommending movie
cluster 2 to some user clusters, the demand shortage of movie cluster 3 is decreased.
The policy, if there is any, that will ship entire inventories of movie clusters 1 and
2 clearly performs better than the above policy. Hence, one needs to solve the fol-
lowing two equations simultaneously: [R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E]n
R1+R2+R3+(Rmax−R1)x1E+(Rmax−R2)x2E = K1 and
[R2+(Rmax−R2)x2E]n
R1+R2+R3+(Rmax−R1)x1E+(Rmax−R2)x2E = K2. The solution of this system results in:
x1 =
K1(R1+R3)−R1(K2−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) and x2 =
K2(R2+R3)−R2(K1−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) .
Now consider the case where K1(R1 + R3) + R1(K2 − n) > 0, and K2(R2 +
R3) + R2(K1 − n) > 0. The assumption at the beginning that n > (K1 + K2)
ensures the non-negativity of x1 and x2. Moreover consider the case where 0 <
K1(R1+R3)−R1(K2−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) < 1, and 0 <
K2(R2+R3)−R2(K1−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) < 1. In this case, the op-
timal solution is: x1 =
K1(R1+R3)−R1(K2−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) , x2 =
K2(R2+R3)−R2(K1−n)
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1−K2) , and x3 = 0.
Therefore, I find a contradicting example for the optimality of the statement in part
(b).
Proof of Proposition 18
Part (a): If expected demand for both of the movies are less than the respective
inventories before any recommendations are made, i.e., R1n
R1+R2
−K1 ≤ 0 and R2nR1+R2−
K2 ≤ 0, then one of the optimal policies is to recommend nothing, i.e., x1 = x2 = 0,
because all of the demand is already satisfied without any recommendations.
Part (b): When expected demand for both of the movie clusters are more than
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their inventories before any recommendations are made, i.e., R1n
R1+R2
−K1 > 0 and R2nR1+R2−
K2 > 0, then it is again optimal to have x1 = x2 = 0, because the entire inventory is
already utilized and no other policy can ship more DVDs.
Part (c): In this case, the optimal policy should maximize the demand for movie
cluster 1 and minimize it for movie cluster 2. No policy can increase the demand
for movie cluster 1 more than its inventory given that n ≤ K1. Hence, an optimal
level is found by recommending movie cluster 1 to everybody and movie cluster 2 to
nobody, i.e., x1 = 1 and x2 = 0.
Part (d): In this case, one should aim to utilize the surplus inventory of movie
cluster 1 and equivalently reduce that of movie cluster 2. Demand for movie cluster
2, i.e., A2n, strictly increases in x2, and therefore x2 = 0. Substituting x2 = 0
in the constraint sets (4.14) and (4.15) from the original formulation, one gets
A1 =
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E+R2 and A2 =
R2
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E+R2 . Now, substituting the
above into the constraint set (4.11) gives Z1 ≥ R1+(Rmax−R1)x1ER1+(Rmax−R1)x1E+R2n−K1 and Z2 ≥
R2
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E+R2n−K2.
At the optimal level, it might not be best to set x1 = 1, because the demand
for movie cluster 1 may become more than its available inventory K1. This may
still be one of the optimal policies, however not in the case where Z2 becomes 0.
On the other hand, if I try to utilize movie cluster 1 as much as possible without
making (A1n1 −K1) ≥ 0, I have one of the optimal policies. Therefore, the value of
x1 that satisfies the demand balance equation
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E
R1+(Rmax−R1)x1E+R2n = K1 is given by
x1 =
(R1+R2)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) .
The given conditions in part (d), i.e., R1n1/(R1 + R2) − K1 ≤ 0, and n1 > K1
guarantee that x1 is nonnegative. The above expression also gives the interval in
which x1 = 1. For that to happen,
(R1+R2)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) ≥ 1 must hold. It holds when
E ≤ (R1+R2)K1−R1n
(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) . Therefore, if E ≤
(R1+R2)K1−R1n
(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , then x1 = 1, x2 = 0; else
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if E > (R1+R2)K1−R1n
(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , then x1 =
(R1+R2)K1−R1n
E(Rmax−R1)(n−K1) , x2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 19
This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 18, and hence omitted.
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